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Introduction
“Raw facts are, as such, a meaningless jumble.”
(Joseph Schumpeter, Business Cycles, Vol. I)
Ever since John Maynard Keynes labeled econometrics as “statistical alchemy” rather
than a science (Keynes (1940)), the theory versus empirics debate in economics has been
ongoing. More recently, this debate has been taken up again in the ﬁeld of development
economics, lanced by the article “Is there too little theory in development economics?”
by Mookherjee (2005). The debate started in view of the multitude of empirical papers
whose relation to economic theory has remained at best unclear. During the last few
years, the role of empirics in economics has been growing, partially due to the increased
possibilities of storing and handling huge data sets. This is reﬂected for example by the
increase in (partially) empirical papers published in top journals, by the type of work that
Ph.D. students from top graduate schools do or by the number of Nobel Prizes that have
been awarded to empirical researchers in the last decade (Eichengreen (2009)).
However, as unsatisfactory an empirical study without theoretical background may be
considered by many economists, theory that does not explain or that even contradicts
empirical facts is essentially questionable. Econometrics plays an important role in test-
ing hypotheses derived from economic theory, but even more in helping theoretical re-
searchers to ﬁnd out which questions to ask (Banerjee (2005)). Empirical ﬁndings have
often challenged existing theory and they have been a starting point for theoretical anal-
yses. Even the critics of econometrics will not deny that the history of science is full of
examples where empirical ﬁndings have preceded and encouraged important theoretical
breakthroughs.
One important motivation for this thesis has been that economic research could greatly
beneﬁt from a close cooperation between theorists and econometricians. To say it in
Koopmans’ words: “Fuller utilization of the concepts and hypotheses of economic theory
[...] as part of the process of observation and measurement promises to be a shorter
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road, perhaps even the only possible road [...]”. A simple truth that is still sometimes
forgotten is that “one needs a clear mathematical formulation of the relevant economic
theory before any statistical analysis with economic data can be done” (Maddala (2001)
[The order of words was changed by the author]).
This dissertation consists of four essays from the areas of insurance and international
economics. Their common aim is to create a close link between theory and empirical
analysis. Empirical facts that have called for an extension of existing theory have always
been the starting point for my analyses.
The second link between the essays in this dissertation is the use of micro data. The past
two decades have seen an explosion in the availability of micro data for both ﬁrms and
households, mainly due to the increased capacity of electronical storage and a quantum
leap in handling and analyzing large data volumes. This has come along with a shift in
empirical analysis from aggregate models describing markets as a whole to the individual
decision maker. This seems a more natural unit of analysis, as economic decisions are
taken at the individual level and drawing conclusions from aggregate data has to rely on
more (and often unrealistic) assumptions.1
In fact, Chapter 2 of my dissertation, the essay “Who is afraid of political risk?” was
inspired by two empirical papers by Desai, Foley and Hines (Desai et al. (2004) and Desai
et al. (2008)) who investigate how multinational ﬁrms choose the capital structure of
their foreign aﬃliates in response to political risk. They claim that in countries where
political risk is high, multinational enterprises hold a smaller equity share in their foreign
aﬃliates while at the same time using relatively more debt for ﬁnancing their aﬃliates.
When we thought of how to theoretically model this relationship, this prediction seemed
less compelling, especially with regard to the predicted impact of political risk on aﬃliate
leverage. If political risk increases the risk of expropriation, then this leads to an increased
risk of bankruptcy, and ﬁrms should use less debt ﬁnancing in countries where political
risk is high. We then started to think about whether there might be diﬀerent types of
political risk such as expropriation, corruption and conﬁscatory taxation, and how we
could analyze these diﬀerent types both empirically and theoretically. In our theoretical
analysis we ﬁnd that, as political risk increases, the ownership share tends to decrease,
because political risk decreases expected proﬁts, whereas leverage can both increase or
decrease, depending on the type of political risk. Only when political risk takes the form
of discriminatory or conﬁscatory taxation, it will be optimal to ﬁnance aﬃliates with more
debt.
1 Train et al. (1989), chapter 1 and Cameron and Trivedi (2005), chapter 1.1 Introduction 3
For our empirical analysis, we use the Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) of the
Deutsche Bundesbank, and we ﬁnd supportive evidence for these eﬀects. We follow two
empirical strategies in order to show that the eﬀects of political risk may diﬀer for diﬀerent
scenarios of political risk. First, we employ various empirical measures, reﬂecting diﬀerent
types of political risk, and identify them with diﬀerent scenarios. Following this strategy,
we can conﬁrm that the ownership share decreases with political risk no matter what
type of measure we introduce, while leverage can either increase or decrease in response
to diﬀerent types of risk. The second strategy is to rank the scenarios according to
their severity and to introduce a quadratic function of political risk which allows the
marginal eﬀects of political risk to vary with the severity of political risk. Here, we ﬁnd
indeed that leverage ﬁrst increases and then decreases in political risk. For ownership,
it is comparatively more likely than for leverage that the ownership share decreases with
political risk.
Our essay is, to my best knowledge, the ﬁrst attempt to develop and test theoretical
assumptions of the impact of political risk on the ﬁnancing of multinational structure
choice. Few thoughts have been spent on what exactly is captured by political risk and
what diﬀerent types of indices reﬂect. Further, while the leverage choice of multinational
enterprises has been analyzed frequently, mainly in the area of business taxation, the
ownership share that a parent company will hold in an foreign aﬃliate has so far received
little attention from econometricians.2
In chapter 3 of my dissertation, “Financial constraints and the margins of FDI”, we analyze
both theoretically and empirically how ﬁnancial constraints aﬀect a ﬁrm’s foreign entry
decision. A brief history of the research preceding our analysis can illustrate how ﬁndings
from micro data have deepened the theoretical understanding of economic relationships
and have led to the development of new theories.
In international economics, trade data have traditionally been analyzed on an aggregate
level.3 In particular, the fact that only few ﬁrms in each sector engage in exporting
or invest in foreign countries and that these ﬁrms diﬀer in many dimensions from their
2 Research on the impact of tax incentives on aﬃliate leverage includes Desai et al. (2004), Huizinga
et al. (2008), Buettner et al. (2009), and Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005). The reaction of aﬃliate
leverage to diﬀerences in political risk has been analyzed in Desai et al. (2004), Aggarwal and Kyaw
(2004) and Novaes and Werlang (2005). Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) and Javorcik and Wei (2009) are
empirical papers on the ownership choice.
3 An insightful description on how empirical ﬁndings on the micro level have altered our understanding
of trade and on how theory has changed in response to empirical ﬁndings is provided by Redding
(2008).1 Introduction 4
domestic counterparts has lead to the development of models of heterogeneous ﬁrms.4
Productivity diﬀerences have served as an explanation for the fact that ﬁrms which are
active in foreign markets, whether as exporters or as producers, are larger than purely
national ﬁrms Helpman et al. (2004).) If there are ﬁxed costs of market entry, only the
most productive ﬁrms should be able to overcome these ﬁxed costs.
However, these models completely ignore the ﬁnancial side of investment: The basic
assumption is that ﬁnancial markets are perfect, and that ﬁrms do not face ﬁnancial
constraints. Using balance sheet data to analyze diﬀerences in ﬁnancial indicators, empir-
ical papers have started to compare exporters to non-exporters with respect to ﬁnancial
variables, and they have found that exporters are less ﬁnancially constrained than their
purely national counterparts. Here, the seminal contribution is a purely theoretical paper
by Chaney (2005). Then, empirical research has started from a more aggregated level with
a paper by Manova (2010) who uses a panel of bilateral exports for countries and sectors
to show that those countries and sectors who are less ﬁnancially constrained export more.
Next, several empirical papers used micro-level data on the ﬁrm-level to show that there
is a negative relationship between ﬁnancial constraints and a ﬁrm’s propensity to engage
in exporting (Greenaway et al. (2007)).
All of the papers about how multinational activity is related to ﬁnancial constraints have
considered exporting ﬁrms. None has attempted to analyze what drives ﬁrms’ decisions
to found an aﬃliate in a foreign country. This is presumably not due to a lack of interest,
but due to a lack of data: Datasets that contained a random sample of ﬁrms, national
and multinational, as well as their foreign aﬃliates, simply did not exist. By merging the
Dafne, a commercial dataset, providing information on a large panel of German ﬁrms,
with the Microdatabase Direct Investment of the Deutsche Bundesbank (MiDi), which
provides information on the foreign aﬃliates of German enterprises, we were able to create
such a dataset. Our data are unique as they allow measuring ﬁnancial constraints and
productivities at the parent level both for domestic ﬁrms and for multinationals, as well
as ﬁnancial constraints at the aﬃliate level.
In our theoretical model, we analyze how productivity and ﬁnancial constraints aﬀect a
ﬁrm’s choice to become a multinational ﬁrm under conditions of limited internal funds
and the need to obtain external debt ﬁnance. Our model features limited contract enforce-
ability and liquidation costs as two sources of ineﬃciencies in ﬁnancial contracting that
are particularly relevant for foreign investments. The model provides a set of testable im-
plications concerning the impact of ﬁnancial constraints, productivity, and host-country
4 Bernard and Jensen (1995) on empirical ﬁndings on exporters, Mayer and Ottaviano (2008) on FDI,
and Helpman et al. (2004)1 Introduction 5
characteristics on ﬁrms’ internationalization choices. In particular, we predict that ﬁnan-
cial constraints are more likely to aﬀect the extensive than the intensive margin, unless
ﬁnancial constraints are severe. Furthermore, we predict that ﬁnancial constraints are
more strongly felt for large ﬁrms, as they are most likely to be interested in foreign ex-
pansion.
In our econometric analysis, we ﬁnd that productivity and ﬁnancial constraints have a
signiﬁcant impact on German ﬁrms’ internationalization decisions. Economically, produc-
tivity and ﬁnancial constraints are of similar importance, but ﬁnancial constraints matter
most to the subset of ﬁrms that consider investing abroad. As suggested by our theoret-
ical model, ﬁnancial constraints have indeed a negative impact on the extensive margin
of FDI, but less so on the intensive margin. However, we also ﬁnd that, in contrast to
the parent-level constraints, the aﬃliate’s ﬁnancial constraints matter for the intensive
margin. This observation points toward a hierarchy of ﬁnancing the intensive margin,
with aﬃliate ﬁnancing being preferred over parent ﬁnancing.
Chapter 4, the essay “On the use of information in repeated insurance markets”, was
inspired by a purely empirical paper by Finkelstein and Poterba (2006). They demonstrate
the presence of adverse selection in annuity purchases by showing that there exist “unused
observables”, namely information available to insurance companies that is correlated with
risk experience, but that is not used when setting insurance premia. In their data, the
address of the insured person is an example of information that is almost always collected
by insurance companies, but that is seldom used in pricing insurance, although there is
a correlation between geographic information and other individual attributes. Further
empirical evidence on unused observables is provided by Brown and Finkelstein (2007)
(gender and place of residence in the U.S. long-term care insurance industry) and Ivaldi
(1996) (smoking in the French automobile insurance industry). Finkelstein and Poterba
(2006) conclude their article by stating that “a complete understanding of the limited use
in pricing of available or collectable risk-related information on insurance buyers remains
an open issue”.
However, we are able to explain this phenomenon using a repeated model of an oligopolistic
insurance market where insurance companies take into account the impact of pricing
decisions on competitors’ actions.
In our model, there are two types of individuals who face either high or low risk of damage.
There is a ﬁnite number of insurance companies. They can distinguish between these
risks and compete for costumers by setting insurance premia in each period. Companies
interact strategically and preconceive the eﬀect of their pricing decisions on the prices set
by their competitors in subsequent periods. If companies fear a price war after adjusting
their prices, they may refrain from doing so. We show that even if insurance companies1 Introduction 6
can distinguish between risk types, equilibria exist in which ﬁrst, insurance companies
charge the same insurance premium to both risks and second, both risk types purchase
positive amounts of insurance. Thus, we derive an equilibrium with unused observables.
We then show that the same equilibrium outcome is possible if insurance companies cannot
distinguish between high and low risks, i.e. if there is asymmetric information. This
renders possible the following explanation for the existence of unused observables: initially,
there exists a collusive equilibrium in an insurance market with asymmetric information.
Then, after analyzing their data, insurance companies learn how to distinguish between
high and low risks. However, they maintain their pricing schedules in order to sustain
collusion. Further, we show the robustness of our model with regard to two extensions:
Market entry and explicit collusion.
With regard to this chapter of my dissertation, two further points seem worth to be
mentioned in connection with the combination of theory and empirics and with regard to
the use of micro data: First, although empirical work seems to suggest that the common
market structure in most insurance markets is oligopolistic, the vast majority of theoretical
models on the insurance market are one-shot models of either perfect competition or
monopolistic behaviour of insurance companies.5 Empirical evidence suggests that more
work should be devoted to imperfectly competitive models of insurance markets - or, in
the words of Chiappori et al. (2006), “there is a crying need for such models”.
Second, the use of information in the insurance market itself has been changed dramati-
cally by the revolution in information technologies which enables insurance companies to
collect, analyze and make use of large amounts of information. An example of evolving
information that has recently received a lot of attention is that of genetic testing (Hoy and
Witt 2007, Hoy and Polborn 2000, Rees and Apps 2008). A promising ﬁeld of research
for theorists and econometricians will be to analyze how insurance companies will use this
information, how they will cope with its constant change, and how this will be aﬀected
by the competitive structure of the insurance market.
Chapter 5, the essay “What if everybody had a choice?” addresses a topical public policy
question by applying appropriate econometric methods to a specially designed survey. It
contributes to the discussion on Medicare Part D by using a hypothetical choice experi-
5 Concentration indices for the top 5 insurance companies in the non-life business in Europe in 2002
ranged from 27 percent in Germany to 89 percent in Finland (Buzzaccki and Valletti 2005). Concentra-
tion measures of the life insurance sector in most developed nations in the 1990s have been constantly
high: even in the USA, the least concentrated market, concentration indices for the top 5 insurance
companies have been above 25 percent, while they have been (far) above 50 percent in Australia,
Canada, Japan and the Netherlands (Bikker and van Leuvensteijn 2008). Market concentration is also
reﬂected in insurance premiums (Dafny et al. (2009)).1 Introduction 7
ment that was conducted using a random sample of the relevant population in order to
analyze the demand for drug insurance with diﬀerent levels of coverage.
In 2006, Medicare Part D, a highly subsidized market for prescription drugs for the elderly,
was newly introduced in the US. Before the introduction of Medicare Part D, prescription
drug insurance had not been part of the 43 million elderly and disabled U.S. residents
on Medicare. Some beneﬁciaries had coverage from some other source, but about a third
of the relevant population remained without prescription drug insurance which imposed
a high ﬁnancial burden on the elderly and led to cost-related non-adherence (McFadden
et al. (2008) and Madden et al. (2008)). Medicare Part D has been the largest single
expansion in social insurance in the US since 1965, and it is often used as a natural
experiment to study the optimal design of social insurance programs. Lessons from this
experiment will be crucial both for deciding whether to introduce universal health care
in the USA and for the design of social insurance programs in other countries. Part D
also gives important insights into the practicality of Consumer Directed Health Care, an
approach achieving eﬃcient allocation of health care resources by confronting consumers
with the full marginal cost of the services they use. Medicare Part D can further give
insights in how consumers behave in real-world decision situations that are characterized
by complexity, ambiguity and important consequences.
Therefore, a lively discussion of the consequences of Medicare Part D has taken place in
numerous studies in economics and health. Most of these studies have restricted their
analysis to the relatively small group of “active deciders”: those consumers who had no
prescription drug coverage before the introduction of Medicare Part D. However, many
other groups of consumers were aﬀected by the introduction of Medicare Part D. 6 We show
that these groups diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the active deciders with respect to their health
and socio-economic characteristics, but also with respect to their insurance demand.
Our essay contributes to the discussion about Medicare Part D by using a hypothetical
choice experiment that was conducted using a random sample of the relevant population
to analyze consumer demand. Thus, the whole potential market is included in the analy-
sis instead of restricting the focus to a small group of consumers. In hypothetical choice
experiments, individuals are asked to choose between diﬀerent commodities whose at-
tributes vary in order to infer the utility associated with these attributes and consumers’
willingness-to-pay. Here, respondents are asked to choose between insurance contracts
that diﬀer in their level of coverage.
6 For example those who had some privately bought or employer sponsored coverage before or those on
Medicaid. Many consumers were not given an equally free choice regarding their insurance coverage
- as for example the consumers who were eligible for both, Medicaid and Medicare, and who were
automatically enrolled and randomly assigned to prescription drug plans.1 Introduction 8
So far, hypothetical choice experiments have mainly been used to create variation in
product attributes. We want to draw attention to the fact that they can be used to
elicit the demand of consumer groups whose choices cannot be observed in the actual
market. This becomes important when making predictions about the impacts of policy
changes. As we observe actual choices for one group of consumers, we can estimate a joint
model using both real and hypothetical choices, thereby mitigating the shortcomings of a
separate analysis of real and hypothetical choices.7
We ﬁnd that willingness-to-pay for drug insurance is low for consumers with either low
expected drug costs or low income. On the other hand, consumers demand extensive
coverage if they are currently in poor health, expect high future drug costs, but also if they
are risk averse. These ﬁndings conﬂict with consumers’ real choices where neither health
nor socio-economic indicators prove signiﬁcant. A possible reason for this discrepancy is
that the active deciders for whom we observe actual choices are too homogeneous. In
order to analyze the impact of socio-economic conditions on insurance demand we need
to consider suﬃciently heterogeneous consumer groups, which is possible through our
hypothetical choice experiment. Further, we show that willingness-to-pay of the passive
participants is signiﬁcantly higher than those of the active deciders. Therefore, welfare
estimates of the introduction of Medicare Part D taking into account the active deciders
only might be too low.
The introduction of Medicare Part D can also serve as an example on how empirical and
theoretical research can have important policy implications: First, the market itself was
designed taking into consideration lessons from economic theory: With regard to the de-
mand side, the government has designed a standard insurance contract for this market
that has features that are supposed to overcome adverse selection and excessive use of
medications. On the supply side, the government has designed an auction mechanism
that provides incentives for insurance companies to pass bulk discounts that they receive
from pharmaceutical companies through to consumers. In order to evaluate market out-
comes researchers have used consumer surveys and data from insurance companies and
the government. Well-designed hypothetical choices experiments can help to predict im-
pacts of policy changes and to generalize ﬁndings from one speciﬁc consumer group to
other groups of the population.
For each chapter of my dissertation, I have pointed to some open questions for future
research. In the following years, my scientiﬁc agenda will be to reassume these lines of
research on important applied questions in close connection with theory. A very promis-
7 Strength and shortcomings of real and hypothetical choice data are discussed in detail in chapter 5.3
of this thesis.1 Introduction 9
ing ﬁeld for this type of research is to apply dynamic and/ or imperfectly competitive
models from industrial organization to the ﬁelds of health and insurance. Few theoretical
researchers have been active in this ﬁeld so far, and the amount of data that becomes
available to researchers in this area is increasing steadily. One present project is to ex-
tend the essay “Real versus ﬁnancial constraints to multinational activity” by analyzing
the decision to enter a foreign market via exports and/ or FDI in the presence of ﬁnancial
constraints. In another present project, we combine the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)
model with a dynamic framework in which consumers can exert preventive eﬀort in several
periods in order to reduce their risk of damage, exhibit hyperbolic discounting and suﬀer
from a non-monetary loss in case of (health) damage. Thus, we are able to overcome some
features of standard models which contradict empirical ﬁndings.Chapter 2
Who is afraid of political risk?
Multinational ﬁrms and their choice of capital
structure
2.1 Introduction
Multinational enterprises (MNE) have to adapt their optimal investment strategy to local
conditions worldwide. Most notably, they have to respond to diﬀerent political environ-
ments that in diﬀerent locations may give rise to varying political risks. Political risk
encompasses not only ‘sovereign risk’, the risk that the sovereign will interfere with a
ﬁrm’s ability to pay its investors as promised, but also other forms of political, economic
and country-speciﬁc risks that aﬀect the proﬁtability of an investment in a foreign coun-
try and that would not be present if the country had more stable and developed business
environment and legal institutions (Hill (1998) and Buckley (2003)). This risk ranges
from outright expropriation to more subtle forms like conﬁscatory taxation, corruption,
or economic constraints such as exchange rate controls. MNE can try to insure against
political risk, but they can never do so fully.8
In this chapter we investigate, both theoretically and empirically, the way MNE choose
their capital structure in response to political risk. For this purpose, we distinguish
diﬀerent types of political risk. We ﬁnd that it is important to identify the type that
prevails in a particular country, because diﬀerent types of risk aﬀect the optimal ﬁnancing
decision in diﬀerent ways.
We focus on two choice variables that determine the capital structure - the level of leverage
and the ownership structure of the foreign aﬃliate. Choosing higher leverage reduces tax
 This chapter is based on joint work with Monika Schnitzer.
8 First, the insurance market for political risk is incomplete because most types of political risk are not
contractible and because the market suﬀers from severe asymmetric information (see for example Desai
et al. (2008)). Second, many investors are unaware of the existence of political risk insurance and even
those who are aware of its existence often do not have such insurance (www.political-risk.net).
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payments but increases the risk of bankruptcy, involving some bankruptcy cost. The
investor balances optimally these costs and beneﬁts of debt ﬁnancing. Furthermore, he
chooses how much of the aﬃliate to sell to outside investors, taking into account how the
ownership structure aﬀects the agency costs and the value of the aﬃliate.
We distinguish three prototypes of political risk throughout the chapter.9 In Scenario
I, political risk takes the form of outright expropriation or nationalization, where the
investor loses all assets and can no longer service his debts. In the past, this type of
political risk used to be very important (Kobrin (1980), Andersson (1991)). Though in
general it seems to be less prevalent nowadays there are very recent examples indicating
its latent relevance.10
Scenario II captures political risk as a form of creeping expropriation that lowers the
expected returns of the project. Examples could be lack of protection for intellectual
property rights or unreliable contract enforcement, but could also be economic constraints
like currency or exchange rate controls, or particular regulatory requirements directed at
foreign multinationals. Political violence that negatively aﬀects market conditions and
hence expected revenues would be another example.
In Scenario III, we capture political risk that directly aﬀects the proﬁts of the investment,
i.e., after servicing potential debt payments. This type of political risk arises if the host
country imposes discriminatory and conﬁscatory taxation, asks for bribes or blocks the
repatriation of funds from the host country to the home country.
Our analysis shows that these diﬀerent forms of political risk aﬀect equity holders and
debt holders in diﬀerent ways and can therefore result in the multinational choosing
diﬀerent capital structures. We ﬁnd that the optimal debt level decreases with increasing
political risk in both Scenarios I and II because (creeping) expropriation increases the risk
of bankruptcy, which calls for smaller leverage. But the optimal debt level increases with
political risk in Scenario III because the negative eﬀects of discriminatory or conﬁscatory
taxation can be contained with higher leverage. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that, in all three
scenarios, the optimal ownership share tends to decrease as the level of political risk
increases because political risk reduces the investor’s expected returns from the foreign
aﬃliate, but does not reduce the managerial cost of running the ﬁrm. Interestingly,
9 For a description of various forms of political risks see Buckley (2003), Hill (1998).
10 Recent examples where expropriations have taken place are Zimbabwe and Venezuela. In 2007, a law
was adopted in Zimbabwe that forces foreign investors to ﬁnd a majority Zimbabwean shareholder
within ﬁve to ten years (compare for example Deutsche Presse Agentur (2007) or Voice of America
(2008)). In 2008, both Cemex, a Mexican cement company, and Sidor, Venezuela’s biggest producer
of steel, were expropriated by the Venezuelan government without paying appropriate compensation
(compare for example The Associated Press (2008), Romero (2008), or Ackerman (2008)).2 Who is afraid of political risk? 12
though, due to the interaction with the optimal debt choice, the ownership share reduction
is less pronounced in case of conﬁscatory taxation, where the debt level increases, as
compared to the case of (creeping) expropriation, where the debt level is reduced as a
response to political risk.
In our empirical analysis, we use the Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) of the
Deutsche Bundesbank to investigate the impact of political risk on both the choice of
ownership shares and the leverage of foreign aﬃliates of German multinationals. The
dataset contains balance sheet information on the foreign aﬃliates. German parent com-
panies are required by law to report this information when the balance sheet total of
the aﬃliate and the ownership share are larger than a certain threshold. As a measure
for political risk, we use the time-varying, country-speciﬁc index that is provided by the
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and that is composed of 12 weighted variables
covering both political and social attributes.
We estimate the impact of political risk on our two choice variables, ownership share
and leverage. We start by looking at the linear eﬀects of political risk. Our ownership
regression indicates that MNEs hold a smaller share of the equity of the foreign aﬃliate
when political risk is high, conﬁrming our theoretical predictions. Regarding the leverage
choice, we ﬁnd that aﬃliates of MNE use a higher level of debt in countries with a higher
level of political risk. This would suggest the prevalence of the less invasive Scenario III
type of political risk.
We then attempt to capture the theoretical insight that the eﬀects of political risk may
diﬀer for diﬀerent scenarios of political risk. For this purpose we follow two diﬀerent
strategies. One strategy is to employ various empirical measures, reﬂecting diﬀerent types
of political risk, and to identify them with diﬀerent scenarios. Following this strategy of
using diﬀerent measures we can conﬁrm that the ownership share decreases in political
risk no matter what type of measure we introduce, while leverage can either increase or
decrease in response to diﬀerent types of risk. The second strategy is to rank the scenarios
according to their severity and to introduce a quadratic function of political risk which
allows the marginal eﬀects of political risk to vary with the severity of political risk.
Following this approach, we ﬁnd that indeed leverage ﬁrst increases and then decreases
in political risk. For ownership, it is comparatively more likely that the ownership share
decreases with political risk.
Our essay is related to two strands of literature, the literature on political risk and the
literature on the capital structure choice.
The ﬁrst strand studies the eﬀects of political risk on foreign direct investment. The
early theoretical papers were primarily concerned with the question of how foreign direct2 Who is afraid of political risk? 13
investment can be sustained if there is a risk of nationalization. The seminal paper in
this literature is Eaton and Gersovitz (1983), which shows under what circumstances
reputation can sustain foreign direct investment. Other papers study how political risk
aﬀects the multinational’s investment strategy. This may induce the investor to choose an
ineﬃcient technology (Eaton and Gersovitz (1984)), ineﬃcient investment paths (Thomas
and Worrall (1994), and Schnitzer (1999)) or excess capacity (Janeba (2000)). More recent
papers have investigated the sale of shares to locals as a possible way of mitigating the
risk of conﬁscatory taxation or creeping expropriation (Konrad and Lommerud (2001),
Mueller and Schnitzer (2006)). However, none of these authors have allowed for diﬀerent
forms of political risk that impact on the investor’s decisions in diﬀerent ways. Empirical
studies have focussed on the question of how country characteristics aﬀect the ownership
structure in foreign direct investment projects (Asiedu and Esfahani (2001)).
The second strand of literature has so far mainly focused on taxes as the driving force
behind the capital structure choice. It has been shown both empirically and theoretically
that tax incentives lead to national diﬀerences in the level of leverage of aﬃliates of MNE
(see for example Desai et al. (2004), Huizinga et al. (2008), Buettner et al. (2009) and
Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005)). However, there is much less evidence on how diﬀering
levels of political risk may aﬀect the capital structure of aﬃliates that are located in
diﬀerent countries. For US-data, Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) ﬁnd that political risk
increases aﬃliate leverage. Aggarwal and Kyaw (2004) also use US data, but on a more
aggregated level. In contrast to Desai, Foley and Hines, they ﬁnd that political risk
reduces aﬃliate leverage. Novaes and Werlang (2005) study foreign aﬃliates in Brazil
and ﬁnd that they are more highly leveraged than their Brazilian counterparts and that
the diﬀerence increases with Brazil’s political risk. This conﬂicting evidence suggests that
the relationship between political risk and leverage is not straightforward and hence needs
more examination.
The contribution of our essay is twofold. Firstly, it provides a theoretical framework that
explicitly models the choice of the capital structure in response to political risk. It is also
the ﬁrst attempt to distinguish in a theoretical framework diﬀerent kinds of political risk.
Secondly, our essay contributes to the empirical literature on political risk by investigating
the impact of political risk on both leverage and ownership choices, and by distinguishing
the impact of diﬀerent types and magnitudes of political risk. As our theoretical analysis
suggests, the coeﬃcient measuring the impact of political risk on leverage may indeed
change signs, depending on the type of political risk. We ﬁnd this possibility of diﬀerent
coeﬃcients conﬁrmed in our empirical analysis.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces our theoretical
model and analyzes the optimal ﬁnancial structure in the baseline model. Section 2.32 Who is afraid of political risk? 14
introduces diﬀerent types of political risk and investigates the optimal ﬁnancial structure
in the presence of political risk. In section 2.4, we derive empirical predictions. Section
2.5 introduces the data set. In Section 2.6 we present our empirical results. Section 2.7
concludes.
2.2 The base line model
Consider a multinational investor who intends to invest a ﬁxed amount I in a foreign
location. The project generates a stochastic return R, with R being uniformly distributed
on the interval [0;  R]. The investment can be ﬁnanced with either debt, D, or equity, E,
or a combination of the two, such that E + D = I.
The investor has to take two decisions, he has to choose (i) how much debt ﬁnance D to
use as opposed to equity ﬁnance and (ii) what share  of the aﬃliate to keep for himself,
i.e., what share (1   ) of the aﬃliate to sell to outside investors. In the corporate
ﬁnance literature, these decisions have always been studied separately. Thus, to jointly
investigate both decisions, we set up a model that draws on both strands of the corporate
ﬁnance literature, the one on the debt versus equity decision and the one on the optimal
ownership share.
Leverage choice
To model the debt versus equity choice, we consider the well established tradeoﬀ that
debt ﬁnancing saves on tax payments but increases the probability of bankruptcy, giving
rise to potential dead weight losses.11 To capture this tradeoﬀ, we assume that in case of
debt ﬁnancing D the investor’s liability is restricted to the investment project. So if the
investor takes up debt D, he owes (1+r)D, where r denotes the interest rate. He can do
so only when the project is suﬃciently successful, i.e., generates returns R  (1 + r)D.
The remaining proﬁts, after interest payments have been deducted, are subject to local
taxation, at interest rate t. If the returns are not suﬃcient to cover the repayment, the
project is liquidated and the investor has to give up all the returns to the bank. The




(1   t)[R   (1 + r)D]
1
 R
dR + D   I (2.1)
11 In the corporate ﬁnance literature, this tradeoﬀ is often called the tradeoﬀ between interest tax shields
and the costs of ﬁnancial distress. See, e.g., Brealey and Myers (2000), pp. 496 ﬀ. Seminal papers on
this issue are Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), and Scott (1976).2 Who is afraid of political risk? 15
Banks are assumed to operate in a competitive market and to be risk neutral. This means
that, for any level of debt that the investor wants the bank to ﬁnance, the interest rate
r is chosen such that the bank can expect to break even. We assume that in case of
bankruptcy transaction costs are incurred during the bankruptcy procedure such that the
bank is able to seize only some share s of the returns that are generated, with s < 1.
This assumption is supposed to capture the dead weight loss that is associated with debt
ﬁnancing due to the risk of bankruptcy. The interest rate is implicitly deﬁned by the












dR = D (2.2)
where the ﬁrst integral represents the expected interest payments and the second integral
represents the expected payoﬀ the bank realizes in case of bankruptcy.
Ownership choice
Consider now the ownership choice of the investor, i.e. what share (1   ) of the foreign
aﬃliate to sell to outside investors. If ﬁnancial markets are competitive and perfect, i.e.
with no transaction costs and risk neutrality, then the assets will be valued by outside
investors at their expected value. So the price the investor realizes for selling a share of
(1   ) of the aﬃliate, P((1   )V ), is equal to (1   )V .12 We will discuss below how
things change if markets are not perfect, in particular if the exposure of outside investors
to political risk diﬀers from that of insiders.
To model the ownership decision, we draw again on the corporate ﬁnance literature. In
this literature, two potential eﬀects are discussed why (and how) the ownership choice
may aﬀect the ﬁrm’s value. The convergence-of-interest hypothesis predicts that larger
ownership stakes are associated with higher ﬁrm values, because they allow for a bet-
ter alignment of the incentives of owner and manager or inside and outside investors.13
The entrenchment hypothesis, on the other hand, suggests that insiders who control a
substantial part of the shares may indulge in non-value maximizing behavior at the cost
of outside investors.14 Empirical studies on this issue suggest that the ﬁrm value as a
function of the insider’s ownership share  follows an inverted u-shaped pattern. This
evidence has been interpreted such that the convergence-of-interest eﬀect dominates for
low and the entrenchment eﬀect for large values of .15
12 See, for example, Ross (1977).
13 Berle and Means (1932), Jensen et al. (1976).
14 Demsetz (1983), Fama and Jensen (1983).
15 See, e.g., Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Short and Keasey (1999).2 Who is afraid of political risk? 16
Following the convergence-of-interest hypothesis we assume that the investor increases his
eﬀort as  increases, at cost K(), with K0() > 0 and K00() > 0, as larger ownership
stakes imply more eﬀort to be spent on the ﬁrm. Following the entrenchment hypothesis,
we assume that the investor enjoys private beneﬁts B() that increase in , i.e. B0() > 0,
but at a decreasing rate, i.e. B00() < 0. The combination of eﬀort and entrenchment
eﬀects are reﬂected in the revenues of the aﬃliate that can be appropriated by the investors
in the following way:  R is an inverted u-shaped function of , with  R0() > 0 for  = 0,
 R00() < 0 and  R0(^ ) = 0 for 0 < ^  < 1.
The investor’s payoﬀ function from holding equity share , selling equity share (1   )
and experiencing private beneﬁts and costs can thus be summarized as follows:
U(D;) = V (D;)+P[(1 )V (D;)]+B() K() = V (D;)+B() K()(2.3)
The investor chooses both the optimal debt level D and the optimal ownership share 
in order to maximize his payoﬀ function.
The optimal ﬁnancial structure
We now turn to solving the base line model without political risk. For this, consider again
the investor’s payoﬀ function, which, using the speciﬁcation of the ﬁrm value in equation
(2:1), is
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0 = 0 (2.7)
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1   s + t
2   s
= 0 (2.8)
The following result summarizes the solution to this maximization problem:2 Who is afraid of political risk? 17







1   s + st
1   s + t
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) (2.9)
where  is implicitly deﬁned by
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1   s + st








0 = 0 (2.10)






2(1   s) + st
(1   s + t)2 (2.11)
Proof: See Appendix
The following result summarizes the comparative statics with respect to the local taxation
rate t.




 R(1   s)2
(1   s + t)3 > 0 (2.12)




















d2 + B00   K00 < 0 if  R
0 > 0: (2.13)
Proof: See Appendix
Result 2 shows the expected pattern for the optimal debt level: as the tax rate increases,
the debt level increases. It is also straightforward to show that dD
ds > 0, i.e. as the
ineﬃciency of bankruptcy decreases, the optimal debt level increases. This captures the
well established tradeoﬀ of debt versus equity ﬁnancing. For the ownership share, we ﬁnd
that  decreases if  R0 > 0 in the relevant parameter range, which, as equation 2:10 shows,
is the case if B0 < K0, i.e. unless the entrenchment beneﬁts are particularly large.
2.3 Political risk and the optimal ﬁnancial structure
Consider now that the investment project is subject to political risk in the foreign location.
To study how this aﬀects the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial structure, we distinguish diﬀerent forms of
political risk.2 Who is afraid of political risk? 18
(1) Expropriation
The ﬁrst type of political risk we consider is expropriation or nationalization. This is the
classic form of political risk where a sovereign simply takes property without compensation
(Buckley (2003), Hill (1998)). We capture this form of political risk by assuming that
the investment is expropriated with some probability 1, i.e. the investors lose control
and cash ﬂow rights from the investment. This leads to the following modiﬁed ﬁrm value
function.
V1 = (1   1)
Z  R
(1+r)D
(1   t)[R   (1 + r)D]
1
 R
dR + D   I (2.14)
Credits are serviced only if the investment is not expropriated. So the zero proﬁt condition
















Of course, if the investment is expropriated, the investor also loses his beneﬁts from
potential entrenchment, B(). His managerial eﬀort costs of running the ﬁrm are incurred
before the potential expropriation takes place and hence are not aﬀected. Thus, the








This payoﬀ function implicitly assumes that outside investors, no matter where they
are located, are aﬀected by the danger of expropriation in exactly the same way as the
multinational investor. Of course, there may be circumstances where they are better
protected against expropriation, e.g. because they are local investors and the government
compensates them for their losses. In this case their perceived value of the aﬃliate is
not as negatively aﬀected as the multinational investor’s perceived value. We will discuss
below how this aﬀects our results.
(2) Creeping Expropriation
Another form of political risk we consider is creeping expropriation or political violence
that negatively aﬀects the expected returns of the investment project. Other examples
would be currency or exchange rate restrictions, or a failure to enforce or respect the
agreed property and contract rights (Buckley (2003), Hill (1998)). We capture this by2 Who is afraid of political risk? 19
assuming that the investor can capture only a share (1 2) of the returns R. This leads





(1   t)[(1   2)R   (1 + r)D]
1
 R
dR + D   I (2.17)
The expected returns of the investment project also aﬀect the zero proﬁt condition for














dR = D (2.18)
As above, also creeping expropriation jeopardizes the investor’s chances of enjoying ben-
eﬁts from entrenchment but leaves managerial eﬀort cost unaﬀected. Thus, the investor’s









We now investigate how political risk aﬀects the optimal ﬁnancial structure. The following
result describes how the investor chooses the optimal ownership share and the optimal debt
level in the presence of (creeping) expropriation. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that both types
of political risk, expropriation and creeping expropriation, aﬀect the ﬁnancial structure
and the investor’s payoﬀ in the same way. Thus, we can state the following results for Ui,
where the subscript i = f1;2g captures both cases, the case of expropriation (1) and the
case of creeping expropriation (2).
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and D
i is given by
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2(1   s) + st
(1   s + t)2 (2.22)
Proof: See Appendix
We now determine the comparative statics with respect to the political risk parameter i,
with i = f1;2g.2 Who is afraid of political risk? 20
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For a given debt level, the risk of expropriation makes it less likely that interest payments
are made. This has to be compensated by a higher interest rate, which in turn increases
the risk of bankruptcy. As a consequence, the investor chooses a smaller debt level. In
case of creeping expropriation, overall revenues are smaller, increasing the likelihood of
bankruptcy for any given level of debt. This leads to the same reduction of the optimal
debt level. Thus, in both cases, the problem is that (creeping) expropriation increases the
risk of default. To avoid costly dead weight losses the investor reduces his debt exposure.
With the same debt level, the overall payoﬀ of the investor is the same, for any given
ownership share. (Creeping) expropriation reduces the monetary and non-monetary payoﬀ
from the investment but does not change the managerial eﬀort cost of running the ﬁrm.
Thus, the investor optimally lowers his ownership share. This eﬀect would be even larger
if outside investors were less exposed to political risk and hence would value the foreign
aﬃliate more highly.16
Desai et al. (2008), who ﬁnd empirically that debt is higher in high political risk countries,
have argued that credits taken by local creditors may not react as much to political risk
because local creditors may be more restricted in their choice of investment opportunities.
The empirical evidence does, however, suggest that local interest rates react positively to
political risk (Desai et al. (2004), Aggarwal and Kyaw (2004)).
(3) Conﬁscatory taxation
Our third scenario captures the type of political risk that directly aﬀects the multina-
tional’s proﬁts. Examples would be the blocking of the repatriation of funds from the
16 This eﬀect will also be larger if the allocation of ownership rights can be used as a means of inﬂuencing
the likelihood of nationalization. As Konrad and Lommerud (2001) and Schnitzer (2002) have shown,
it could be in the interest of the investor to share ownership with host country ﬁrms, even without
compensation, if this makes the host country less prone to engage in expropriation or conﬁscatory
taxation.2 Who is afraid of political risk? 21
host country to the home country, or corruption and discriminatory and conﬁscatory tax-
ation that treats foreign ﬁrms diﬀerently from domestic ﬁrms (Buckley (2003)). We model
this as a form of proﬁt tax, i.e., interest payments can be deducted and are not subject
to taxation or bribes. This scenario is particularly relevant if credits are obtained locally
and hence the local government has no interest in jeopardizing the repayment of local
credits.




(1   t   3)[R   (1 + r)D]
1
 R
dR + D   I (2.25)
This type of political risk has no impact on the zero proﬁt condition for banks, provided
that the government indeed exempts the interest payments from discriminatory taxation.












dR = D : (2.26)
As this type of political risk applies to proﬁts rather then revenues, the private beneﬁts of
the investor, B(), are not likely to be aﬀected, nor is the managerial eﬀort cost, K().








+D   I + B()   K()
The following result describes how the investor chooses the optimal ownership share and
the optimal debt level as a function of political risk.
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2(1   s) + s(t + 3)
(1   s + (t + 3))2 (2.30)2 Who is afraid of political risk? 22
Proof: See Appendix
We can now determine the comparative statics with respect to political risk 3.
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(1   s + t + 3)3 > 0 (2.31)
The optimal ownership share 




















d2 + B00   K00
< 0 if  R
0 > 0 (2.32)
Proof: See Appendix
Note that although the value functions in case of expropriation (2:14) and conﬁscatory
taxation (2:25) look very similar, the break even conditions for the banks (2:15 and
2:26) look diﬀerent. In contrast to the case of (creeping) expropriation, conﬁscatory
taxation does not aﬀect the investor’s ability to repay his debt and hence does not increase
the likelihood of bankruptcy. Thus, it avoids the extra cost of capital that comes with
potential bankruptcy. Instead, conﬁscatory taxation induces the investor to choose a
higher debt level to avoid this drain on proﬁts. As pointed out above, this strategy is
particularly worthwhile if debt holders are not negatively aﬀected and hence do not have
to increase interest rates.17
The optimal ownership share is likely to decrease as conﬁscatory taxation increases, pro-
vided  R0 > 0, which, according to the ﬁrst order condition that implicitly deﬁnes 
3, is
the case if B0(
3) < K0(
3).
We can summarize the ﬁndings from our theoretical analysis as follows:
For the optimal debt level, we ﬁnd that the eﬀects depend on the type of political risk. In
scenario (1) and (2) the eﬀects were negative. Only in scenario (3) did we ﬁnd a positive
eﬀect of political risk on the optimal debt level. The eﬀect of political risk on ownership
share tends to be negative in all three scenarios. Only in scenario (3) could it be positive,
and only if the beneﬁts from the entrenchment eﬀect are particularly large.
17 Note that if our interpretation is correct then we should observe more debt default in case of full or
creeping expropriation, but not in case of conﬁscatory taxation. Although we have no direct evidence
on the number of defaults, there is suggestive evidence from interest rates that is consistent with our
interpretation. Desai et al. (2004) report in Table V that interest rates react positively to political risk,
but negatively to country tax rates. To the extent that conﬁscatory taxation has a similar eﬀect as
taxation in general, this supports our implication that the likelihood of default diﬀers in the diﬀerent
scenarios.2 Who is afraid of political risk? 23
Result 7 The optimal ownership share reacts more negatively to (creeping) expropriation










This is due to the interaction with the optimal debt choice. The ownership share reduction
is smaller in case of conﬁscatory taxation, where the debt level increases, than in case of
(creeping) expropriation, where the debt level is reduced as a response to political risk.
2.4 Empirical predictions
We now turn to the predictions that can be derived from our theoretical analysis. The
following predictions capture the results 4 and 6.
Hypothesis 1 The eﬀect of political risk on the aﬃliate’s debt level is negative in the
case of (creeping) expropriation and positive in the case of conﬁscatory taxation.
Hypothesis 2 The eﬀect of political risk on the ownership share is negative in the case
of (creeping) expropriation and tends to be negative in the case of conﬁscatory taxation.
The problem of directly testing these hypotheses is that it may be diﬃcult to identify
empirically which type of political risk is present. An alternative approach would be to
rank the diﬀerent political risk scenarios according to their severity. It seems natural to
argue that the ﬁrst two scenarios of (creeping) expropriation capture a more severe type
of political risk because they describe situations where political risk increases the risk of
bankruptcy, whereas the third scenario describes a situation where political risk is less
severe, because it aﬀects the proﬁtability of the investment only, without jeopardizing
the survival of the aﬃliate and hence without imposing additional dead weight losses.
Following this approach, we can state the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 The more severe the political risk, the more likely the debt level will be
negatively aﬀected.
Similarly, we can formulate our hypothesis about the ownership share.
Hypothesis 4 The more severe the political risk, the more likely the ownership share will
be negatively aﬀected.
Result 6 also allows us to compare the relative reactions of leverage and ownership share
to political risk. Whereas the reaction of debt is always positive in case of conﬁscatory2 Who is afraid of political risk? 24
taxation, this is possible for the ownership share but not necessary. From this, we derive
the following prediction.
Hypothesis 5 The ownership share is more likely to react negatively to political risk than
the debt level.
Finally, we include one prediction about the impact of taxation on the level of debt and
the ownership share, based on Result 2.
Hypothesis 6 The eﬀect of taxation is positive on the optimal debt level and it tends to
be negative on the ownership share.
2.5 Data
The empirical analysis presented in section 2.6 is based on the Microdatabase Direct
Investment (MiDi) of the Deutsche Bundesbank. The database contains a panel dataset
of yearly ﬁrm-level information on German parent companies and their foreign aﬃliates
for the period 1996-2006. The parents are required by law to report information on
their investments abroad and on the ﬁnancial characteristics of their foreign aﬃliates if
the balance sheet total of the aﬃliate and the ownership share are larger than a certain
threshold that varies over time (Lipponer (2006)).
The MiDi contains 469,332 observations with yearly observations over 11 years. As we
are interested in outward FDI, we exclude all observations on inward FDI. This leaves
303,870 observations that represent aﬃliate-year cells. Aﬃliates can be present more than
once a year if several parent companies report on them. Dropping all aﬃliates that are
present more than once in one year leaves 292,494 observations. Deleting all “indirect”
FDI leaves 208,441 observations. Deleting all ﬁrms that report negative equity removes
another 21,489 observations from our dataset.18 Thus, the ﬁnal dataset comprises 186,952
observations.
In each year, our sample consists of about 5,000 to 8,000 German parents and of about
15,000 to 24,500 foreign aﬃliates (compare Table 2.1). The aﬃliates are located in more
than 140 countries.
We augment the MiDi dataset by country-level information. As a measure of political
risk, we use the time-varying International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) index provided by
18 These are cases of ownership chains where dependent companies of German parents invest in other
companies.2 Who is afraid of political risk? 25
Table 2.1: Overview of the number of parent companies and aﬃliates per year
the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group. The index is composed of 12 weighted variables
covering both political and social attributes.19 We recode the index in such a way that
an increasing value represents higher political risk.
There are numerous indices that try to capture the variation of political risk across coun-
tries. A good overview is provided in Howell (2008). For our analysis, the ICRG index
is the best choice for three reasons: First, it takes into account diverse dimensions of
political risk like corruption, bureaucratic quality, but also ethnic and religious tensions
and socioeconomic conditions. Second, while many indices provide only information on
a selective sample of countries, the ICRG index covers more than 140 countries. Third,
the ICRG index varies according to time and provides information for all years that are
covered in the MiDi dataset.
Information on GDP, GDP per capita and the rate of inﬂation is taken from the World
Economic Outlook Database of the IMF (www.imf.org). The Private Credit variable
is based on Beck et al. (2000). It measures the ratio of private credit lent by de-
posit money banks to GDP. Statutory tax rates are taken from the Institute for Fiscal
19 Government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment proﬁle, internal conﬂict, external conﬂict,
corruption, military in politics, religion in politics, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic account-
ability and bureaucracy quality.2 Who is afraid of political risk? 26
Studies (www.ifs.org.uk), as well as from various issues of the Corporate Tax Guides of
Ernst&Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers.
Table 2.2 provides descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analysis. The deﬁni-
tions of the variables are standard, and they are also presented in Table 2.2. Comparing
the descriptive statistics to those of American MNE in Desai et al. (2004), we ﬁnd that
regarding most variables used in our analysis, on average American and German MNEs
tend to be quite similar. Both are active in about all countries worldwide. Consequently,
the means of our country variables diﬀer only insofar as the time period considered by
Desai et al. (2004) is 1982 to 1994, while we analyze the year 1996-2006. In the period
we analyze, both average inﬂation and political risk are lower. Aﬃliate-level variables are
also quite similar for German and US-American aﬃliates, the sole exception being proﬁts
over total assets: while Desai et al. (2004) report a share of proﬁt to assets of about 15
percent, this ratio is at only 4 percent for the German aﬃliates.
2.6 Econometric Analysis
The aim of our analysis is to investigate how the capital structure choice of multinational
enterprises reacts to political risk. The two choice variables we consider are the ownership
share and the level of leverage. We deﬁne the level of leverage as debt over total assets
and the ownership share as the share of equity of the foreign aﬃliate held by the German
parent.
Leverage has a mean of 0.61 and a standard deviation of 0.31 at the ﬁrm-level. The
standard deviation of average leverage per country is 0.12. The mean of the ownership
share is 0.87, while its standard deviation is 0.24, and the average ownership share per
country has a standard deviation of 0.14. The political risk indicator has an average value
of 0.19 and a standard deviation of 0.08.
Examples of countries with extremely high political risk in our sample (an average political
risk score above 0.45) are Algeria (with a political risk of 0.50), Colombia (with an average
political risk of 0.47), Nigeria (with an average political risk of 0.54), Pakistan (political
risk at 0.49), Yugoslavia (with an average political risk of 0.47) and Zimbabwe with a
political risk of 0.51. The country with the lowest average political risk in our sample
period is Luxembourg with an average political risk score of 0.07.
Figure 2.1 presents how the mean of the ownership share by country varies with political
risk. The graph suggests a negative relationship between the ownership share and political
risk even if we do not control for any other country or aﬃliate speciﬁc factors. When2 Who is afraid of political risk? 27
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics
plotting leverage aggregated by country versus political risk (Figure 2.2), we cannot deduct
any clear relationship between the two variables from the graph. In a regression analysis
at the ﬁrm-level we are going to analyze the relationship more thoroughly.
All regressions presented in this chapter are estimated by OLS and include parent-ﬁxed-
eﬀects in order to control for parent-speciﬁc individual heterogeneity, and we include year
and aﬃliate industry dummies. The reason for this speciﬁcation is that we can explicitly
control for aﬃliate and country speciﬁc heterogeneity, but the only way our data allows
us to control for parent-speciﬁc heterogeneity is to include parent ﬁxed eﬀects.20 Thus, we
20 See Desai et al. (2004), Desai et al. (2008) and Buettner et al. (2009) who use the same ﬁxed eﬀects
and dummies in order to control for ﬁrm-speciﬁc and industry-speciﬁc considerations.2 Who is afraid of political risk? 28
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aim to make use of the observed variation between aﬃliates of the same parent which are
located in diﬀerent countries as well as of the variation over time. Indeed we ﬁnd that the
time variation alone is not suﬃcient for identiﬁcation, so that we need the cross-section
variation between aﬃliates of the same parent company located in diﬀerent countries.21
In all regressions, we use heteroscedasticity robust standard errors, and we control for
clustering of the standard errors by parent company.
In Table 2.3, we present the eﬀect of political risk on both our independent variables as
a ﬁrst test of our hypotheses. We report each regression with and without including our
statutory tax variable, because we lose many observations when including it. The choice
21 When we use pure time variation in the ICRG index, political risk is no longer signiﬁcant in explaining
the leverage choice and it positively aﬀects the ownership choice. The latter eﬀect is not inconsistent
with our model (Result 6) but it is not what we would expect to be the dominant eﬀect (Hypothesis
2) and what others have found in cross-section studies (see footnote 15).2 Who is afraid of political risk? 29
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of independent variables is based on Desai et al. (2004) where the authors investigate the
capital structure choice of US-American MNEs.
On average, an increase in political risk leads to an increase in aﬃliate leverage and to a
decrease in the ownership share the parent holds in the foreign aﬃliate. This seems to be
consistent with our hypothesis 5 that leverage is more likely to react positively, if at all,
to political risk, than to the ownership share. In the leverage regression, the coeﬃcient of
political risk of 0.1491 can be interpreted as follows: when political risk increases by one
standard deviation of 0.0797, leverage increases by 0.0119 (=0.1491*0.0797), which repre-
sents 2.3 percent of its mean value. This eﬀect is quite close to the 2.9 percent estimated
by Desai, Foley, Hines (2004) for aﬃliates of US-American MNEs. The estimated eﬀect
of statutory taxes on the leverage share is 0.0146 (=0.2074*0.0705) which represents 2.8
percent of its mean value. Thus, the relative impact of a change of one standard deviation2 Who is afraid of political risk? 30
Table 2.3: The impact of political risk on aﬃliate leverage and ownership share2 Who is afraid of political risk? 31
in political risk on leverage versus a one standard deviation change in statutory taxes is
about 81 percent. The estimated eﬀect of political risk on the ownership share is smaller.
A one standard deviation increase of political risk decreases the ownership share by 1.1
percent of its mean value.22
We include some other exogenous variables that are not directly related to our model
in order to make our results comparable to other results presented in the literature. In
particular, we use the same set of controls as Desai et al. (2004) and Desai et al. (2008),
who include these variables to control for observable dimensions of country and ﬁrm het-
erogeneity, and we ﬁnd the same signs of the coeﬃcients in our regressions as they do.
Larger aﬃliates, for example, use more debt and hold smaller ownership shares. These
coeﬃcients may be a reﬂection of ﬁnancial constraints of foreign investors, something not
explicitly modeled in our framework, which require them to turn to more outside ﬁnance
in case of larger investment projects. Along the same lines, we ﬁnd that aﬃliates with
higher proﬁts/ assets use less debt, as they seem to have a greater cash ﬂow generating
capacity. The ﬁxed assets reported in the Bundesbank data include tangibles as well as
intangible assets. Thus, the negative coeﬃcient of the ﬁxed asset variable could reﬂect the
fact that ﬁrms with a larger share of intangible assets ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to use debt,
as intangible assets are usually not accepted as collateral. We also ﬁnd that ﬁrms have
smaller ownership shares in more proﬁtable ﬁrms, which seems counter-intuitive. The
eﬀect, however, is economically not very signiﬁcant: For an increase in proﬁts of one stan-
dard deviation, ﬁrms decrease their ownership share only by 0.005 standard deviations.
This ﬁnding may also be due to the fact that we only observe accounting proﬁts which
in turn may reﬂect a ﬁrm’s tax saving strategy. Including other macro variables, like
inﬂation, GDP and GDP per capita, is important as a robustness test of our political risk
variable and indeed their inclusion does not turn the political risk variable insigniﬁcant.
Firms in countries with higher GDP per capita use more debt and hold larger ownership
shares. If we interpret GDP per capita as a measure of the proﬁtability of the foreign
market these coeﬃcients seem intuitive.
The fact that a ﬁrm’s ownership and leverage choices might be related to each other can
be captured by a correlation of the error terms of the two regressions. The two equations
therefore form a system of seemingly unrelated regressions (Zellner (1962)). In general, it
is more eﬃcient to estimate this system of equations using feasible GLS and to allow for
correlation of the error terms in the asymptotic variance matrix than to use OLS. In our
22 Javorcik and Wei (2009) show that corruption on the country level, measured by three diﬀerent indices,
reduces the probability of whole ownership of a company. Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) show that the
risk of expropriation decreases the probability of whole ownership. Both papers use cross-sectional
data.2 Who is afraid of political risk? 32
case, however, there is no eﬃciency gain from estimating the equations jointly, because the
same regressors are included in both regressions (Cameron and Trivedi (2005)). We test
for correlation of the estimated residuals and we ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant correlation
in the residuals of the two regressions. This implies that a positive shock on one of the
two variables is also associated with an increase in the other variable.
Desai et al. (2004) and Desai et al. (2008) assume a linear eﬀect of political risk on the
capital structure choice. By contrast, according to our model the inﬂuence of political risk
diﬀers by type or strength of political risk, as noted in our hypotheses 1 to 4. To study
this eﬀect in more detail, we follow two empirical strategies. We ﬁrst continue to work
with the aggregated ICRG index for political risk, but include political risk squared, to
allow for the the marginal eﬀect of political risk to change with its level. This corresponds
to our interpretation above, that the diﬀerent scenarios or political risk can be ranked
with respect to their severity, with scenario III being the less severe and scenarios I/II
the more severe. Our second strategy is to use alternative disaggregated measures for
political risk, with the idea to capture more speciﬁcally one particular scenario.
Table 2.4 presents our results for the ICRG political risk index, including political risk
squared. In both regressions, the estimated marginal eﬀect of political risk on the variable
in question is positive for low levels of political risk and negative for high levels of political
risk. Both results are consistent with the predictions of hypotheses 3 and 4. The big
diﬀerence between leverage and the ownership share is in the level of political risk where
the marginal eﬀect changes from positive to negative: for leverage, a maximum is reached
at a level of political risk of about 0.3. The vast majority (about 91 percent) of aﬃliates
of German MNE operate in countries where the political risk is weaker than this - thus,
for them, the predicted eﬀect is positive. Only for about 9 percent of all aﬃliates, we
predict the eﬀect of political risk on leverage to be negative. When we model leverage
as a linear function of political risk, the positive eﬀect that we predict for the majority
of aﬃliates of German MNEs, prevails, as seen in Table 2.3. For the ownership share,
the change from a positive to a negative eﬀect of political risk is predicted to take place
for a much lower level of political risk (about 0.13). This is in fact consistent with our
hypothesis 5.
As outlined above, as a second strategy to capture diﬀerent scenarios of political risk, we
try diﬀerent measures of political risk. We use two measures taken from the ICRG invest-
ment risk component (contract risk and repatriation risk) and three measures from the
Heritage Index (corruption, investment risk and property rights risk). Data on contract
risk and repatriation risk have only been available since 2001. Contract risk is deﬁned as2 Who is afraid of political risk? 33
the risk of unilateral contract modiﬁcation or cancelation and, at worst, outright expro-
priation of foreign owned assets. Repatriation risk captures to what extent proﬁts can
be transferred out of the host country. Impediments include exchange controls, excessive
bureaucracy and a poor banking system. Corruption is deﬁned as failure of the integrity
of the system. Investment risk measures the degree of restrictions on foreign investment,
considering a country’s policies towards foreign investment, as well as its policies towards
internal capital ﬂows. Property rights risk measures the lack of freedom to accumulate
private property as well as the risk to be expropriated.23
All measures have been recoded in such a way that ﬁrst, higher values are associated
with higher risk and, second, they lie between 0 and 1. Table 2.5 shows that, as in
Table 2.3, the inﬂuence of political risk on the ownership share is negative, for all types
of political risk measures considered. Interestingly, however, political risk can have either
a positive or a negative inﬂuence on the level of leverage, depending on the type of risk
present (Table 2.6 ). It is positive for corruption, investment risk and property right risk.
According to our interpretation, this suggests that these three types of risk reduce the
proﬁtability of the investment without signiﬁcantly increasing the risk of bankruptcy. In
contrast, the coeﬃcient is negative for contract risk, which seems to aﬀect the chances
to generate revenues and hence increases the risk of bankruptcy. Surprisingly, it is also
negative for repatriation risk, even though this kind of political risk is more about the
use of proﬁts, i.e., scenario 3, for which a positive coeﬃcient is predicted. If, however,
credits are taken at home, not locally, the negative coeﬃcient would make sense, because
barriers to repatriation proﬁts would undermine the ability to repay credits.
23 For a more detailed description of the methodology underlying the Heritage Index see Beach and Kane
(2008).2 Who is afraid of political risk? 34





























































Table 2.6: The impact of political risk (diﬀerent measures) on aﬃliate leverage2 Who is afraid of political risk? 37
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have investigated how MNEs adapt their capital structure choices
in the presence of political risk. Our analysis suggests that, when it comes to assessing
the potential eﬀects of political risk, it is important to distinguish diﬀerent types of
stakeholders and how these are aﬀected by diﬀerent political measures. Only then is it
possible to determine the optimal reaction of the investor to this risky environment.
Almost by deﬁnition, any form of political risk negatively aﬀects the proﬁtability of a
MNE as a whole. The investor as one of the equity holders is residual claimant of the
MNE. Thus, it is not surprising that he will want to reduce his stake in the ﬁrm when
political risk becomes more severe.
But, as our analysis has shown, the eﬀects are less straightforward for debt holders. If debt
holders expect debt service to become less likely, they have to adjust their interest rates.
The larger the additional dead weight losses, the more costly debt ﬁnancing becomes
and hence the more leverage is reduced. If, instead, debt service is less aﬀected than
the returns to equity holders, then debt can act as a shield against political risk and the
balance shifts towards more debt ﬁnance relative to equity ﬁnance.
Why does it matter how political risk aﬀects the multinational’s choice of capital struc-
ture? Smaller ownership shares, for example, may negatively aﬀect the governance struc-
ture of the MNE because they typically lead to smaller incentives for controlling the
ﬁrm eﬀectively. In addition, smaller ownership stakes could reduce the investor’s incen-
tive to transfer necessary technology. These eﬀects, though not explicitly modeled here,
are well known in the literature. Higher leverage, and hence higher risk of bankruptcy,
on the other hand, lead to higher dead weight losses arising from ineﬃcient bankruptcy
procedures and, in this way, add to the social cost of political risk.
Thus, we would expect diﬀerent kinds of dead weight losses to prevail, depending on
how political risk aﬀects equity holders relative to debt holders. If ownership shares are
reduced and leverage increases, one may have to face deteriorating governance structures
and more ineﬃciencies from increased risk of bankruptcy. If instead both ownership
shares and leverage are reduced, it is mostly deteriorated governance structures one has
to expect.2 Who is afraid of political risk? 38
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2[  R   (2   s)(1 + r)D]
(2.41)





(1   r)  R
(2.42)2 Who is afraid of political risk? 39
The investor maximizes
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Proof of Result 2
To see how the optimal debt level reacts to changes in t, consider the optimal debt level
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To determine how the ownership ratio  reacts to changes in t, we rewrite the ﬁrst order
condition (2:47) that implicitly deﬁnes , using (2:42) and the solution to D and r.
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Note that the sign of d
dt depends on the sign of d  R
d. Using equation (2:57), we ﬁnd that
R0 > 0 if B0 < K0 in the relevant parameter range, and hence d
dt < 0 if B0 < K0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Result 3
Consider ﬁrst the case of expropriation. Recall that the interest rate is implicitly deter-
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Using equation (2:61) we can rewrite the payoﬀ function in the following way
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We can use this condition to solve for r and 1 + r:
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Inserting this in (2:65), we can solve for
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Using the solutions for r and D1, we can ﬁnally determine the investor’s payoﬀ
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Creeping expropriation
Consider now the case of creeping expropriation. Recall that the interest rate is implicitly
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Solving and rearranging yields
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Using equation (2:84) we can rewrite the payoﬀ function in the following way
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We can use this condition to solve for r2 and 1 + r2:
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(2.96)
Inserting this in (2:84), we can solve for
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Using the solutions for r2 and D2, we can ﬁnally determine the investor’s payoﬀ
U2 = (1   2)
  R
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
  K()   I (2.98)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Result 4
In Result 3 we have seen that the optimal debt levels and the investor’s payoﬀ are the
same in both cases, expropriation and creeping expropriation. We now determine the
comparative statics with respect to the local taxation rate i, with i = f1;2g.2 Who is afraid of political risk? 45
To see how the optimal debt level reacts to changes in 1, consider the optimal debt level
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To determine how the ownership ratio  reacts to changes in i, we use the ﬁrst order
condition of (2:79) or (2:98) that implicitly deﬁnes 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where the negative sign of the nominator is due to the fact that the ﬁrst order condition
(2:100) needs to be satisﬁed.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Result 5
Recall that in case of conﬁscatory taxation the interest rate is implicitly determined by












dR = D (2.102)
This implies the same implicit function and hence the same conditions for the interest
rate as above.
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+D   I + B()   K() (2.107)
Using equation (2:103) we can rewrite the payoﬀ function in the following way
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We can use this condition to solve for r3 and 1 + r3:
r3 =
(2   s)(t + 3)
2(1   s) + s(t + 3)
1 + r3 =
2(1   s + t + 3)
2(1   s) + s(t + 3)
(2.113)







2(1   s) + s(t + 3)
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1   s + s(t + 3)
1   s + t + 3
  I + (1   3)B()   K() (2.115)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Result 6
To see how the optimal debt level reacts to changes in 3, consider the optimal debt level
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
=
 R(1   s)2
(1   s + t + 3)3 > 0 (2.116)
To determine how the ownership ratio  reacts to changes in t, consider the ﬁrst order
condition of (2:115) that implicitly deﬁnes 
3.

1   s + s(t + 3)
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Note that the sign of
d3
d3 depends on the sign of d  R
d. Using equation (2:117), we ﬁnd that
R0 > 0 if B0 < K0 in the relevant parameter range, and hence
d3
d3 < 0 if B0 < K0.
Q.E.D.
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 and the denominator is smaller than the respective denominator.
Simple rearranging of the respective equations prove that this is indeed the case. Q.E.D.Chapter 3
Financial constraints and the margins of FDI
3.1 Motivation
Multinational ﬁrms are larger than their domestic counterparts. For European ﬁrms,
Mayer and Ottaviano (2008) show that multinational ﬁrms are also more productive,
generate higher value added, pay higher wages, employ more capital per worker, and em-
ploy a larger number of skilled workers. In the theoretical literature, the characteristic size
patterns of multinational ﬁrms are explained mainly by diﬀerences in productivity. Ac-
cording to this explanation, observed internationalization patterns reﬂect real constraints
since only the more productive ﬁrms can aﬀord to shoulder the ﬁxed cost of market entry.
These stylized facts are conﬁrmed by our data for German companies, where ﬁrms owning
foreign aﬃliates are indeed substantially larger than purely domestic ﬁrms (Figure 3.1(a)).
Yet, the two groups of ﬁrms also diﬀer in a number of other respects. Multinational ﬁrms,
for instance, have lower debt ratios and higher cash ﬂows. This suggests diﬃculties in
obtaining external ﬁnance as an additional impediment to foreign expansions.24 However,
most of the theoretical literature considers the impact of ﬁnancial constraints to be of lesser
importance, arguing that foreign direct investment (FDI) and the associated ﬁnancing
decisions can largely be treated separately.25
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the (relative) importance of real and ﬁnancial
barriers for the cross-border expansion of ﬁrms. In doing so, we distinguish between the
decision to enter a foreign market for the ﬁrst time (the extensive margin) and the decision
on the volume of foreign aﬃliate sales (the intensive margin). We proceed in two steps.
In a ﬁrst step, we theoretically analyze how productivity and ﬁnancial constraints af-
fect a ﬁrm’s choice to become a multinational ﬁrm under conditions of limited internal
 This chapter is based on joint work with Claudia Buch, Alexander Lipponer, and Monika Schnitzer.
24 In the crisis that started in 2007, for instance, an increasing number of German ﬁrms reports credit
constraints as an impediment to expansion into foreign countries (DIHK 2009).
25 See, for example, Markusen (2002).
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funds and the need to obtain external debt ﬁnance. Our model features limited contract
enforceability and liquidation cost as two sources of ineﬃciencies in ﬁnancial contract-
ing that are particularly relevant for foreign investments. The model provides a set of
testable implications concerning the impact of ﬁnancial constraints, productivity, and
host-country characteristics on ﬁrms’ internationalization choices. In particular, we pre-
dict that ﬁnancial constraints are more likely to aﬀect the extensive than the intensive
margin, unless ﬁnancial constraints are severe. Furthermore, we predict that ﬁnancial
constraints are more strongly felt for large ﬁrms, as they are more likely to be interested
in foreign expansion.
In a second step, we provide empirical evidence using data for German ﬁrms. We obtain
information on the foreign aﬃliates of German ﬁrms from a detailed ﬁrm-level database
provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Direct Investment Micro-Database (MiDi).
Furthermore, we use data on the balance sheets of ﬁrms in Germany from both the
Dafne database provided by Bureau van Dijk and the Hoppenstedt database. Our data
are unique as they allow measuring ﬁnancial constraints and productivities at the parent
level for both domestic ﬁrms and for multinationals, as well as ﬁnancial constraints at
the aﬃliate level. This enables us to analyze the extensive and the intensive margins of
FDI. Furthermore, we can evaluate the relative importance of ﬁnancial constraints at both
the parent and at the aﬃliate level, a question that has - to the best of our knowledge
- not been addressed in the literature so far. In contrast to earlier work focusing on
manufacturing ﬁrms, our sample also contains services ﬁrms.
Our research is motivated by recent theoretical work stressing the importance of pro-
ductivity for ﬁrms’ international expansions. Seminal papers focusing on ﬁrms’ export
decisions are Bernard et al. (2003) and Melitz (2003). Helpman et al. (2004) extend the
Melitz model to account for multinational ﬁrms. The key to these models is that, ex
ante, ﬁrms do not know their productivity. Upon entry, ﬁrms draw their productivity
from a commonly known productivity distribution, and the level of productivity becomes
common knowledge as well. Depending on the level of productivity, ﬁrms exit the mar-
ket, they produce only for the domestic market, they become exporters, or they set up
aﬃliates abroad.
The implicit assumption of these models is that ﬁrms can ﬁnance foreign operations
internally and/or without incurring an external ﬁnance premium. Recent papers introduce
ﬁnancial constraints into the Melitz model. The focus of these models is on ﬁrms’ decisions
to export. Chaney (2005) predicts that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms are less likely to be
able to cover the ﬁxed cost of exporting. Manova (2010) examines the interaction of
productivity and credit constraints and their impact on the export decision as well as the
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Recent empirical work shows that ﬁnancial frictions indeed aﬀect export behavior. Using
panel data on bilateral exports at the country level, Manova (2010) ﬁnds that ﬁnancially
more developed countries are more likely to export, and that the eﬀect is more pronounced
in ﬁnancially vulnerable sectors. Firm-level studies show that ﬁnancial constraints matter
more for the extensive margin than for the intensive margin of exports (Berman and
Héricourt (2010)), that export starters enjoy better ﬁnancial conditions (Bellone et al.
(2008)), and that ﬁnancially healthy ﬁrms are more likely to export (Greenaway et al.
(2007)).26 Stiebale (2008), in contrast, ﬁnds no eﬀect of ﬁnancial constraints on a ﬁrm’s
export decision once observed and unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity is accounted for.
This essay provides complementary evidence on the role of ﬁnancial frictions for FDI. As
predicted by our model, we ﬁnd that productivity and ﬁnancial constraints have a signif-
icant impact on German ﬁrms’ internationalization decision. Economically, productivity
and ﬁnancial constraints are of similar importance, but ﬁnancial constraints matter most
to the subset of ﬁrms that consider investing abroad. Our model also suggests that the
extensive margin is more likely to be aﬀected than the intensive margin, unless ﬁnan-
cial constraints are severe. Our empirical analysis shows that parent ﬁnancial constraints
have indeed a negative impact on the extensive margin of FDI, but less so on the intensive
margin, mirroring ﬁndings by Berman and Héricourt (2010) for exports. However, we also
ﬁnd that, in contrast to the parent-level constraints, the aﬃliate’s ﬁnancial constraints
matter for the intensive margin. This observation points towards a hierarchy of ﬁnancing
the intensive margin, with aﬃliate ﬁnancing being preferred over parent ﬁnancing.
In the following section, we present our model of multinational ﬁrms. In section three,
we describe our data and provide descriptive statistics. Section four provides empirical
evidence, and section ﬁve concludes.
3.2 Finance and the margins of FDI: Theory
In this section, we analyze a ﬁrm’s choice to become a multinational ﬁrm and the volume
of sales of its foreign aﬃliates in the presence of ﬁnancial constraints. Firms incur a ﬁxed
cost of market entry as well as a variable cost of production. They ﬁnance their foreign
expansion using internally generated funds as well as an external bank credit, potentially
secured by collateral. Financing decisions are made under uncertainty.
Financial constraints are ﬁrm-speciﬁc; they do not merely reﬂect diﬀerences across ﬁrms
with regard to productivity. We do not specify the sources of “ﬁnancial heterogeneity”,
26 Evidence on the reverse causality from exporting to ﬁnancial conditions is mixed (Bellone et al. (2008),
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but there are several reasons why ﬁrms may have diﬀerent ﬁnancial constraints. Firms
diﬀer, for instance, with regard to their customer structure and, thus, the probability of
being hit by an adverse demand shock. Firms also diﬀer with regard to the quality of
their management and, thus, the ability of outside lenders to extract information on the
proﬁtability of an investment project.
Financial contracting in our model suﬀers from potential ineﬃciencies due to limited en-
forceability of ﬁnancial contracts, a problem particularly relevant when investing in a
foreign country. Enforceability diﬀers across countries and may be linked to the devel-
opment of the ﬁnancial market as well as the presence of home country banks abroad.
With limited contract enforcement, collateral may be required to obtain credit ﬁnancing.
However, collecting and liquidating collateral generates transaction costs, and the amount
of collateral available may be limited. The need for costly and limited collateral conﬁnes
the use of external ﬁnance and thus the foreign expansion of ﬁrms.
To see how the model works, consider the decision problem of a multinational ﬁrm that
can invest abroad to serve the foreign market.27 The ﬁrm’s alternative investment option
is normalized to zero.28 To set up a foreign aﬃliate, the ﬁrm has to incur a ﬁxed cost of
market entry F. Once the ﬁrm has decided to set up a foreign aﬃliate, it has to choose
the level of sales. Thus, we capture both the extensive and the intensive margins of the
ﬁrm’s foreign expansion strategy. To ﬁx ideas, consider the following variable production
cost function, k(x) = x2
2(1+), where x denotes the quantity produced and sold by the
foreign aﬃliate. The productivity of the parent ﬁrm, which also spills over onto the
foreign aﬃliate, is captured by . The larger the ﬁxed cost of entry and the lower a ﬁrm’s
productivity, the larger are the "real barriers" that a ﬁrm faces when entering foreign
markets.
The ﬁrm also faces a "ﬁnancial barrier" in the form of a cash-in-advance constraint be-
cause set up and production cost has to be paid before production starts and before
revenues are generated. Revenues that can be generated on the foreign market are uncer-
tain. Serving the foreign market yields positive revenues px with probability q and zero
27 We focus on horizontal FDI. The qualitative implications of our model with regard to the impact of
ﬁnancial constraints would also go through for vertical FDI.
28 It is straightforward to extend our model and to include an outside option like exports that depends
positively on the ﬁrm’s productivity. As we show in Buch et al. (2010), the ﬁrm’s productivity level
matters relatively more for the investment opportunity abroad than for the outside option of exporting.
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revenues with probability (1   q), where p is the foreign price level.29
Benchmark case without liquidity constraints
Before we describe the impact of ﬁnancial constraints on investment decisions, consider as
a benchmark the ﬁrst-best situation where the ﬁrm is not liquidity constrained. The ﬁrm
can ﬁnance both the ﬁxed cost of entry and the variable cost of production from internal
funds L . Thus, it maximizes the following proﬁt function:




Taking the ﬁrst-order condition, solving for the optimal sales of the aﬃliate xFB = (1+)qp







2(1 + )   F (3.1a)
Thus, if liquidity is not an issue, the investment takes place if and only if FB  0, i.e. if
net proﬁts of the investment are positive. Not surprisingly, proﬁts depend positively on
the ﬁrm’s productivity  , i.e. less productive ﬁrms are less likely to be able to cover the
ﬁxed cost of market entry.
Foreign expansion with liquidity constraints
Consider now the situation where the ﬁrm is liquidity constrained, which we deﬁne as a
situation in which its liquid assets L are not suﬃcient to cover the cost associated with
market entry and production. Thus, the ﬁrm needs external ﬁnance. We assume that
external ﬁnance is raised in the form of debt ﬁnance and, speciﬁcally, credits from banks.
Firms can obtain credits from domestic or foreign banks. We do not model this choice
explicitly and hence do not impose restrictions with regard to the degree of integration of
ﬁnancial markets. However, domestic and foreign banks may diﬀer with regard to their
ability to enforce contracts. For instance, if domestic banks maintain aﬃliates in the
foreign country, too, they are in a better position than banks operating abroad solely
to monitor the aﬃliates and collect collateral. This adds to the comparative advantage
that they already have in terms of knowledge about the domestic parent. The focus on
29 We abstract from exchange rate changes, i.e. revenues generated on the foreign market can be remitted
1:1 into domestic currency. Russ (2007) has a model in which endogenous adjustment of exchange rates
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external debt ﬁnance assumption reﬂects the fact that external equity ﬁnance plays a
limited role for German ﬁrms (?). Also, theoretical considerations suggest a "pecking
order" of external ﬁnance according to which external equity ﬁnance and portfolio capital
are dominated by bank lending.
Let D denote the credit necessary to ﬁnance the ﬁxed and variable cost of entry for a
production level x, given the available liquid funds L , i.e. D = k(x)+F L. Furthermore,
let (1 + r)D denote the repayment of principal plus interest payment that the ﬁrm is
supposed to pay. Like Manova (2010) and others, we assume that credit repayment is
possible only if the revenues from foreign sales are positive. In particular, we rule out the
possibility that the parent ﬁrm steps in and repays the aﬃliate’s credit if the aﬃliate is
not able to do so. This implies also that the credit repayment (1 + r)D cannot exceed
the revenues px, i.e. (1+r)D  px . Banks are assumed to operate competitively and to
determine the interest rate such as to just break even in expected terms.
To capture enforcement problems in ﬁnancial contracts, we assume that credit repayment
cannot be enforced with certainty, even if revenues are positive, but only with probability
, with 0    1 . The enforcement parameter  has two interpretations. On the one
hand, it can reﬂect diﬀerent institutional quality across countries. Legal systems may, for
instance, diﬀer with regard to the degree of creditor friendliness and the enforceability
of contracts.30 On the other hand, it could reﬂect a greater presence of home-country
multinational banks in the host country. These banks may be able to acquire useful
information on the host-country environment and be able to monitor ﬁrms more closely
through their aﬃliates abroad. This reduces informational asymmetries and makes it
more likely that credit enforcement is successful.
The ﬁrm can collateralize (part) of its credit with assets from two potential sources.
First, the ﬁrm can pledge its ﬁxed cost investment in the foreign aﬃliate, F, as collateral.
Second, the ﬁrm can use an exogenously given collateral, C, provided by the parent
company, to secure the credit. Let C  C + F denote the collateral actually chosen
to secure the credit, the exact value of which is determined endogenously below. If the
credit is not repaid, the creditor can seize the collateral to cover her losses. However, she
can realize only a fraction  of the collateral when liquidating it.31 Thus, liquidating the
collateral involves a dead weight loss of (1   )C.
There are two situations where liquidation of a collateral (potentially) becomes an issue.
Suppose the aﬃliate has positive revenues but the creditor fails to be able to enforce the
30 Harrison et al. (2004) report that ﬁnancial development lowers ﬁnancial constraints.
31 Without loss of generality, we assume that the eﬃciency loss is the same for both kinds of collateral
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repayment. Then, the bank has the option to liquidate the collateral. However, it would
be ineﬃcient to do so, due to the dead weight loss of liquidation. In this case, we assume
that eﬃcient renegotiation will make the ﬁrm pay C, i.e. the amount that the bank can
realize from liquidating the collateral, to avoid ineﬃcient liquidation, and the bank will
accept this oﬀer.32
Now, consider the zero proﬁt condition for banks which determines the interest rate for a
given choice of C:
q(1 + r)D + (1   q)C = D (3.2)
Banks obtain the promised credit repayment (1 + r)D only if credit repayment can be
enforced. In all other cases, they obtain the liquidation value of the collateral, C, either
because this is what the ﬁrm pays voluntarily, after renegotiation, or this is what they
receive from actually liquidating the collateral. Solving for (1 + r)D, we ﬁnd that banks
charge a risk premium over and above the risk-free rate which is declining in the probability
of success of the project q and in the eﬃciency of the liquidation procedure, 
(1 + r)D =
D   (1   q)C
q
(3.3)
Recall from above that the maximum repayment cannot exceed revenues, requiring
(1 + r)D =
D   (1   q)C
q
 px (3.4)
Note that the smaller , the more important it is to pledge a collateral for this condition
to be satisﬁed. However, due to the dead weight loss in case the collateral is actually
liquidated, which happens with positive probability, the ﬁrm limits the collateral pledged
to the minimum required to obtain the desired credit. Inserting D = k(x) + F   L and
solving for C yields the minimum collateral needed to ﬁnance the ﬁxed cost of market










The larger the required credit, the larger is the minimum collateral needed. Note, however,
that the collateral cannot exceed the upper bound speciﬁed above, C + F. We consider,
32 This assumes that the ﬁrm can hold the bank down to its outside option of liquidating the collateral.
It would be straightforward to modify this assumption and let the two parties split the gains from not
liquidating the collateral. However, given our assumption of a perfectly competitive banking market,
the ﬁrst assumption seems to be the most convincing one. If revenues are not positive, however,
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in turn, the cases where this upper bound of collateral constrains the ﬁrm’s optimal sales
choice and where it does not, starting with the case of a non-binding collateral constraint.
3.2.1 Non-binding collateral constraint
Suppose for a moment that the collateral constraint is not binding. Then, for a given
level of aﬃliate sales x and collateral C, the ﬁrm expects the following proﬁts:
 = qpx   q(1 + r)D   (1   q)C   (1   q)C   [k(x) + F] + D (3.6)
The ﬁrst term reﬂects the expected revenues, the second term the debt repayment that
can be enforced with probability  if revenues are positive, which happens with probability
q. If credit repayment cannot be enforced, the ﬁrm voluntarily pays what the bank would
be able to collect in the event of liquidation, C, to avoid costly liquidation, as discussed
above. If revenues are not positive, however, the collateral will be liquidated, as captured
by the fourth term. The last terms capture the cost of market entry and production and
the credit obtained by the ﬁrm to ﬁnance this cost, respectively.
The ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁts by choosing the optimal sales of the aﬃliate x taking into
account the collateral needed to ﬁnance market entry and production, C(x).
Using D = k(x) + F   L and the equations (3.3) and (3.5) for (1 + r)D and C(x) we
obtain:
 = qpx   k(x)   F   (1   q)(1   )max

0;




Note that if C(x) = 0, i.e. if no collateral is needed to secure the credit, ﬁnancing cost
does not bias the investment decision. If collateral is needed, however, expected proﬁts
are lowered by the expected liquidation cost, (1   q)(1   )C(x).
The following proposition characterizes the solutions of the ﬁrm’s maximization problem.
Proposition 1: Non-binding collateral constraint - Extensive and intensive
margins





1+z (1 + )qp < xFB; for C(x) > 0
(1 + )qp = xFB; for C(x) = 0
with z =
(1   q)(1   )
(1   q)
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2(1 + )q2p2   z(F   L)   F  FB; for C(x) > 0
1
2(1 + )q2p2   F = FB; for C(x) = 0
(3.8)





Note that for  = 1, the optimum level of sales is the same as the ﬁrst-best level. Also,
if  = 1, then z = 1, and again the optimum level of sales is the same as in the ﬁrst-best
case. Thus, the optimum level of sales diﬀers from the ﬁrst-best choice only if both  < 1
and  < 1. The intuition for this is straightforward. Only if contract enforcement is
less than perfect may a collateral be required to obtain a credit, and only if the use of
a collateral is costly does it aﬀect the marginal cost of ﬁnancing the production. Thus,
only if a costly collateral is required do proﬁts fall short of ﬁrst-best proﬁts.
Of course, the ﬁrm will engage in FDI only if the maximum proﬁts from investment
are non-negative. The following proposition characterizes the comparative statics for the
ﬁrm’s extensive and intensive margins of investment.
Proposition 2: Non-binding collateral constraint - Comparative statics
Changes in the following parameters aﬀect the probability of non-negative proﬁts and thus






















Furthermore, the intensive margin is described by the following comparative static results























Both the optimal volume of sales and the ﬁrm’s proﬁts increase in the ﬁrm’s productivity
and in the lucrativeness of foreign markets. Furthermore, better contract enforcement in
the host country has a positive eﬀect on sales and proﬁts because it lowers the requirement3 Financial constraints and the margins of FDI 58
to use costly collateral, and improving the eﬃciency of liquidating collateral reduces cost.
Higher ﬁxed cost lowers expected proﬁts not only directly but also indirectly. The larger
the ﬁxed cost, the fewer liquid funds are left for ﬁnancing the investment. Less liquid
funds, in turn, mean greater need for using costly collateral. Hence, there is an indirect
negative eﬀect of ﬁxed cost over and above the direct eﬀect. However, ﬁxed cost and
internal funds do not aﬀect the optimal level of sales choice because the marginal cost of
using collateral does not depend on how much collateral is actually needed. The maximum
collateral, in turn, has no eﬀect on proﬁts and on the ﬁrm’s choice of sales as long as it
does not impose a binding constraint.
This scenario describes the situation of a mildly ﬁnancially constrained investor. The need
for credit ﬁnancing and the requirement of providing collateral increase the marginal cost
of investment and hence limit the volume of sales and proﬁts. However, as long as the
collateral requirement does not impose a binding constraint, the constraints are not as
severe, as ﬁxed cost and internal funds aﬀect the extensive margin only, not the intensive
margin.
3.2.2 Binding collateral constraint
Consider now the case where the collateral constraint is binding for the optimal sales level
determined above, x = x, i.e.









In this case, x cannot be implemented because the credit constraint becomes binding. In-
stead, production settles at a smaller level x that is determined by the maximum available
exogenous collateral:
C + F =
[k(x) + F   L]   qpx
(1   q)
(3.10)
Solving this equation for x and inserting it into the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function yields the
constrained optimal level of sales choices and proﬁts as characterized by the following
proposition.
Proposition 3: Binding collateral constraint - Extensive and intensive margins
Suppose the maximum exogenous collateral imposes a binding constraint on the ﬁrm’s
optimal choice of the level of sales, i.e.
C < C
(x
)   F (3.11)3 Financial constraints and the margins of FDI 59
Then, the investor can attain a maximum proﬁt of
 = qpx   [k(x) + F]   (1   q)(1   )[C + F]  
 (3.12)
Where the foreign level of sales x < x is determined by equation (3.10)
Proof: See Appendix
Not surprisingly, proﬁts fall short of the second-best proﬁts that can be attained if the
collateral constraint is non-binding. The following proposition characterizes the compar-
ative static results for the extensive and intensive margins.
Proposition 4: Binding collateral constraint – Comparative statics
The following comparative static results characterize the extensive margins of FDI, sum-





























Furthermore, the intensive margin is described by the following comparative statics for the






























Like above, productivity, lucrativeness of foreign markets, contract enforcement, and the
eﬃciency of collateral liquidation positively aﬀect both the extensive and the intensive
margin of foreign direct investment. Unlike before, however, ﬁxed cost and internal funds
now aﬀect the level of sales as well, because higher ﬁxed cost (or fewer internal funds)
leaves fewer funds for the ﬁnancing of production, which cannot be compensated by
increasing credit ﬁnancing if the collateral constraint becomes binding. And of course
both margins are positively aﬀected if the collateral constraint becomes less binding.3 Financial constraints and the margins of FDI 60
We also ﬁnd that the ﬁnancial status of the ﬁrm as captured by the liquid funds and
the collateral available plays a more important role for more productive ﬁrms, since they
are the ones more likely to invest. Thus, a high productivity is a necessary, but not a
suﬃcient condition for foreign expansion.
This scenario captures the case of a more severely ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm that is not
only exposed to higher marginal cost of credit ﬁnancing, but that is also constrained in
its access to collateral. The ﬁrm is constrained not only at the extensive, but also at the
intensive margin of expansion. Of course, in reality, the two cases may be considered as
representing the two limits of a continuous distribution, with marginal cost of using a
collateral increasing in the size of the collateral. It would be straightforward to generalize
our set up and to allow for a more continuous distribution of ﬁnancial constraints.
3.2.3 Financial constraints at the aﬃliate level
So far, we have assumed the liquid funds (L) and the exogenous collateral (C) to be
provided by the parent ﬁrm. For the market entry decision, this is the natural assumption.
Over time, however, the foreign aﬃliate may in turn accumulate earnings and collateral
goods that may aﬀect the ﬁnancing constraints for the volume of sales. A natural extension
of the model would thus be to take into account liquid funds and collateral goods provided
by the aﬃliate itself. It seems plausible to conjecture that funds provided by the aﬃliate
incur lower opportunity cost and/or dead weight losses than funds provided by the parent
ﬁrm.33 If this is the case, we would expect funds provided by the aﬃliate to be used ﬁrst,
and only if they are not suﬃcient would we expect them to be supplemented by funds
provided by the parent.
3.2.4 Summing up
The model has rich implications for the determinants of ﬁrms’ intensive and extensive
margins of foreign activities. Higher productivity, more eﬃcient liquidation of collat-
eral, better contract enforcement, and more lucrative foreign markets always increase the
volume of aﬃliate sales. Higher ﬁxed cost decreases and higher internal funds increase
activities. The impact of these variables on the intensive margin depends on whether
the collateral constraint is binding. They have no eﬀect on the intensive margin if the
available collateral is suﬃciently large. Likewise, the impact of the size of the collateral
depends on the scenario considered. It should matter most when the collateral available
33 This is a topic discussed extensively in the literature on internal capital markets. See for example
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is low. Finally, our model predicts that ﬁnancial constraints matter more for larger, more
productive ﬁrms, since these ﬁrms are more likely to be interested in foreign expansions.
Table 3.1 gives an overview of the results of the comparative static analyses.
3.3 Data and stylized facts
3.3.1 Data sources
To investigate the importance of real and ﬁnancial constraints for the foreign investment
choices of ﬁrms, we use data from three sources.34 Dafne and Hoppenstedt are commer-
cial databases providing ﬁnancial information on a large panel of ﬁrms that are active in
Germany.35 We use these datasets to obtain information on parent-level ﬁnancial con-
straints and productivity. Information on the number of German ﬁrms’ foreign aﬃliates,
their sales, the host countries, and aﬃliate-level ﬁnancial constraints are obtained from
the ﬁrm-level database on multinational ﬁrms MiDi (Microdatabase Direct Investment),
provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank (Lipponer (2006)).
To eliminate outliers, we start from the full Dafne dataset and drop ﬁrms with negative
values for key variables such as sales and total assets. Also, as we need information on
cash ﬂow and sales, we eliminate observations for ﬁrms which do not report an income
statement. We additionally truncate some of the data at the 1st and 99th percentile.
Finally, we drop observations showing large changes in sales or in the number of employees
from one year to another (increase by a factor of 10 or drop to 1/10 or less) in order to
control for possible merger-induced outliers.
Table 3.4 compares the structure of the sample after the outlier correction (“corrected
sample”) and the sample used for the regressions in Table 3.6 (“regression sample”). The
two samples are fairly similar in terms of the percentage allocation of the number of
ﬁrms across sectors. We have also compared the structure of our sample to the sectoral
structure of the German economy as a whole, and the rank correlation in terms of sectoral
structure of sales has proven to be quite high.
34 See Tables 3.2 and 3.3 for details.
35 Dafne is the German equivalent to the European ﬁrm-level database Amadeus. Bayraktar et al. (2005)
also use the German data from Amadeus for an analysis of ﬁrm-level domestic investment behavior.3 Financial constraints and the margins of FDI 62
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3.3.2 Dependent and explanatory variables
Extensive and intensive margin
By merging the ﬁrm-level databases Dafne and Hoppenstedt with information on the
foreign aﬃliates of German ﬁrms provided in MiDi, we obtain a dataset which includes
two groups of ﬁrms. The ﬁrst group contains purely domestic German ﬁrms, i.e. ﬁrms
which do not hold aﬃliates abroad (“Domestic Firms”) (94.5% of the ﬁrm-year obser-
vations). The second group consists of German ﬁrms with foreign aﬃliates (“German
MNEs”) (5.5%). From MiDi, we also obtain a count variable on the number of aﬃliates
that a given parent operates abroad. This serves as an additional proxy for the extensive
margin of foreign activities, which measures complex FDI strategies involving many af-
ﬁliates. We also have information on the volume of a ﬁrm’s foreign aﬃliates’ sales as a
measure of the intensive margin.
Productivity
In line with the theoretical model, we use cost eﬃciency as a ﬁrm-level measure of produc-
tivity. Cost eﬃciency is given by parent sales over total cost, i.e. labor cost plus the cost
of other inputs. A higher value reﬂects higher cost eﬃciency, hence we expect a positive
sign. Higher sales relative to total cost might also reﬂect higher mark-ups. The expected
sign of the coeﬃcient would be the same. We include the size of the parent as a measure
for its productivity, and the expected sign is positive.
Fixed cost
The parent’s ﬁxed cost of investment is proxied by the ratio of ﬁxed over total assets.
We use the ratio rather than the level of this variable as we additionally account for size
eﬀects in our regressions. We expect a negative impact of the ﬁxed asset share on the
extensive margin. The impact of this variable on the intensive margin could be insigniﬁ-
cant, according to our model, if the collateral available is suﬃciently large.
Internal funds
In our model, we distinguish liquid funds from less liquid collateral as two determinants
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available for ﬁnancing a particular investment project. This variable should have a posi-
tive impact on the extensive margin of foreign activities. As in the case of ﬁxed cost, its
impact could be insigniﬁcant on the intensive margin if the collateral available is suﬃ-
ciently large. In addition, we look at retained earnings of the aﬃliate as a measure for the
liquid funds available to the aﬃliate to ﬁnance the intensive margin. Again, the expected
sign is positive or insigniﬁcant.36
Collateral
The debt ratio measures leverage at the parent and at the aﬃliate levels ex ante. We can
interpret the debt ratio as a measure of the ﬁrms’ collateral – ﬁrms which are more highly
leveraged ex ante have, ceteris paribus, fewer assets available that can serve as collateral
for new credits. Hence, the expected sign for the parent debt ratio is negative for both
the extensive and the intensive margins if the collateral constraint is binding. Similarly,
the expected sign for the aﬃliate debt ratio is negative for the intensive margin. Firms
may also report a high leverage ratio precisely because they have taken out a credit in
order to ﬁnance FDI. If this were the correct interpretation, we should expect a positive
sign of the coeﬃcient.
Foreign market size
In our theoretical model, we have described the attractiveness of the foreign market in
terms of the price that ﬁrms can fetch abroad for their product. In our empirical model,
we distinguish two aspects of foreign market size. The ﬁrst is the size of the market
measured through its GDP. The second is the state of development of a foreign market
measured through GDP per capita. We expect a positive sign for both variables.
Contract enforcement
The probability of contract enforcement depends on two parameters - an index measuring
the diﬃculty of contract enforcement as well as the presence of aﬃliates of German banks
36 Following Kaplan and Zingales (1997) criticism, there has been a lively debate on the usefulness of
investment-cash ﬂow sensitivities as a measure for ﬁnancial constraints. The focus of the discussion
have been endogeneity issues as well as issues of adequately taking into account access to external
ﬁnance. See also Brown et al. (2009) for an overview of this discussion. We use lagged variables to
address the simultaneity of ﬁrm-level variables issue. We also include the debt ratio, as discussed
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abroad. The variable (weak) contract enforcement gives the number of procedures required
to enforce contracts, and the expected impact is negative. This variable can be expected
to inﬂuence both the entry decision as well as the volume of activities, and we include
it for both margins. Aﬃliates of German banks should be at an advantage over other
lenders with regard to monitoring foreign aﬃliates and enforcing contracts. We use MiDi
to obtain information on the volume of FDI of German banks by country, and we expect
a positive impact on the intensive margin.
3.3.3 Stylized facts
In Figure 3.1, we visualize the diﬀerences between German MNEs and Domestic Firms by
plotting the Kernel densities of size (Figure 3.1(a)), cost eﬃciency (Figure 3.1(b)), cash
ﬂow (Figure 3.1(c)), the debt ratio (Figure 3.1(d)), and the share of ﬁxed assets (Figure
3.1(e)).
Figure 3.1(a) conﬁrms stylized facts reported in earlier papers using ﬁrm-level data (e.g.
Mayer and Ottaviano (2008)): MNEs are larger than purely domestic ﬁrms. Unreported
one-sided t-tests on the equality of the means between the two sub-samples show that
this diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant. Measuring size through the volume of sales gives
a very similar result. MNEs also exhibit a somewhat lower share of ﬁxed assets (Figure
3.1(e)). Figure 3.1(b) shows that diﬀerences between the two types of ﬁrms in terms of
cost eﬃciency are small and, in fact, not signiﬁcant.
Hence, while the dividing line between multinationals and non-multinationals is not as
clear-cut as might have been expected on the basis of the cost eﬃciency of these ﬁrms,
the dividing line is clear for measures of ﬁnancial status. Multinationals have signiﬁ-
cantly higher cash ﬂow (Figure 3.1(c)) and lower debt ratios (Figure 3.1(d)). Prima facie,
these graphs suggest that heterogeneity with regard to the openness and international
orientation of ﬁrms could be driven by ﬁnancial factors just as by real factors.
3.4 Productivity versus ﬁnancial constraints: Regression results
Our main empirical model relates ﬁnancial constraints and productivity to the pattern of
internationalization at the ﬁrm level. We are interested in two main questions. First, do
ﬁnancial constraints and productivity aﬀect the probability of investing abroad? Second,
do these factors aﬀect the volume of foreign aﬃliates’ sales? We answer these questions
in two steps. In a ﬁrst step, we analyze the determinants of the ﬁrms’ extensive margin of
FDI using the probability of investing abroad and the number of aﬃliates as dependent3 Financial constraints and the margins of FDI 69
Figure 3.1: Firm characteristics by multinational status3 Financial constraints and the margins of FDI 70
variable. In a second step, we analyze the sales of aﬃliates across countries, i.e. the
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3.4.1 Extensive margin
Our baseline regression for the extensive margin - the decision to enter a foreign market
- is given by the following probit model:
Pr(FDI)i,k,t = 0 + 1Zi;t 1 + 2Zk;t + 3I + 4S + 5T + i;t (3.13)
where Pr(FDI)i;k;t indicates whether a ﬁrm i has invested abroad in year t in country k.
Zi;t 1 (Zk;t) are vectors of ﬁrm-level (country-level) control variables.37 We include the
ratio of sales over total cost as a measure of cost eﬃciency. Our main proxies for ﬁnancial
barriers are cash ﬂow and the debt ratio. The country-level control variables are GDP,
GDP per capita, and the severity of contract enforcement. We additionally include ﬁrm
size, and a full set of industry (I), German states (S), and time (T) dummies. These
dummies capture systematic diﬀerences across industries and states as well as common
macroeconomic eﬀects. We also include an exporter dummy to account for the fact that
exporting is typically a stepping stone into international markets (see Helpman et al.
(2004)). This variable turns out to be positive and signiﬁcant on the extensive margin
regarding the number of aﬃliates abroad but insigniﬁcant regarding the probability of
owning foreign aﬃliates.
Table 3.5 shows the results. Column (1) has the baseline speciﬁcation for the full regression
sample. In columns (2)-(7), we split the sample by size, by sector (manufacturing versus
services), and by legal status (listed versus unlisted). While the sub-sample of listed ﬁrms
is small (6,165 versus 51,922 ﬁrm-country-year observations), it nevertheless serves as a
useful test of the impact of ﬁnancial frictions. A priori, we expect ﬁnancial frictions to be
less important for the listed ﬁrms with access to a larger range of ﬁnancial sources.
Larger and more eﬃcient ﬁrms are more likely to be multinationals. Size has a positive
and signiﬁcant impact on the probability of being a multinational, and this eﬀect is robust
across speciﬁcations. Contrary to expectations, cost eﬃciency is negative and signiﬁcant
in some speciﬁcations. This eﬀect is driven by certain sub-samples such as the large ﬁrms
and the services sector ﬁrms and suggests that size is a better proxy for productivity than
cost eﬃciency.
Our measure for ﬁxed cost of market entry, the ﬁxed asset share, has a strong and sig-
niﬁcantly negative impact on the probability of investing abroad for all speciﬁcations, as
37 Firm-level regressors are lagged by one period to account for the simultaneity of the explanatory
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expected.38 Berman and Héricourt (2010) as well as Manova (2010) interpret the ﬁxed
asset share as capturing the tangibility of assets, and hence as a measure of easier access
to external ﬁnance secured by collateral. Following their interpretation, the expected ef-
fect is positive. The negative coeﬃcient we ﬁnd suggests that, for FDI, our interpretation
is the more appropriate one. Financial constraints have a signiﬁcant and robust impact
on the extensive margin. Cash ﬂow is mostly positive and signiﬁcant. The debt ratio
has an insigniﬁcant impact, consistent with the prediction of the model for non-binding
collateral constraints.
The marginal eﬀects reported in Table 3.5 show a similar importance of productivity and
ﬁnancial frictions. Generally, however, ﬁxed cost of entry (the ﬁxed asset share) and the
country-level variables are more important than variables such as size or the debt ratio.
Mean elasticities also show the strongest response to changes in log GDP (elasticity of
+0.66), cost eﬃciency (-0.45), ﬁrm size (+0.30), the ﬁxed asset share (+0.23), and cash
ﬂow (+0.16).
To study the interaction of productivity and ﬁnancial constraints, we split the sample.
We take ﬁrm size as an indicator for ﬁrm productivity. One of the ﬁnancial variables -
the debt ratio - is insigniﬁcant for both groups. The other - cash ﬂow - matters for large
ﬁrms, but not for small ﬁrms. The latter ﬁnding may look counterintuitive at ﬁrst sight,
as one would expect smaller ﬁrms to be more opaque and hence more likely to be aﬀected
by ﬁnancial constraints. Our ﬁnding is, however, consistent with the prediction of our
model that ﬁnancial constraints should matter the more, the more productive the ﬁrm
and hence the more interested it is in expanding abroad.39 Financial constraints, in other
words, do not impede the foreign expansion of small ﬁrms because these ﬁrms are not
productive enough to invest abroad in the ﬁrst place. It is also consistent with the ﬁnding
of Berman and Héricourt (2010) who observe that productivity has no eﬀect on a ﬁrm’s
export decision if the ﬁrm faces ﬁnancial constraints.
The country-level variables are signiﬁcant and have the expected sign. GDP is positive and
signiﬁcant, and GDP per capita is positive and signiﬁcant for the full sample and for most
of the sample splits, thus conﬁrming the expectation that market size matters. Consistent
38 An alternative interpretation of this ﬁnding is that ﬁrms with a large share of intangibles and thus
ﬁrm-speciﬁc know-how are more likely to venture abroad. These ﬁrms would also have a lower ﬁxed
asset share.
39 Chaney (2005) distinguishes three classes of ﬁrms, with low, intermediate and high productivity. He
predicts that ﬁrms with low productivity are not aﬀected by ﬁnancial constraints, since investing
abroad is not a viable option for them, even without ﬁnancial constraints. More productive ﬁrms,
instead, are hampered by ﬁnancial constraints in their foreign expansion strategy. In his model, very
productive ﬁrms are by construction not liquidity constrained and hence not aﬀected by ﬁnancial
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with our model, greater diﬃculties with contract enforcement lower the probability that
a given German ﬁrm enters a particular country.
In sum, our results show that parent-level ﬁnancial constraints and productivity aﬀect the
extensive margin of foreign entry: larger, more eﬃcient, and ﬁrms with a lower share of
ﬁxed assets are more likely to become multinationals. In addition, country-level variables
capturing contract enforcement and market size play an important role for the entry
decision.
3.4.2 Extensive margin: Number of aﬃliates
Table 3.6: Determinants of the number of aﬃliates
An alternative way of looking at the extensive margin of ﬁrms’ foreign activities is to
count the number of foreign aﬃliates that a given parent holds. Adding an aﬃliate
implies a new set-up cost, hence the count data models presented in Table 3.6 provide
information on the determinants of complex FDI strategies. The count data models
diﬀer in their assumptions regarding the moments of the distribution and the presence
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large share of zeros in our data to a diﬀering degree.40 The basic count data model is
the Poisson model which is quite restrictive in assuming that the conditional mean of
the dependent variable equals the conditional variance. The Negative Binomial model
allows for unobserved individual heterogeneity and for overdispersion. It is the preferable
model, as the equidispersion assumption is strongly rejected for our data. Finally, zero-
inﬂated models assign an even higher weight to the probability of observing a zero in the
dependent variable.
Results from count data models support our ﬁnding that larger, less indebted parents,
ﬁrms with a lower share of ﬁxed assets, and ﬁrms with higher cash ﬂow are more active
internationally. Cost eﬃciency is negative or insigniﬁcant. The debt ratio has a negative
impact on the extensive margin when using the number of foreign aﬃliates. This is
consistent with the interpretation of high debt ratios as indicators of low collateral at the
parent level which is available to back up new lending.41
3.4.3 Intensive margin: Sales of aﬃliates
We now focus on the sales of the foreign aﬃliate, while taking the decision to become a
multinational as well as its location as given. The dependent variable log(Sales)ijk;t are
the sales of aﬃliate j of parent i in country k, and the regression equation includes control
variables at the parent level (Zi;t 1), at the aﬃliate level (Zj;t 1), and at the country level
(Zk;t):
log(Sales)ijk;t = 0 + 1Zi;t 1 + 2Zj;t 1 + 3Zk;t + 4S + 5T + ijk;t (3.14)
We estimate this equation as a parent-level ﬁxed eﬀects model; results are given in Ta-
ble 3.7. In contrast to the results for the extensive margin, all our parent-level measures
for real and ﬁnancial constraints are insigniﬁcant for the intensive margin. Given that
most parent characteristics are already absorbed by the ﬁxed eﬀects, variables that cap-
ture parents’ real and ﬁnancial constraints do not have an additional impact on the sales
of their aﬃliates. The retained earnings of the aﬃliate enter with a positive and signif-
icant sign in all speciﬁcations. Hence, the availability of liquid funds which also reﬂects
the proﬁtability of the aﬃliate matters for the volume of activities.
Our host-country regressors again yield the expected signs. German ﬁrms have larger
foreign aﬃliates in larger countries and in countries hosting many German banks. While
the impact of market size per se is not surprising and would, in fact, be borne out by many
40 For a detailed description of count data models, see, for example, Jones et al. (2007).
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theoretical models, the positive impact of bank FDI is in support of our theoretical model.
A greater presence of home country banks and thus familiarity of domestic lenders with
the foreign market should improve the collection of information on the foreign aﬃliate.
This increases the probability that collateral can be collected abroad, thus lowering the
cost of ﬁnancing and increasing the volume of lending.
In columns (2)-(5), we perform similar sample splits by size and sector. The overall
ﬁndings are very similar with two exceptions. Size (negative) and cash ﬂow (positive) are
weakly signiﬁcant (at the 10%-level) for the large ﬁrms. The positive sign on cash ﬂow is
consistent with the previous ﬁnding that ﬁnancial constraints matter most for ﬁrms with
larger foreign activities. Also, within the group of already large ﬁrms, the relatively small
ones have higher foreign aﬃliate sales.
Whereas parent-level frictions do not matter for the volume of activities, ﬁnancial frictions
at the aﬃliate level have an impact on aﬃliate sales. This is a novel ﬁnding since, to the
best of our knowledge, the joined impact of parent- and aﬃliate-level ﬁnancial frictions has
not been analyzed before. These results suggest a hierarchy of ﬁnancing foreign expansion,
where preference is given to local funds and only if they are not suﬃcient, parent funds
are used, albeit at potentially higher opportunity cost.
3.4.4 Heckman selection model
So far, we have treated the decision whether to enter a foreign country and the decision
how much to produce and sell separately. To check whether this assumption is justiﬁed, we
estimate a Heckman selection model, which explicitly accounts for the selection into the
FDI mode (Table 3.8). We use state dummies as exclusion restrictions, thus accounting
for the fact that - historically - diﬀerent regions in Germany have diﬀerent degrees of
international openness. Variables measured at the aﬃliate level and German bank FDI
abroad are included in the outcome but not in the selection equation. The Mills ratio in the
outcome equation – aﬃliate sales – is insigniﬁcant, which justiﬁes our earlier assumption
to model the extensive and the intensive margin separately.
Qualitative results by and large conﬁrm earlier ﬁndings. It is interesting to see that some
variables aﬀect the probability of setting up an aﬃliate, but not the volume of its sales.
Higher cash ﬂow has a positive impact on the selection into foreign status but not on
the volume of sales. This eﬀect is, consistent with the ﬁndings reported above, driven by
the large ﬁrms. Country-level variables such as GDP and GDP per capita have a strong
positive impact on the extensive margin, but none on the intensive margin.3 Financial constraints and the margins of FDI 77
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Table 3.8: Determinants of the volume of aﬃliate sales3 Financial constraints and the margins of FDI 79
Some parent-level variables such as cost eﬃciency (negative), size (positive) and ﬁxed asset
share (negative) have a consistent impact on both margins.42 Aﬃliate’s retained earnings
have a strong and signiﬁcant positive impact on the intensive margin, thus conﬁrming
the previous ﬁnding that distinguishing parent- and aﬃliate level frictions is important.
(Weak) contract enforcement also inﬂuences both margins negatively, as expected. Bank
FDI has the expected positive impact on the intensive margin.
Finally, splitting the sample into small and large ﬁrms conﬁrms that selection into foreign
status is aﬀected by ﬁnancial constraints for the large ﬁrms. Market size has a positive
and signiﬁcant impact on the volume of foreign sales of large ﬁrms and a negative impact
on sales of small ﬁrms. This reﬂects scale economies and the sorting of smaller ﬁrms into
smaller markets.
3.4.5 Summing up
Comparing our empirical results to the theoretical predictions summarized in Table 3.1, we
ﬁnd that they are more consistent with the scenario of non-binding than with the scenario
of binding collateral constraints. Our measure for the parent’s internal funds, cash ﬂow,
is consistently signiﬁcant for the extensive margin, but not for the intensive margin. Our
measure for the parent’s collateral, the debt ratio, is mostly insigniﬁcant at both the
extensive and intensive margin, the only exception being the Heckman selection equation
for large ﬁrms and the count model of aﬃliates where the coeﬃcient of the parent’s debt
ratio is signiﬁcantly negative. The ﬁxed asset share as our measure for ﬁxed cost is
signiﬁcantly negative at the extensive and insigniﬁcant at the intensive margin, with the
exception of the Heckman outcome equation. Size is always signiﬁcantly positive for the
extensive margin, and, in the Heckman outcome equation, also for the intensive margin.
Inconsistent with the model, our alternative measure of productivity (cost eﬃciency)
is frequently insigniﬁcant or exhibits the wrong sign. A similar observation has been
made by Greenaway et al. (2007) who ﬁnd insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients for their measure of
productivity (TFP) on ﬁrm’s export choice, but signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcients for size.
3.5 Conclusions
Multinationals are large. Earlier literature focuses on diﬀerences in productivity across
ﬁrms as an explanation for this stylized fact. More productive ﬁrms ﬁnd it easier to
42 Note that results in Table 3.8 are not fully comparable to those in Table 3.7 since we do not include
parent ﬁxed eﬀects in Table 3.8 but state, sector, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.3 Financial constraints and the margins of FDI 80
shoulder the ﬁxed cost of foreign entry, thus being more likely to enter new markets. This
chapter analyzes the importance of ﬁnancial constraints as an additional barrier to entry
into foreign markets.
We provide a theoretical model and empirical evidence using data on ﬁrms’ extensive
margin of foreign activities (the probability to be a multinational ﬁrm) as well as their
intensive margin (the volume of aﬃliate sales across countries). Considering real barriers
to entry as captured by size/productivity and entry cost, we ﬁnd that larger ﬁrms and ﬁrms
with a smaller share of ﬁxed assets are consistently more likely to become multinationals,
and these ﬁrms also have larger foreign activities. Cost eﬃciency, in contrast, does not
have the expected positive impact.
Considering ﬁnancial constraints, our empirical results conﬁrm that these constraints
matter for foreign expansions. Parents with larger cash ﬂow are more likely to become
multinationals and have more aﬃliates. For the intensive margin, we ﬁnd a weaker impact
of parent-level ﬁnancial constraints, but a strong positive impact of aﬃliate’s retained
earnings. This suggests a ﬁnancing hierarchy for the intensive margin, with aﬃliate
ﬁnancing to be the ﬁrst and parent ﬁnancing to be the second choice. Furthermore,
considering the interaction of real and ﬁnancial barriers, ﬁnancial constraints matter more
for large ﬁrms because these ﬁrms are most likely to expand abroad.
The ﬁndings of our essay have a number of implications for diﬀerent literatures. To the
literature of multinational ﬁrms, we add a mechanism through which productivity and
ﬁnancial constraints interact. Models ignoring ﬁnancial constraints would predict that
enhancement of ﬁrm productivity could improve ﬁrms’ access to foreign markets. Our
results suggest that high productivity may be a necessary, but not a suﬃcient precondition
for foreign expansion. Lowering ﬁnancial constraints might be just as important, as even
large and productive ﬁrms are hampered in their internationalization strategy by ﬁnancial
constraints.
To the banking literature, we add a mechanism explaining why banks and non-ﬁnancial
ﬁrms typically expand into foreign markets in tandem. One reason for the “follow their
customer” patterns in the data could be that home-country banks that are active abroad
could have comparative advantages over local banks in enforcing credit repayment and in
assessing the creditworthiness of FDI projects. This does not ultimately resolve the “follow
their customer” question, but the speciﬁc interaction between ﬁnancial and real barriers
to entry that we stress may provide the possibility of testing this link more structurally.
Finally, our ﬁndings can have implications for the international macroeconomic litera-
ture. Essentially, the ﬁnancial constraints imbedded in our model are similar to ﬁnancial
accelerator mechanisms used to model the interaction between the ﬁnancial sector and3 Financial constraints and the margins of FDI 81
business cycles. In this sense, extensions of our model might provide useful insights into
credit channel mechanisms in open economies and the persistence of shocks triggering
entry into foreign markets.3 Financial constraints and the margins of FDI 82
3.6 Mathematical appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
We obtain x by taking the ﬁrst-order condition from (3.6) or (3.6a) respectively, setting
it equal to zero and solving for the optimal x. To see that x  xFB, note that
1+z
1+z < 1
if  < 1, which is required for a positive collateral to be needed.   FB follows directly
from x  xFB and can be shown analytically by checking that FB >  whenever C > 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
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Using these derivatives, we obtain:
dx
d
= (1 + )qp
(1 + z)dz
d   (1 + z)dz
d









= (1 + )qp
(1 + z)[ dz
d + z]   (1 + z) dz
d
(1 + z)2
= (1 + )qp
(1 + z)z   (1   ) dz
d
(1 + z)2 = (1 + )qp
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are straightforward to see. To see that d
d > 0 and d
d > 0 , note that dx
d > 0 and
dx
d > 0. Using a revealed preference argument, it follows that the proﬁt has to be in-
creasing in these parameters as well.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
We ﬁnd the constrained optimal choice of x by solving the collateral constraint:
C + F =
[k(x) + F   L]   qpx
(1   q)
for x. This gives us a quadratic function of x which has the following solutions:
x1=2 = (1 + )qp 
q
(1 + )22q2p2   2(1 + )[F   L   (1   q)(C + F)]
Since we are looking at constrained levels of sales that fall short of the second-best level
of sales x, the solution for the investor is to choose the larger of the two levels of sales.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
Consider ﬁrst x. It is straightforward to see that: dx
d > 0; dx
dp > 0; dx
dF < 0: dx




Finally, note that dx
d > 0, because increasing  relaxes the collateral constraint. To see
this, note that the right-hand side of:
C + F 
[k(x) + F   L]   qpx
(1   q)3 Financial constraints and the margins of FDI 84






(1   q)( qpx)   (F + k(x)   L   qpx)( q)
(1   q)22 =
 q
px   (F + k(x)   L)
(1   q)22 < 0
To see the comparative statics for  note that they have the same signs as the compara-
tive statics for x because they follow from relaxing (or tightening) the constraints on the
constrained choice of x.
Q.E.D.Chapter 4
On the use of information
in repeated insurance markets
4.1 Introduction
The vast majority of theoretical models on the insurance market are one-shot models of
either perfect competition or monopolistic behavior of insurance companies.43 However,
empirical evidence seems to suggest that in reality, the common market structure in most
insurance markets is oligopolistic. Concentration indices for the top 5 insurance companies
in the non-life business in Europe in 2002 ranged from 27% in Germany to 89% in Finland
(Buzzacchi and Valletti (2005)). Concentration measures in the life insurance sector in
most developed nations in the 1990s have been constantly high: even in the USA, the
least concentrated market, concentration indices for the top 5 insurance companies have
been above 25%, while they have been (high) above 50% in Australia, Canada, Japan
and the Netherlands (Bikker and van Leuvensteijn (2008)). Market concentration is also
reﬂected in insurance premiums (Dafny et al. (2009)).
Recently, numerous empirical studies have attempted to test the predictions of theoretical
models of insurance markets regarding the distribution and use of information in insur-
ance markets and its eﬀects on market outcomes.44 Several empirical results are hard to
reconcile with standard theoretical models, and they suggest more work should be devoted
 This chapter is based on joint work with Heiner Schumacher.
43 Some of the few exceptions are Ania et al. (2002) who re-examine the equilibrium non-existence
problem of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) in a dynamic setting, and Buzzacchi and Valletti (2005) who
provide a model of strategic price discrimination in compulsory insurance markets.
44 See, for example, Chiappori et al. (2006) on general testable implications on insurance markets, Chi-
appori and Salanie (2008) on empirical issues in modeling competition and market equilibrium in
insurance markets, Cutler et al. (2008) on preference heterogeneity in insurance markets, Finkelstein
and Poterba (2006) on testing for adverse selection using unused observables.
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to analyzing imperfectly competitive models of insurance markets – or, in the words of
Chiappori et al. (2006), “there is a crying need for such models”.
In this chapter, we analyze a repeated oligopolistic insurance market. The main feature
of our model is that insurance companies take into account the impact of pricing deci-
sions on competitors’ actions. We think that analyzing repeated interaction is crucial to
understand the use of information in insurance markets for the following reasons:
First, our model provides an explanation for the puzzle of “unused observables” that has
been tested in several empirical papers, but that has not received interest in the theo-
retical literature. In theory, proﬁt maximizing insurance companies should exploit any
risk-relevant information available to them.45 However, there is evidence of unused ob-
servables in insurance markets, that is information which a) insurance companies collect
or could collect, b) is correlated with the risk experience, but c) is not used by companies
to set prices. For example, according to Finkelstein and Poterba (2006), the address of the
insured person is almost always collected, but seldom used in pricing insurance, although
there is a correlation between geographic information and other individual attributes that
aﬀects both the demand for insurance and the risk type. They use data on annuity pur-
chases in the UK to illustrate that the information on the annuitant’s residential location
would help to predict future mortality risk, but that it does not inﬂuence the insurance
premium. Gender is another example of an unused observable that is usually collected by
default, but that is not used for pricing in certain insurance markets, the most prominent
example being the the long-term care insurance market and the automotive insurance. In
both markets, the expected costs for the insurer diﬀer substantially for men and women.46
Further empirical evidence on unused observables is provided by Brown and Finkelstein
(2007) (gender and place of residence in the U.S. long-term care insurance industry) and
Ivaldi (1996) (smoking in the French automobile insurance industry). Finkelstein and
Poterba (2006) conclude their article by stating that “a complete understanding of the
limited use in pricing of available or collectible risk-related information on insurance buy-
ers remains an open issue”.47
45 Under perfect competition, companies will use all information in order to charge the fair premium. A
monopolist will use all information in order to maximize proﬁts through price discrimination.
46 See, for example, Finkelstein and Poterba (2006) or the “Gesamtverband der deutschen Ver-
sicherungswirtschaft”, (www.gdv.de), the association of German insurance companies.
47 They mention a number of possible reasons for the existence of unused observables, e.g. regulation or
implementation costs, but show that these cannot fully explain the puzzle.4 On the use of information in repeated insurance markets 87
Second, the information available to insurance companies and the correlation with the
underlying risk of the insured is subject to constant change. The revolution in information
technologies has enabled insurance companies to collect, analyze and make use of large
amounts of information. An example of evolving information that has recently received
a lot of attention is that of genetic testing (Hoy and Witt (2007), Hoy and Polborn
(2000), Rees and Apps (2006)). Correlation like the one between an insured’s address
and socioeconomic status may change over time as the composition of residents in a
certain area changes. It is therefore important to know how insurance companies respond
to a constant change in their information about risks.
Third, in an oligopolistic insurance market, the existence of bulk discounts can also be
rationalized if companies collude and therefore make positive proﬁts. In competitive
insurance markets with asymmetric information, high risk individuals will demand larger
quantities of insurance than low-risk individuals. In order for an insurance company to
break even, theory predicts that marginal prices should rise with quantity. However, in
reality, many insurance companies oﬀer discounts in bulk (Cawley and Philipson (1999)
or Chiappori et al. (2006)).
In our model, there are two types of individuals who face either high or low risk of dam-
age. There is a ﬁnite number of insurance companies. They can distinguish between
these risks and compete for customers by setting insurance premia in each period. Com-
panies interact strategically and preconceive the eﬀect of their pricing decision on the
prices set by their competitors in subsequent periods. If companies fear a price war after
adjusting their prices, they may refrain from doing so. We show that even if insurance
companies can distinguish between risk types, equilibria exist in which (1) insurance com-
panies charge the same insurance premium to both risks, and (2) both risk types purchase
positive amounts of insurance (however, low risks potentially acquire less insurance than
high risks). Thus, we derive an equilibrium with unused observables. Furthermore, if
companies make positive proﬁts out of all risks, it may be rational for them to oﬀer bulk
discounts.
We then show that the same equilibrium outcome is possible if insurance companies cannot
distinguish between high and low risks, i.e. if there is asymmetric information. This
renders possible the following explanation for the existence of unused observables: initially,
there exists a collusive equilibrium in an insurance market with asymmetric information.
Then, after analyzing their data, insurance companies learn how to distinguish between
high and low risks. However, they maintain their pricing schedules in order to sustain
collusion.4 On the use of information in repeated insurance markets 88
In the next step, we analyze the robustness of our model with regard to two extensions.
First, we allow for market entry.48 Outside ﬁrms can enter the market incurring some
entry costs and become incumbent ﬁrms for the rest of the game. Second, we allow for
explicit collusion between ﬁrms, i.e. they can agree on charging the proﬁt-maximizing
insurance premia for low and high risks. If they can negotiate with each other, companies
are likely to exploit their information. We show that if entry costs are neither too high
nor too low, there exist equilibria with unused observables in which incumbent companies
cannot gain by explicit collusion. The intuition for this result is as follows: if incumbent
companies decide to increase their period proﬁts by charging diﬀerent premia for low
and high risks, outside companies can enter the market proﬁtably by making a one-shot
gain. If on the other side one incumbent company undercuts the insurance premium of
its competitors, it triggers a price war, which wipes out all gains of this deviation. We
therefore show that equilibria with unused observables can be robust to explicit collusion
and to the threat of market entry. In these equilbria, it does not pay oﬀ to use the
information about risks as the maximal level of per-period proﬁts can already be attained
without this information.
At a technical level, our essay also contributes to the literature of third-degree price
discrimination.49 In the case where insurance companies are able to distinguish between
high- and low-risk costumers, they have to decide whether to charge the same or diﬀerent
prices to two groups of costumers who diﬀer in their willingness to pay. This literature
has introduced the possibility of ﬁrms’ competition, but it has not analyzed equilibrium
strategies in the repeated game.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: The next section outlines the basic model
and derives an equilibrium with unused observables. We include explicit collusion and
market entry into the model in section 4.3. In section 4.4, we provide further examples
of the evolution of the use of information in insurance industries, and discuss welfare and
policy implications. The last section concludes.
48 Bikker and van Leuvensteijn (2008) show empirically that market entry is indeed a relevant phe-
nomenon in insurance markets in the countries analyzed in their study (Canada, Germany, Japan, the
Netherlands, and the UK).
49 See Tirole (1988), chapter 3.2 for a summary of this issue.4 On the use of information in repeated insurance markets 89
4.2 A repeated insurance market
4.2.1 Framework
Time is discrete and denoted by t 2 f0;1;:::g. The stage game is the simplest version
of an insurance market.50 In each period, there is a continuum of customers of mass 1.
These can be the same customers or diﬀerent ones in each period.51 Each customer has
wealth W in each period, and faces the risk of losing an amount of d < W. She may
have either a high-risk probability of H or a low-risk probability L < H. Let  be the
fraction of high-risk individuals. All customers have the same von Neuman-Morgenstern
utility function U(W).52 We assume that U(W) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable with
U0(W) > 0 and U00(W) < 0.
There are N > 1 long-lived risk-neutral insurance companies in the market. Let I =
f1;:::;Ng be the set of insurance companies. First, we will assume that these companies
can distinguish between high- and low-risk customers.53 At a later stage, we will turn
to the case of asymmetric information. In each period, each company i 2 I oﬀers any




L ) be the insurance premium for high-risk
(low-risk) individuals oﬀered by company i in period t. If an individual of risk j 2 fL;Hg
purchases an insurance cover Dj  0 in period t from company i, she pays Dj
i;t
j to
the company in this period, regardless of whether damage occurs or not. If the damage
50 As formalized, for example, in Rees and Wambach (2008).
51 There may also be a certain in- and outﬂow of individuals in each period. As long as not all customers
are locked into a speciﬁc contract for all periods, the results of the model do not change.
52 This only simpliﬁes the exposition of the model. All of our results would also hold if customer are
heterogeneous in their risk aversion (the only thing we need is that customers are risk averse to some
extent). Note that in standard models of the insurance market, the assumption of a uniform utility
function is not innocuous, see Smart (2000).
53 An alternative interpretation would be that insurance companies cannot perfectly distinguish risks,
but have imperfect information (variables which are imperfectly correlated with risk types) which can
be used to categorize risks, as in Hoy (1982).
54 We thereby assume non-exclusive provision of insurance which is diﬀerent from most insurance market
models, where companies oﬀer price-quantity combinations (such as Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)).
The assumption of non-exclusivity is not crucial for some markets such as the life insurance market
(see Polborn et al. (2006)). However, for property-liability insurance exclusivity it is more natural (we
are indebted to Michael Hoy for pointing out this fact to us). In terms of our model, non-exclusivity is
not needed for the results on the insurance market with symmetric information in sections 4.2.2 and
4.3. For the results on the insurance market with asymmetric information in section 4.2.3 it is needed
for our characterization of equilibrium outcomes, but not for the existence of collusive equilibria.4 On the use of information in repeated insurance markets 90
occurs, she gets Dj from the company, i.e. Dj = d implies full coverage. We say that





Customers are not modelled as strategic players: in each period, they purchase the utility
maximizing insurance cover from the company that oﬀers at the cheapest premium for
their risk. If more than one company has the lowest insurance premium, each customer
randomizes with equal probability from which company she buys insurance. The sequence
of events in each period t is as follows:









2. Customers purchase insurance DL and DH.






H = 0 (4.1)
for all i 2 I. For t 2 f0;1;:::g, we denote by ht the history of all insurance premia that




























The set of all possible histories at date t will be denoted by Ht. A strategy of company i is





H as a function of the history ht:

i;t : Ht ! R
2: (4.3)
Without loss of generality we concentrate on pure strategies. The strategies of companies












From this sequence, we can derive the proﬁt Gi;t of company i in period t. Insurance com-
panies discount future gains by . The sum of normalized discounted proﬁts of company
i is then given by
G






The insurance market is in equilibrium if no company i can increase its proﬁt Gi by
choosing unilaterally another strategy.4 On the use of information in repeated insurance markets 91
4.2.2 Equilibria in an oligopolistic insurance market with symmetric infor-
mation
We start by analyzing the demand for insurance. Assume for a moment that company i
oﬀers the lowest insurance premium to individuals with risk j 2 fL;Hg in period t. A
customer with risk j purchases the utility maximizing amount of insurance:
~ Dj(
i;t
j ) = argmaxDjjU
 











This demand is implicitly given by
U0

W   d + ~ Dj(
i;t






















As U0 is continuous, ~ Dj(
i;t
j ) must also be continuous. The fair insurance premium under
which the customer purchases full coverage is given by

f
j = j; (4.8)
while the highest insurance premium such that the customer is indiﬀerent between pur-


















demand is positive and company i earns a positive
proﬁt from contracts with individuals of risk j. For higher insurance premia, proﬁts are
0, for lower insurance premia, proﬁts are negative. Note that if L is suﬃciently close to




~ j 2 argmaxj 2 R(j   j) ~ Dj(j): (4.10)








therefore attains its maximum.
Assume now that only company i oﬀers the lowest premium for customers of both types,






P , where 
i;t
P
is called the “pooling premium”. We then have
G





















H ) implies positive demand for insurance by at least the high-risk4 On the use of information in repeated insurance markets 92






L < P0 < 
f
H. We then can state our ﬁrst main result:
Proposition 1 (a) For each  2 (P0;max
H ) there is a () < 1 such that there exists a
subgame-perfect equilibrium in which 
i;t
P =  for all companies i 2 I and in all periods
t if   (). (b) If  = 2 (P0;max
H ), then no such equilibrium exists. (c) We have that
lim#P0 () = 1.
Proof. (a) Consider the following simple grim-trigger strategy which is played by all
companies i 2 I: charge 
i;0
P = . In period t > 0, charge 
i;t














H. We employ the one stage deviation principle in order to show that this can





no other company can make positive proﬁts. Thus, the maximal normalized discounted
proﬁt from a deviation of company i in period t is given by
G
i;d = (1   )
h
(~ H   H) ~ DH(~ H) + (1   )(~ L   L) ~ DL(~ L)
i
: (4.12)






(   H) ~ DH() + (1   )(   L) ~ DL()
i
: (4.13)
As  2 (P0;max
H ), this term is positive. Thus, if  is suﬃciently close to unity, we have
Gi;c  Gi;d. (b) If 
f
L <   P0 and 
i;t
P =  for all i 2 I and in all periods t, a single
company l could increase its normalized discounted proﬁt by charging 
l;0









P =  for all i 2 I and in all periods t,









H in all periods t. If max
H   and 
i;t
P =  for all i 2 I and in all periods t,
a single company l could increase its normalized discounted proﬁt by charging 
l;0
L = ~ H,

l;0
H = ~ L and the fair premia thereafter. (c) Assume that an equilibrium exists in which

i;t
P =  for all i 2 I and in all periods t. Then the normalized discounted proﬁt for each
ﬁrm is equal to the term in (4.13). Note that this term converges to 0 as  approaches
P0 from above. The maximal normalized discounted proﬁt of a deviating ﬁrm can be at
least
(1   )(1   )(P0   L) ~ DL(P0) > 0: (4.14)
Thus, we must have lim#P0 () = 1.
In the equilibria of proposition 1, insurance companies fear a price war if they change
their insurance premia. Thus, they maintain a pooling premium, which guarantees them
positive proﬁts. This situation exhibits the following features:4 On the use of information in repeated insurance markets 93
 Although companies have more detailed information about risks, they do not use
it. Thus, we have an equilibrium with unused observables.
 Given that L is suﬃciently close to H, both low- and high-risk individuals pur-
chase positive amounts of insurance. However, there is adverse selection: as we can
derive from equation (4.7), low-risk customers purchase less insurance than high-risk
customers.
4.2.3 Equilibria in an oligopolistic insurance market with asymmetric infor-
mation
We now turn to the case where insurance companies cannot distinguish between high-
and low-risk individuals and show that a result similar to proposition 1 holds. Because of
asymmetric information, each ﬁrm i 2 I only charges a pooling premium ~ 
i;t
P in period t
and customers purchase the amount of insurance which maximizes their expected utility
from the ﬁrm that charges the lowest insurance premium. Fix
~ 
i; 1
P = 0 (4.15)
for all i 2 I. For t 2 f0;1;:::g, we denote by ~ ht the history of all insurance premia that






















The set of all possible histories at date t will be denoted by ~ Ht. A strategy of company i is
an inﬁnite sequence of action functions ~ i;t for every t 2 f0;1;:::g, where ~ i;t determines
~ 
i;t
P as a function of the history ~ ht:
~ 
i;t : ~ Ht ! R: (4.17)
Again, we concentrate on pure strategies. The strategies of companies determine the










from which the sum of normalized discounted proﬁts ~ Gi can be calculated as in the last
subsection. The rest of the model remains unchanged. Deﬁne
AP =
n
~ P j ~ P 2 argmax 2 R(   H) ~ DH() + (1   )(   L) ~ DL()
o
;(4.19)




P = minf~ 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which is the smallest element in this set. We then can derive:
Proposition 2 Assume that companies cannot distinguish between high- and low risks.
For each  2 [P0;max
H ) there is a ~ () < 1 such that there exists a subgame-perfect
equilibrium in which ~ 
i;t
P =  for all companies i 2 I and in all periods t if   ~ (). (b)
If  = 2 [P0;max
H ), then no such equilibrium exists. (c) If  > P0 is suﬃciently small,
then ~ () = 1   1
N.
Proof. Observe that one equilibrium of the stage game is ~ i
P = P0 for all i 2 I, therefore
it is an equilibrium if ~ 
i;t
P = P0 for all i 2 I and in all periods t. In this equilibrium, all
companies make zero-proﬁts. Assume now that  2 (P0;max
H ). Consider the following
simple grim-trigger strategy which is played by all companies i 2 I: charge ~ 
i;0
P = . In
period t > 0, charge ~ 
i;t
P =  if and only if ~ 
l;
P = , l 2 I, in all periods  2 f0;:::;t   1g.
Otherwise, charge ~ 
i;t
P = P0. If at least one company charges P0, no other company can
make positive proﬁts. Thus, the maximal normalized discounted proﬁt from a deviation
of company i in period t is given by
G




P   H) ~ DH(~ 

P) + (1   )(~ 












(   H) ~ DH() + (1   )(   L) ~ DL()
i
: (4.22)
As  2 (P0;max
H ), this term is positive. Thus, if  is suﬃciently close to unity, we have
Gi;c  Gi;d. (b) If  < P0 and ~ 
i;t
P =  for all i 2 I and in all periods t, a single company
l could increase its normalized discounted proﬁt by charging ~ 
l;t
L = P0 in all periods t. If
max
H   and ~ 
i;t
P =  for all i 2 I and in all periods t, a single company l could increase
its normalized discounted proﬁt by charging ~ 
l;0
L = ~ 
P and ~ 
l;
L = P0 in all periods 
thereafter. (c) Deﬁne
G() = (   H) ~ DH() + (1   )(   L) ~ DL() (4.23)
and observe that G() is continuous on the interval (P0;max
H ) with G(P0) = 0. Thus,
there must exist an ^  with P0 < ^   ~ 
P, such that G() strictly increases in the
interval (P0; ^ ). Consider the same strategy as in part (a) for  2 (P0; ^ ). As before,
the normalized discounted proﬁt from compliance is then 1
NG(), while the normalized
discounted proﬁt from a deviation is (1   )G(). Consequently, the critical discount
factor equals 1   1
N.
The results of proposition 1 and proposition 2 enable the following interpretation: the ar-
rival of new information about risks does not necessarily change the equilibrium outcome.
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insurance companies charge a premium of ~  2 (P0;max
H ) in each period (proposition 2
says that this is possible). If in that situation new information about risks arrives (as a
result of data-collection, for example), then, by proposition 1, the market can enter an
equilibrium with symmetric information and with exactly the same equilibrium outcome
(given that  is suﬃciently high). This is especially relevant if collusion must be tacit and
companies avoid explicit negotiations. In particular, we have shown that almost every
equilibrium outcome under asymmetric information is also an equilibrium outcome under
symmetric information.
Whether an equilibrium outcome survives the arrival of new information about risks
or not, might depend on the extent of collusion: observe from proposition 1 (c) and
proposition 2 (c) that if proﬁts are low under asymmetric information (i.e. if ~ 
i;t
P is close
to P0 for all i), the critical discount factor is just 1  1
N, while it is very close to 1 under
symmetric information. Thus, if proﬁts are low, then the arrival of new information
potentially triggers a price war and a change of the equilibrium outcome. Compared to
that, the critical discount factor equals 1   1
N under both asymmetric and symmetric
information if ~ 
i;t
P = ~ 
P for all i (which can be shown by going through the same steps as
in the proof of proposition 2 (c)), i.e. if proﬁts are relatively high.
Whenever insurance companies can make expected proﬁts out of all contracts, it is not
diﬃcult to imagine a situation when they do so by granting bulk discounts (instead of
linear pricing) to customers, as discovered by Cawley and Philipson (1999). This especially
makes sense when ﬁrms face administrative ﬁxed costs per contract, such that selling more
insurance to some risks increases the expected proﬁt per unit of insurance.
4.3 Explicit collusion and market entry
The equilibria in the last section had a number of attributes that are inconsistent with the
results of one-shot models of the insurance market, but consistent with empirical results.
However, there remain two important issues:
 If an industry makes proﬁts, we would expect market entry.
 If companies are able to sustain collusion, they should be able to increase their
proﬁts even further by using the information about risks, i.e. they may coordinate
on an equilibrium in which all ﬁrms discriminate between risks and charge 
i;t
H = ~ H
and 
i;t
L = ~ L in all periods t.55
55 Here we implicitly assume that ~ H 6= ~ L which is true for most standard utility-functions.4 On the use of information in repeated insurance markets 96
We will deal with both questions in this section and show that the equilibria of proposition
1 still can be robust against market entry and explicit collusion. In all what follows, we
will again consider a scenario with symmetric information. Note that explicit collusion
is illegal in most legislations and tacit collusion (i.e. collusion without communication
between ﬁrms) hard to detect.56 We will not rely on this, but assume that ﬁrms can
negotiate without being exposed to the danger of punishment.
Denote the set of incumbent companies in each period by It, where
I0 = f1;:::;Ng:
In each period t, there is an inﬁnite number of outside ﬁrms k 2 NnIt which can enter
the market at cost c > 0.57 These entry costs can be interpreted as installation costs,
for example, the costs of acquiring the necessary distribution channels. If an outside
company enters the market, it belongs to the set of incumbents in all future periods
and can distinguish between high and low risks.58 As tie-breaking rule we deﬁne that a
company only enters the market if it can make strictly positive proﬁts. Furthermore, we
deﬁne:
Deﬁnition An equilibrium is robust against explicit collusion if there is no other weakly
pareto superior equilibrium for incumbent companies.
If an equilibrium in which companies i 2 I0 do not use the information about risks is
robust against explicit communication, any agreement on adjusting insurance premia to
increase proﬁts must result in a decrease of proﬁts for at least one incumbent company,
and therefore would not be accepted by this company.59
We assume that in each period, outside companies observe the insurance premia charged
by incumbent companies and then decide about whether to enter the market or not. Thus,
56 For a discussion about the diﬀerence between explicit and tacit collusion, see Rees (1993).
57 This also could be insurance companies which oﬀer the same insurance contracts, but at substantially
higher rates, such that only a small fraction of uninformed consumers (who do not compare insurance
premia, but randomly choose some contract) purchases those contracts.
58 This particular model of market entry was introduced by Harrington (1989).
59 Note that robustness against explicit collusion is weaker than (weak) renegotiation proofness. For
details about renegotiation proofness, see Mailath and Samuelson (2006), pages 134 - 143. One also
could construct weak renegotiation proof equilibria in our setting, however, their structure is not
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incumbent companies are Stackelberg leaders and market entry is endogenous as in Etro
(2008). The sequence of events now is as follows:









2. Outside companies decide whether to enter the market at cost c or not. If a company









3. Costumers purchase insurance DL and DH.
4. Nature decides about the occurrence of damage and payoﬀs are realized.
5. If a company k 2 NnIt has entered the market, then It+1 = It [ fkg.
Clearly, as entry costs are positive, incumbents can price outside companies out of the
market. However, if entry costs are small, then per-period proﬁts also must be small. If
these proﬁts are generated by charging a pooling premium such that low risks subsidize
high risks, then it can be proﬁtable for an outside ﬁrm to enter the market and to make
a one-shot gain by oﬀering contracts only to low risks. We therefore get:
Proposition 3 If c is suﬃciently small, then in equilibrium all companies that make
positive proﬁts in period t use the information about risks in this period.









l 2 It and j 2 fL;Hg. If an outside company k 2 NnIt enters the market, then it earns
at least
 c + (1   )(P0   L) ~ DL(P0); (4.24)
by charging 
k;t




H, given that there is no other outside company which
enters the market. The term in (4.24) is positive if c is suﬃciently low. Therefore, the
situation outlined above cannot be an equilibrium outcome if c is suﬃciently low.
Thus, the equilibria of proposition 1 are not robust against market entry, if entry costs are
suﬃciently small. However, we do not expect entry barriers to be negligible for insurance
markets. If c is suﬃciently high, the existence of equilibria with pooling premia might be
restored. Deﬁne ~ 
P as in the last section and denote
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   L) ~ DL(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Ghigh is the highest period proﬁt from a pooling contract, Glow is the highest period proﬁt













L, such that Glow ! 0. Thus, if H is
suﬃciently close to L, then Ghigh > Glow. We then can show:
Proposition 4 Assume that  > 1   1




there is a subgame-perfect equilibrium which is robust against explicit collusion and in
which 
i;t







, for all incumbent companies i 2 I0 in all periods t, while
outside ﬁrms do not enter the insurance market.















j (   H) ~ DH() + (1   )(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) = G
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:(4.27)
Fix a value G 2
 
Glow;Ghigh
. Assume that in each period, incumbent companies play a
grim-trigger strategy that also deters entry: Charge 
i;t














H. We show that this strategy can support an equilibrium. If a company i 2 I0
undercuts G in period t, then the deﬁnition of G, the continuity of  ~ Dj() and the
fact that G > Glow ensure that Gi;t < G. Given that no outside company ever enters
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; (4.28)
which is equivalent to




The tie-breaking rule implies that an outside company will not enter if and only if
G
  c: (4.30)
Thus, if c 2
 
Glow;Ghigh
and (4.29) holds, then an equilibrium with no market entry,
G = c, 
i;t
P = G for all i 2 I0 and all t exists and is robust against explicit collusion.
The logic of these equilibria is again simple. As incumbent companies play a grim-
trigger strategy, they refrain from changing their pricing schedule. The punishment is
also triggered if an outside company enters the market. Therefore, the period proﬁt is
limited to entry costs, otherwise it would pay oﬀ for an outside company to enter the
market and make a one-shot gain. Therefore, incumbent companies cannot coordinate on
insurance premia, such that they earn strictly higher proﬁts.4 On the use of information in repeated insurance markets 99
The upper bound on entry costs, Ghigh, ensures that a period proﬁt equal to 1
Nc per
incumbent company can be attained by charging a pooling premium. If entry costs
are much higher than Ghigh, incumbent companies can increase their proﬁts by explicit
collusion and by using their information about risks. The lower bound, Glow, is needed
to make sure that no incumbent company can gain by undercutting the premium for
customers with small risk if the period payoﬀ is equal to 1
Nc for each incumbent company.
If entry costs are lower, incumbent companies could still deter entry by charging low
insurance premia, but they would have to use the information about risks in some periods,
otherwise each incumbent company could gain by one-shot deviation. The measure of
admissible values of c can be substantial: Glow strictly decreases in  and will be small if
H is close to L, while Ghigh can be large if customers are very risk averse and ready to
pay a high risk premium.
The result of proposition 3 remains valid if incumbents use other punishment strategies
to deter market entry or deviation from pooling premia. However, the maximal period
proﬁt for incumbent companies may decrease. Consider, for example, a tit-for-tat strategy
where incumbent companies again start to charge proﬁtable pooling premia after a ﬁnite
number of periods with zero-proﬁts. Then in an equilibrium with entry-deterrence, the
period proﬁt per incumbent company must be lower than 1
Nc. Otherwise, an outside
company could enter the market, cover its entry costs by capturing the whole market
(as it earns c), and participate in future business proﬁtably after the price war has been
ﬁnished.
4.4 Discussion
4.4.1 Examples of the evolution of information in insurance markets
Our model interprets the presence of unused observables as a sign of collusion. This is
in accordance with experience in the US automotive insurance market where, as long as
companies were making extensive proﬁts, contracts were almost not diﬀerentiated by risk
class (Carter (2005)). However, as proﬁts in the market started to deteriorate in the
late 1990s, one insurance company (Allstate), changed the number of pricing categories
from 3 to over 1,500. As a consequence, Allstate’s return on equity almost doubled in
the following two years. However, as the author points out, this strategy might not be
of lasting success, as other insurance companies also start to change their pricing system,
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It seems to be the case that it is often small ﬁrms or new entrants who start using a ﬁner
risk classiﬁcation (Finkelstein and Poterba (2006)). Ainslie (2000) provides an example
of the U.K. annuity market where new start-up companies were formed to oﬀer impaired
annuity products to those individuals in observable poor health. Only under increased
competitive pressure did the existing companies follow suit.
The evolution of the use of information in the European Union has followed the evolution
of competition in the insurance industry. Before 1994, when the European Commission
completed a series of directives in order to remove obstacles to competition, the insurance
markets in several European countries such as Germany and Italy were tightly regulated.
Considering the use of information in automotive insurance in Germany, risk categories
were rather coarse and involved extensive pooling (Rees and Kessner (1999)), while in
Italy, companies were even restricted by law to a very limited number of parameters they
could use in their pricing schemes (Buzzacchi and Valletti (2005)). After deregulation, as a
consequence of increased competition, premiums in automotive insurance have undergone
large reductions, and at the same time companies introduced contracts with ﬁner risk
categorization, see Rees and Kessner (1999) and Buzzacchi and Valletti (2005). However,
in some markets, such as the annuity market in Germany, the companies remain in an
equilibrium where contracts are almost not diﬀerentiated by risks classes at all.
4.4.2 Welfare and policy implications
The sole existence of unused observables is a signal of anti-competitive behavior in the
insurance industry for the regulator. Therefore, the presence of unused observables could
be used as a policy tool by competition authorities. Given that customers are aware of
their individual risk, equilibria with unused observables are clearly ineﬃcient: as long as
customers are not forced to purchase full coverage (for example, by regulation), they will
buy too little insurance.
Considering the debate on whether insurance companies should be allowed to gather
genetic information or not,60 there are cases where it might be welfare enhancing if not
all information is used to set prices: if customers do not know their individual risk,
genetic testing might impose ex-ante a classiﬁcation risk on potential insurance buyers.
However, our analysis shows that there are good reasons for insurance companies not
to use genetic information in their pricing schedules: ﬁrstly, adjusting pricing schedules
60 For an in-depth discussion of this issue consult Polborn et al. (2006), Strohmenger and Wambach
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without coordination with other companies might trigger a price war. Secondly, using
more information only makes sense for companies if proﬁts rise. Companies might refrain
from using all additional information in their pricing decisions for fear of market entry.
4.5 Conclusion
Recently, several empirical ﬁndings have contradicted the predictions of the standard
one-shot model of an insurance market. Our model of an oligopolistic insurance market
rationalizes the occurrence of two formerly unexplained phenomena, unused observables
and bulk discounts.
From the model we derived two explanations why ﬁrms may not use all risk-relevant
information: ﬁrst, if ﬁrms collude tacitly and available information changes over time, then
they possibly refrain from using new information in order to prevent a price war. Second,
if there is the threat of market entry, then per-period proﬁts are limited. Whenever ﬁrms
attain the upper limit of per-period proﬁts, it does not pay oﬀ for incumbents to include
more information. Under both scenarios, ﬁrms can make positive proﬁts out of contracts
with high and low risks and therefore may oﬀer bulk discounts to customers.
A number of extensions to our model can be made. We used a very simple model of an
insurance market, where in each period a new cohort of customers arrives. Usually, a
customer is insured over a longer time horizon and the insurance company can condition
premia for this customer on her history of damages. Thus, experience rating could be
introduced into the model. Eventually, ﬁrms may ﬁnd it optimal to skip experience rating
in order to simplify collusion. Furthermore, one can analyze more complex forms of collu-
sion like, for example, collusion on several diﬀerent insurance markets as in Bernheim and
Whinston (1990). Note that many insurance companies oﬀer various types of insurance.
Finally, more empirical work on contracts and collusion in insurance markets would be
desirable to investigate the use of information by insurance companies.Chapter 5
What if everybody had a choice?
Using hypothetical choice experiments to analyze
the demand for prescription drug insurance
5.1 Introduction
“To say it as plainly as I can, health care reform is the single most important thing we
can do for America’s long-term ﬁscal health” (President Barack Obama, speech at the
American Medical Association, June 15, 2009).
The USA is the country with the single most expensive health care system in the world
(more than 16.2 percent of GDP in 2007) – health care costs per person are almost 50
percent higher than those in the next most costly nation.61 Real health care costs per
capita have been rising at an annual rate of 4.4 percent since the 1980s, and they are
projected to rise even faster in the future. However, Americans are not healthier than
citizens of other nations – among the twenty developed countries with the highest health
care spending, the USA ranks lowest in life expectancy. In fact, the USA is in the group
of countries performing particularly poorly in the elasticity of life expectancy of the 15 to
60 years-old with respect to health care spending - together with Botswana, Swaziland,
South Africa, Namibia, Zambia, Uganda and Gabon. One of the main reasons for this is
uneven access to health care that is caused by the great number of individuals without
health insurance, an estimated 47 million U.S. citizens in 2007.
Thus, there is a crying need for health care reform. After Roosevelt, Truman, Nixon,
Carter and Clinton, President Obama is the latest American president who has called for
such a reform. With the reform, the following features of the present system are supposed
to remain in place: First, obtaining health insurance coverage will remain an individual’s
free choice. Second, the supply of health insurance will remain in the hand of private
61 This and the following facts about international comparisons of health care spending and outcomes
are taken from McFadden et al. (2008).
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companies. Third, the old system, with employers oﬀering coverage for their employees,
the Veterans Administration oﬀering coverage for those (formerly) in the military, and
public insurance for the elderly, disabled and poor (Medicare for the elderly and disabled,
Medicaid for the poor and Shift for children) will remain in place.
Medicare provides basic health coverage for 43 million elderly and disabled U.S. residents.
However, until 2006, prescription drug coverage was not provided by the program, and
about a third of the relevant population were without such coverage (Neuman et al.
(2007)). In 2006, Medicare Part D, a highly subsidized market for prescription drug
coverage, was introduced. This introduction has been the largest single expansion in
social insurance in the U.S. since 1965. Medicare Part D has implications for the optimal
design of the U.S. health insurance systems, because it is similar in many dimensions to
the envisaged health care reform.62
Lessons from this experiment will be crucial both for deciding whether to introduce uni-
versal health care in the USA and for the design of social insurance programs in other
countries. Part D also gives important insights into the practicality of Consumer Di-
rected Health Care (CDHC), an approach to achieving eﬃcient allocation of health care
resources by confronting consumers with the full marginal cost of the services they use.
Further, Medicare Part D can act as a natural experiment of consumer behavior in real-
world decision situations that are characterized by complexity, ambiguity and important
consequences. Therefore, lively discussion of the consequences of Medicare Part D has
taken place in numerous studies in economics and health.63 Most of these studies have
restricted their analysis to the relatively small group of “active deciders”: those consumers
who had no prescription drug insurance before the introduction of Medicare Part D.64
This essay contributes to the discussion on Medicare Part D by using a hypothetical
choice experiment that was conducted using a random sample of the relevant popula-
tion to analyze consumer demand. Thus, the whole potential market is included in the
analysis instead of restricting the focus to a small group of consumers. In hypothetical
choice experiments, individuals are asked to choose between diﬀerent commodities whose
attributes vary in order to infer the utility associated with these attributes and consumers’
62 More details on Medicare Part D and its connection to the health care reform are given in section 5.2.
63 The results of at least some of them are presented in section 5.2.
64 Many other groups of consumers were also aﬀected by the introduction of Medicare Part D, for example
those who had some privately bought or employer sponsored coverage before or those on Medicaid.
Many consumers were not given an equally free choice regarding their insurance coverage – as for
example the consumers who were eligible for both, Medicaid and Medicare, and who were automatically
enrolled and randomly assigned to prescription drug plans. We will call these consumers passive
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willingness-to-pay (WTP). Here, respondents are asked to choose between insurance con-
tracts that diﬀer in their level of coverage. The insurance premia for these contracts are
randomly assigned to the respondents. Hypothetical choice experiments are a well-known
tool from marketing and psychology that in recent years has been used increasingly for
demand estimation by economists. They are also used frequently by health economists
to elicit consumer preferences regarding health care.65 We want to draw attention to the
fact that they can be used to elicit the demand of consumer groups whose choices cannot
be observed in the actual market.66 We thereby proceed as follows:
In this chapter, we use the hypothetical choice experiments to elicit WTP for prescription
drug insurance with diﬀerent levels of coverage for all types of consumers. We distinguish
between the active deciders and the passive participants (those receiving prescription
drug coverage through their employers, the Veterans Administration, private insurance,
Medicare Advantage Plans or Medicaid). We show that these groups of consumers diﬀer
in many dimensions from the active deciders (for example their WTP for insurance, their
income, their risk types and risk attitudes). Therefore, drawing inference from just this
group of consumers might lead to misleading conclusions - for example, when analyzing
welfare eﬀects of eliminating the coverage gap as suggested by President Obama in his
speech to Congress on health care reform on September 10, 2009. As for the active
deciders, we observe their actual decisions in addition to their hypothetical choices. We
can then estimate a joint model.
For our analysis, we use the Retirement Perspectives Survey (RPS), a dataset unique in
providing a random sample of elderly Americans (and thus covering all groups described
above) and containing both respondents’ actual decisions regarding Medicare Part D as
well as a hypothetical choice dataset where respondents are asked to choose between
diﬀerent prescription drug plans and the option of not having coverage at all.
We ﬁnd that WTP for drug insurance is low for consumers with either low expected drug
costs or low income. On the other hand, consumers demand extensive coverage if they
are currently in poor health, expect high future drug costs, but also if they are more
risk averse. These ﬁndings conﬂict with consumers’ real choices where neither health nor
socio-economic indicators prove signiﬁcant. A possible reason for this discrepancy is that
the active deciders for whom we observe actual choices are too homogeneous. In order to
analyze the impact of socio-economic conditions on insurance demand we need to consider
65 For example Scanlon et al. (1997) or Becker and Zweifel (2008). For a review on the literature
of applications of discrete choice experiments in health economics see Ryan and Gerard (2003) and
Guttmann et al. (2009).
66 More on hypothetical choice experiments and how they can be combined with survey on consumers’
actual decisions can be found in section 5.3.5 What if everybody had a choice? 105
suﬃciently heterogeneous consumer groups, which is possible through our hypothetical
choice experiment. Taking the whole potential market into consideration, we ﬁnd that
active deciders exhibit a signiﬁcantly lower WTP than passive participants. Therefore,
welfare estimates of the introduction of Medicare Part D based on these consumers alone
might underestimate actual welfare.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 describes Medicare Part D, the institu-
tional setting, the types of insurance plans oﬀered, and consumer groups. Section 5.3
is on hypothetical choice experiments. Section 5.4 provides a description of our data
and some descriptives. Section 5.5 describes our estimation method, and section 5.6 our
econometric results. Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 Medicare Part D
5.2.1 The market
Since its introduction in 1965, Medicare has been providing health insurance for elderly
and disabled Americans. In 2008, enrollment was at about 45 million.67 Individuals are
eligible for Medicare if they are U.S. citizens or long-term legal residents of at least 65
years of age and if either they or their spouses have paid Medicare taxes for at least ten
years.68 Medicare is administered by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
Medicare Part A provides basic coverage for inpatient hospital stays. Medicare Part B
is optional and provides additional care, for example for physician and nursing services
and for durable medical equipment. In 1997, the government introduced the possibil-
ity to receive care through private health insurance plans which are known as Part C,
Medicare+Choice or Medicare Advantage Plans. These plans contract with health care
providers, and eligible patients can only receive care through those providers under con-
tract.69
Before the introduction of Medicare Part D in 2006, only pharmaceutical treatments ad-
ministered in a physician’s oﬃce, in a hospital or other institution were covered by the
67 There are several websites which provide information on Medicare: www.cms.hhs.gov,
www.medicare.gov and www.statehealthfacts.org.
68 Further, disabled U.S. citizens or those with end stage renal disease are eligible for the program.
However, we concentrate on the elderly beneﬁciaries here who form the vast majority of over 90
percent of beneﬁciaries.
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program. This was a major drawback of Medicare, because only some Medicare beneﬁ-
ciaries had prescription drug coverage from some other source, while about 30 percent of
Medicare beneﬁciaries had little or no prescription drug coverage (Neuman et al. (2007)).
This had serious negative consequences: First, medical expenditures placed a major ﬁnan-
cial burden on the elderly.70 Second, cost-related non-adherence, i.e. the discontinuation
of medication because it is too expensive, was a big concern before the introduction of
Part D (Madden et al. (2008)).
Consequently, the aims of Medicare Part D were to make drug insurance coverage af-
fordable for the elderly with low incomes, to provide protection against catastrophic drug
costs and to reduce cost-related non-adherence.71
Another motive was that insurance companies have more bargaining power than single
consumers vis- a-vis pharmaceutical companies and this would stop the increase of pre-
scription drug expenditures. Before the introduction of Medicare Part D, the share of
prescription drug spending in U.S. health care spending had been rising steadily.72
In the designing of the market, the government has taken several measures to overcome
problems related to adverse selection and excessive spending. First, the government sub-
sidizes the newly established market so that enrollment should be optimal for almost
everybody. Second, the market is organized in a way that is supposed to give companies
incentives to pass the reductions they receive from pharmaceutical companies through to
consumers.73 Furthermore, the subsidy is supposed to equalize the portfolio of consumers
with regard to their risk types and it provides reinsurance for catastrophic drug beneﬁts.
70 According to data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, per-person expenditures among Medi-
care recipients for prescription drugs were equal to $1,789 in 2003, with more than half of this paid
out-of-pocket and just about 8 percent paid for by the Medicare program (Duggan and Scott-Morton
(2006)). In 2005, about 10 percent of Medicare beneﬁciaries had catastrophic drug bills of more than
$5,600, while the median income in this population was only $15,700 (McFadden et al. (2008)).
71 There exists a subsidy that recipients whose incomes were at or below 135 percent of the poverty line
can apply for (the so-called LIS). Estimations for 2008 show that 12.5 million Medicare beneﬁciaries
are eligible for LIS, with 9.4 million actually receiving it. Certain groups of Medicare recipients are
automatically enrolled in the subsidy, for example those on Medicaid (The Henry J. Kaiser Family
Foundation (2008)).
72 The increase was ﬁrst slow starting from 4.5 percent in 1982 and then rapidly accelerating in the 1990s
to 10.1 percent by 2005 (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) (2008)), and about 60
percent of all prescriptions in the U.S. are ﬁled for beneﬁciaries of Medicare, Medicaid, and other
government programs (Duggan and Scott-Morton (2010)).
73 At the beginning of each period, insurance companies take part in a bidding procedure with their bids
representing an estimation of the costs that the company incurs in order to provide basic prescription
drug coverage to a representative Part D enrollee. The monthly premium that the plan can charge to
its costumers depends on this bid (and therefore, competition for consumers reduces the incentive to
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Third, the late enrollment penalty helps overcoming adverse selection by encouraging
individuals to join Medicare Part D earlier in their lives and not only when they have
already developed health problems. It has to be paid by everybody who i) was eligible
for Medicare Part D during the initial enrollment period (November 15, 2005 to May 15,
2006) or who becomes eligible for the ﬁrst time during any future open-enrollment period
(November 15 - December 31 of each year); ii) does not have creditable coverage (coverage
which is considered equivalent to Medicare Part D); and iii) who decides not to enroll in
Medicare Part D. It is equal to the months without coverage times one percent of the
national base beneﬁciary premium.
Fourth, the standard plan designed for this market has several features that are supposed
to discourage excessive spending: A deductible, copayments and a coverage gap in which
the insured has to bear 100 percent of prescription drugs. Further, most plans give
incentives to buy cheap drugs such as generics by reducing copayments for these types of
drugs.74
5.2.2 Market outcomes and prior research on the active deciders
Research on the active deciders has drawn the following lessons from Medicare Part D:
First, by and large, Medicare Part D has been a success in providing a large percentage of
the Medicare eligible population with prescription drug coverage. Enrollment rates were
above 90 percent in the ﬁrst year of Medicare Part D (Winter et al. (2006)). Those who
remained without coverage in 2006 belong to two very diﬀerent consumer groups: Those
in relatively good health and those potentially diﬃcult to reach (Neuman et al. (2007)).
Second, the complexity of the market with its many providers and many diﬀerent products
may have resulted in suboptimal choices, especially among the most vulnerable - those
with low income, low educational attainment, poor health or some cognitive impairment
(Heiss et al. (2006) and Duggan et al. (2008)). Some research suggests that actual premia
are the main driver of consumers’ choices, and that too little weight is placed on expected
out-of-pocket costs (Abaluck and Gruber (2011)).
Third, substantial adverse selection seems to have occurred, but no moral hazard among
the active deciders.75 Most consumers who remained without prescription drug coverage
behaved economically optimal, as their prescription drug needs were low (Winter et al.
74 See section 5.2.3 where the available plans are described in more detail.
75 The term moral hazard might not be the correct one in the context of health insurance. Individuals
might have used too little prescription drugs before, and this might have had adverse consequences for
their health. In fact, this was one of the reasons for introducing prescription drug coverage in the ﬁrst
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(2006) and Levy and Weir (2009)). However, premia of those plans oﬀering basic Part
D coverage (see below) do not seem to have been aﬀected strongly by adverse selection:
They were even lower than expected. Only those plans appear to have been aﬀected by
adverse selection that oﬀer more extensive coverage that does not beneﬁt from government
subsidies, a sign of which were rapidly rising premia and reduced coverage (McFadden
et al. (2008)).
Several features of Medicare Part D described above make it similar to the envisaged
health care reform.76
First, it remains an individual’s choice whether to enroll in Medicare Part D, whether to
remain without coverage, or whether to remain with the already existing coverage, for
example from employers or private insurance.
Second, there are subsidies for low-income consumers. The government subsidy for catas-
trophic costs places a limit on the out-of-pocket expenses of insured individuals. There is
no cap on the amount of coverage that someone can receive.
Third, insurance is oﬀered by private companies, but there are government regulations
that restrict what can be oﬀered on the market: Contracts oﬀered have to provide a certain
minimum coverage as well as coverage for catastrophic events. Individuals cannot be
denied coverage because they are high-risk consumers. Because insurance companies buy
in great bulks, the government expected that they would be able to use their bargaining
power vis- a-vis pharmaceutical companies or health care providers.
Fourth, there are several mechanisms that are supposed to counteract adverse selection
and excessive use of care.
Although research on Medicare Part D has already drawn many important conclusions,
when analyzing consumer welfare or predicting policy changes, for example the abolition of
the coverage gap, it is crucial to make predictions that are valid for the whole population.
Therefore, in the following, we describe the features of the supplied plans and the groups
of consumers which will be important for the following analysis.
5.2.3 Types of plans
Under Medicare Part D, the plans insurers can oﬀer are standardized. The standard drug
beneﬁt, as deﬁned by the Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization
Act of 2003, is characterized by four main features:77
76 Government plans for the reform can be found at www.healthreform.gov.
77 Features of the plan have changed slightly over time. These are the features of the plan in 2006, when
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1. A $250 (annual) deductible below which the insured have to pay for all costs them-
selves.
2. An interval of drug spending between $250 and $2,250 where the plan covers 75
percent of drug costs.
3. A coverage gap between $2,250 and $5,100 where the insured has to bear the full
costs (which translates into an out-of-pocket limit of $3,600).
4. A catastrophic threshold of $5,100 above which the insurance covers 95 percent of
all costs.
Figure 5.1 (from Heiss et al. (2009a)) shows the beneﬁciary’s out-of-pocket costs as a
function of his yearly drug bills. The plan was designed in order to both reduce moral
hazard (through the deductible and the coverage cap) and to provide insurance against
catastrophic drug costs.
Figure 5.1: Beneﬁt schedule of the Medicare Part D standard plan
Companies can either oﬀer the standard plans, or plans that oﬀer more extensive coverage,
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classiﬁes the stand-alone prescription drug plans that are available under Medicare Part
D in four categories (Heiss et al. (2009a)):
 The standard plan is the plan with the statutorily deﬁned coverage, deductible,
gap, and cost sharing.
 An actuarially equivalent plan has the same deductible and gap as the standard
plan, but has diﬀerent cost sharing modalities (such as copayment tiers for preferred
drug costs and generic drugs rather than percentage copayment). Actuarial equiva-
lence to the standard plan may be achieved through restrictions in plan formularies,
but all approved plans must have formularies that include at least two drugs in each
therapeutic category. In 2009, about 34 percent of Part D stand-alone prescription
drug plans had the standard deductible (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation
(2008)).
 A basic alternative plan is actuarially equivalent to the statutory deﬁned beneﬁt,
but both the deductible and cost sharing can be altered (most of these plans have
no deductible). In 2009, about 55 percent of stand-alone plans had no deductible
at all, and 11 percent of plans had a deductible diﬀerent from the standard one.
 An enhanced alternative plan exceeds the deﬁned standard coverage - for ex-
ample, by oﬀering coverage in the gap for generic drugs only, or both generic and
branded drugs. About one quarter of Part D stand-alone plans and one half of
Medicare Advantage Plans oﬀered gap coverage in 2008 and 2009. The share of
Medicare stand-alone plans with no gap coverage decreased from 85 percent in 2006
to 75 percent in 2009. In Medicare Advantage prescription drug plans this percent-
age was reduced even more drastically from 72 percent in 2006 to 49 percent in 2009
(The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation (2008)).
5.2.4 Groups of consumers
Medicare recipients can belong to diﬀerent groups regarding their prescription drug cover-
age: Stand-alone plans, Medicare Advantage Plans or private insurance, coverage through
the employer or the Veterans Administration, or coverage through Medicaid. These groups
will be described in the following.
Those individuals who had no prescription drug coverage before the introduction of Medi-
care Part D had to make an active choice to enroll in Medicare Part D - remaining inactive
meant choosing to remain uncovered. They could either enroll in Medicare Part D stand-
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Medicare + Choice before) where prescription drug coverage is provided as part of overall
health care through HMOs.
Some of these plans had covered prescription drugs already before the introduction of
Medicare Part D. With the introduction of Medicare Part D, Medicare Advantage Plans
were almost forced to oﬀer prescription drug coverage, because their enrollees could not
take up Medicare Part D without losing their beneﬁts from outpatient and inpatient care
(Levy and Weir (2009)). Further, these plans are subsidized more heavily in order to
encourage Medicare recipients to seek more extensive coverage (Duggan et al. (2008)).
Thus, Medicare Advantage Plan beneﬁciaries may belong to either of two groups: They
may have had prescription drug coverage before, and this coverage was simply converted
into Part D coverage, or they may have chosen prescription drug coverage only with
the introduction of Part D. In 2006, about 10.4 million of Medicare recipients enrolled
in Part D chose stand-alone coverage, while about 6 million received coverage through
Medicare Advantage Plans, including 1.2 million new enrollees. About half a million of
those enrolled in Medicare Advantage Plans are recipients of Medicaid (U.S. Departement
of Health and Human Services (2006)).
The situation is similar for individuals that had private insurance for their prescription
drugs before the introduction of Medicare Part D. A special situation holds for Medigap
(or Medicare supplemental) health insurances. These are private supplemental health
insurance plans that cover medical expenses that are not, or partially not, covered by
Medicare. Since 2006, these plans cannot oﬀer prescription drug coverage to new enrollees.
In order not to crowd out prescription drug coverage oﬀered by employers, there are tax-
free subsidies to those employers who provide prescription drug plans that are actuarily
equivalent to Medicare Part D.78 In January 2007, there were 6.9 million Medicare re-
cipients whose coverage was subsidized in this way (Duggan and Scott-Morton (2010)).
Alternatively, employers could decide to wrap around Medicare drug coverage. Individuals
enrolled in these types of plans are counted under Medicare Advantage Plans.
Those employees who had prescription drug coverage before the introduction of Medi-
care Part D simply received a letter from their employer that informed them that their
prescription drug coverage was creditable when Medicare Part D was introduced.
Veterans already had prescription drug coverage before the introduction of Medicare Part
D. As this is considered creditable coverage, there is no need for veterans to sign up
78 Companies receive 28 percent of covered charges between the deductible and an upper limit of $5,600
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for Medicare Part D, however, they can do so if they want.79 In 2006, about 2 million
Medicare beneﬁciaries received their prescription drug coverage through the Veterans
Administration, and about one million veterans were enrolled in a Part D plan (U.S.
Departement of Health and Human Services (2006)).
Medicare recipients who are also eligible for Medicaid were automatically enrolled in a pre-
scription drug plan with some option to switch plans afterwards. Medicaid recipients do
not pay any premium if they choose a plan with average or below average costs. They fur-
ther have no deductibles, no coverage gaps, and lower copays (Duggan and Scott-Morton
(2010)). In 2006, about 6.1 million Medicare and Medicaid recipients were automatically
enrolled in prescription drug plans. Additionally, about half a million Medicare and Med-
icaid recipients received prescription drug coverage through Medicare Advantage Plans
(U.S. Departement of Health and Human Services (2006)).
5.3 Hypothetical choice experiments
5.3.1 Real versus hypothetical choice experiments
In this section, we describe two types of data, real and stated preference data, which can
be used to analyze consumer preferences.
Since the seminal work of McFadden (1974), economists have used survey data on the
micro-level to analyze consumer demand. Each product is deﬁned as a bundle of charac-
teristics, for example in McFadden’s famous work on travel demand, each mode of travel
is deﬁned by the price and time of travel. Consumer preferences are deﬁned over these
characteristics, and the utility consumers obtain from buying a product depends both on
the product’s and their personal characteristics and tastes which can only be partially
observed by the researcher.80
In these consumer surveys, respondents were asked about their actual purchasing decisions
in real markets. The preferences researchers deduce from this information are called
revealed preferences because people reveal their preferences by making their choices. The
advantage of deducing preferences from consumers’ actual choices is that consumers spend
real money facing their actual budget constraints and therefore, the researcher may be
conﬁdent about making predictions from this type of data.
79 In fact, this may be beneﬁcial for some low-income veterans who are eligible for the Medicare Part D
low-income subsidy (Rupper et al. (2007)).
80 Some more information on discrete choice models can be found in section 5.5. A detailed description
on the concepts and developments of demand estimation is given in Ackerberg et al. (2007).5 What if everybody had a choice? 113
However, making predictions from observed choices has some important limitations.81
First, the attributes of products often exhibit little variation in real markets. For example,
in many markets, price varies very little over products as well as over time. In a statistical
model the researcher might therefore wrongfully deduce that consumer decisions do not
respond much to variations in price, when in reality prices do not vary much because
price elasticity is very high. Second, when forecasting demand for new products, revealed
preference data simply does not exist. The same holds true for certain public goods which
are not traded in the market. Third, choices might be observed for a certain group of
consumers only - as in the case of Medicare Part D. When drawing conclusions or making
predictions, for example what happens if a certain insurance coverage is extended to a
larger group of consumers, researchers may want to have variation not only in product,
but also in consumer characteristics.
To overcome these problems, individuals have been presented with hypothetical choice
tasks. In these tasks, respondents are asked to choose among alternatives from a choice set
whose attributes have been deﬁned by the researcher. In hypothetical choice experiments,
WTP is inferred from individuals’ choices. This allows the researcher to give estimations
on the overall utility of the alternatives as well as their attributes.82 For example, in
our data respondents are asked to choose between diﬀerent insurance contracts whose
prices vary randomly. The preferences elicited from this type of experiments are called
stated preferences in contrast to consumers’ revealed preferences from their real choices.
Hypothetical choice experiments have been used extensively in marketing and psychology.
Louviere et al. (2000) provide a comprehensive guide to the design, implementation and
interpretation of stated choice methods. In these experiments, suﬃcient variation can be
created. The choice situation can also be presented to a random sample of the population.
Additionally, the researcher can hold ﬁxed everything in the choice situation that he
wants to hold ﬁxed, and concentrate only on the product characteristics that he is really
interested in. This helps to overcome the well-known problem that prices are correlated
with unobserved product quality, which leads to biases in the estimate of consumer price
elasticity in real data.
Still, a concern about stated choice data is that consumers might behave diﬀerently in
the experiment than they do in the real world. As in every experiment, researchers are
concerned with the external validity of hypothetical choice experiments. The seminal
work in this regard is the paper by Mitchell and Carson (1989). Since then, many studies
81 Compare chapter 2 of Louviere et al. (2000) or chapter 7 of Train (2003).
82 In contrast, contingent valuation questions ask the respondent directly about their WTP. Avoiding to
ask respondents directly about their WTP reduces the risk of strategic manipulation of the answers
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have aimed at testing how WTP stated in hypothetical choice experiments diﬀers from
real WTP. Two studies from the health sector are Hanley et al. (2003) and Becker and
Zweifel (2008). Carson et al. (1996) have performed a meta-analysis comparing WTP
estimates from stated and revealed preference counterparts, and they ﬁnd that the stated
WTP is slightly lower than real WTP. The issues cited most frequently are that ﬁrst, the
sample drawn for experiments is not representative of the population. For example, a
sample of undergraduate students might not be a representative sample or the population
for eliciting WTP for public goods. However, the sample of respondents we use in our
data is a random sample of the relevant population. Second, when asked for their WTP
for public goods, respondents might strategically overstate their WTP or respond in a
way that they think is “politically correct”. We expect this to hold true more in the public
good setting and not in the insurance setting that we will apply the hypothetical choice
experiments to.
There are also beneﬁts from combining real and stated preference data, a method that is
sometimes also called data enrichment. The basic idea is to create variation in attributes
through the hypothetical choice data and to base the hypothetical choice experiments in
reality using respondents’ real choices.83
Figure 5.2 shows what type of choices, real or hypothetical or both, we observe for diﬀerent
consumer groups. For all consumers, we observe their hypothetical choices. For the active
deciders, whether or not they decided to take up insurance coverage in Part D, and for
those consumers who decided to enroll in Part D, we can observe their actual plan choices.
Figure 5.3 illustrates what share the diﬀerent groups have in our dataset. This gives us
diﬀerent possibilities of using our hypothetical choice experiment:
First, we can use the hypothetical choice experiment to analyze WTP for prescription
drug insurance taking into account the whole potential market.
Second, concentrating on the active deciders, we can test for external validity of our
hypothetical choice experiment - this is, we can try to answer the question of whether
consumers’ WTP expressed in our hypothetical choice experiment diﬀers from their actual
WTP (Carlsson and Martinsson (2001)).84
83 See Train (2003), chapter 7, and Louviere et al. (2000), chapter 8. Applications include Morikawa
(1989), Ben Akiva and Morikawa (1990), Hensher and Bradley (1993), Adamowicz et al. (1997),
Hensher et al. (1999), Brownstone et al. (2000), Bhat and Castelar (2002) and Walker and Ben-Akiva
(2002).
84 Some of the methodological factors concerning the combination of revealed and stated choice experi-
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Figure 5.2: Decision tree of consumer groups
Population
Active Deciders Passively enrolled
Non-participation Participation
Plan Choice
Figure 5.3: Consumer groups in the RPS
Third, we can estimate a joint model of both revealed and stated choices as for the active
deciders we observe both types of choices. This can help us to mitigate the weaknesses
and make use of the strengths of both types of data.5 What if everybody had a choice? 116
5.4 Data and descriptives
The Retirement Perspectives Survey (RPS) is a panel dataset of elderly U.S.-citizens that
is representative of the U.S. non-institutionalized population in terms of demographics and
socio-economic status. It is a research project conducted by Daniel McFadden, Joachim
Winter and Florian Heiss, based on a panel of individuals maintained by Knowledge
Networks, a commercial survey ﬁrm. Participants were provided with web TV hardware
which enabled them to answer the internet survey with their TV sets.
There are four waves of the survey:
 RPS-2005, conducted in November 2005
 RPS-2006, conducted in May 2006
 RPS-2007, conducted in March and April 2007
 RPS-2009, conducted in February and March 2009.
The following information was obtained from each respondent:
 Socio-economic characteristics, including household income, age, gender, ethnic
group, and education level85
 Measures of the respondent’s health (such as self rated health, chronic conditions,
functional limitations)
 Measures of the respondent’s prescription drug use (number of prescription drugs
taken, current and expected out-of-pocket costs for prescription drugs, names of
prescription drugs taken for some frequent health conditions like chronic pain, high
cholesterol or diabetes)
 Information on the respondent’s prescription drug insurance coverage
 Information on the respondent’s enrollment decisions, knowledge, and opinion re-
garding Medicare Part D
 Hypothetical choice experiments where respondents were given the choice between
insurance contracts with diﬀering levels of coverage (including no coverage) and
randomly varying premia
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 Some simple measures of risk attitudes and planning horizons.
There are several articles which use the RPS in order to analyze the enrollment decisions
of active deciders (Winter et al. (2006), Heiss et al. (2009a), McFadden et al. (2008), Heiss
et al. (2009b)). Heiss et al. (2009a) provide a detailed description of response behavior,
selection issues and the application of sampling weights. Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 are taken
from Heiss et al. (2009b). Table 5.1 shows how the sample of respondents and the response
rates developed over time. For our analysis, we are only interested in those individuals
eligible for Medicare, therefore we restrict the sample to respondents aged 65 and older in
2006. Table 5.2 shows how the RPS compares to the 2004 Health and Retirement Survey
(HRS) in terms of socio-economic characteristics and insurance status. The RPS seems
to reasonably mirror the HRS, even more in the weighted samples. However, we will not
use weights in our subsequent analysis.
Table 5.1: Sample selection criteria and response rates, RPS 2005-2009
Deﬁnitions and descriptive statistics of the variables used can be found in Table 5.3. Most
variables correspond to a question of the survey with the exception of expected drug costs
which was created by Winter et al. (2006) based on the respondents’ prescription drug
use and the price they would have paid for them over the counter. The idea is to elicit
the expected drug bill for each individual in the case of no insurance.
In 2006, the RPS sample in the relevant age group (aged 65+) consisted of 1,666 respon-
dents. 97 of them had to be excluded from the analysis because they did not answer the
questions on prescription drug insurance coverage. 56 percent of our sample are females.
Most of the respondents (about 38 percent) are between 65 and 70 years old, 28 percent
between 71 and 75, and about 33 percent are older than 75 years. Annual household in-
come was below $20,000 for about 23 percent, between $20,000 and $60,000 for about 58
percent of the sample and above $60,00 for the remaining 19 percent. About 13 percent5 What if everybody had a choice? 118
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics, HRS 2006 and RPS 2006
of respondents have less than high school education, while about 87 percent have high
school education or higher qualiﬁcation.
As to their health and prescription drug use, in 2006, when asked about the number
of diﬀerent prescription drugs used in the last month, some 10 percent did not use any
prescription drugs at all. About 29 percent reported having used one or two diﬀerent
prescription drugs, and about 61 percent of respondents reported having taken more than
three diﬀerent prescription drugs within the last month. Most of the respondents (about
40 percent) rated their health as “good”, 38 percent as “very good” or “excellent”, and only
22 percent said that they were in “fair” or “poor” health. Our estimated prescription drug
costs have a skewed distribution with a long tail, where a lot of consumers have quite low
costs and very few consumers have very high costs.
Table 5.4 shows how prescription drug coverage in the RPS compared to the total popula-
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groups.86 The most noticeable patterns regarding sociodemographic characteristics are
that ﬁrst, among veterans, the percentage of males is highest. Second, the groups with
the lowest incomes are, as expected, those on Medicaid or state programs, while those
with employer coverage or private insurance have rather high incomes. The latter groups
also tend to have received more education. The fraction of non-whites is largest for those
on Medicaid, for veterans or individuals who are covered by their employers.
Regarding health and prescription drug use, there are large diﬀerences among consumer
groups: Total drug costs in 2005 were much lower for those consumers who were without
prescription drug coverage before the introduction of Medicare Part D and who decided
to remain without coverage (see also Figure 5.4). The median of estimated annual pre-
scription drug costs for this consumer group is only $94, while it is about $1,567 for
the group with the next lowest median, those who were covered by an Medicare HMO.
The same holds true for the number of diﬀerent prescription drugs taken during the last
month - almost 40 percent of those remaining without coverage report not to have taken
any prescription drugs. Other groups whose prescription drug use in 2005 was relatively
low are those consumers with HMO or employer coverage, while consumers with cover-
age by either Medicaid or the Veterans Administration, but also consumers who bought
private description drug coverage, on average took many prescription drugs and had high
estimated costs.
Self reported health is likewise far better for those who remained without prescription
drug coverage than for any other group (see Figure 5.5). Veterans, beneﬁciaries eligible
for Medicaid or those who received coverage through state programs tend to be in poor
health.
5.4.1 The RPS hypothetical choice experiment
In the RPS 2006, a hypothetical choice experiment was conducted in order to elicit the
preferences for prescription drug coverage of all consumers, not just the active deciders.87
As the RPS focuses on questions on Medicare Part D and as all respondents in the
RPS 2006 have already answered the questionnaire in 2005, we expect respondents to be
familiar with the questions on insurance and Medicare Part D when taking part in the
hypothetical choice experiment.
86 Most diﬀerences between the other groups and the active deciders are statistically diﬀerent at the ten
percent level. Results of t-tests are not reported here.
87 A description of the RPS can be found in section 5.4.5 What if everybody had a choice? 120
Figure 5.4: Number of diﬀerent prescription drugs taken in 2005
Consumers were provided with a short introduction, in order to place our hypothetical
choice experiment in the context of Part D (telling them for example that the same
late enrollment premia would apply in the experiment as under the Part D regulation).
One part of the introduction for the experiment diﬀered depending on which group of
consumers was interviewed. The exact wording of the experiment can be found in the
appendix of this chapter.
Then the respondents were given a choice between four alternatives with randomly varying
premia:
 Basic Plan premium: $ PBi This plan covers all prescription drugs you currently
use and most of what you might need in the future. It has a deductible of $250, pays
75 percent of costs above $250 up to $2250, provides no additional beneﬁt until costs
reach $5100, and pays 95 percent of costs above that level.
 Enhanced Plan premium: $ PEi This plan is equivalent to the Basic Plan but
has no deductible. This means that the 75 percent coverage begins at the ﬁrst dollar
you spend on prescription drugs, up to $2250. Like the Basic Plan, there are no5 What if everybody had a choice? 121
Figure 5.5: Self-rated health status in 2005
additional beneﬁts until costs reach $5100. The Enhanced Plan pays 95 percent of
costs above that level.
 Premier plan premium: $ PPi This plan is equivalent to the Enhanced Plan, but
is does not impose a coverage gap between $2250 and $5100. So it pays 75 percent
of all costs up to $5100 and for 95 percent above that amount.
 No prescription drug insurance at all
Each respondent was presented with three diﬀerent hypothetical choice tasks. In the ﬁrst
round, everybody was presented with the same hypothetical prices, and in the second
and third round, prices were randomly assigned to the respondents. The upper panel
of Table 5.6 shows the premia that were assigned to the diﬀerent types of plans in our
hypothetical choice experiment, and therefore our hypothetical supply prices. For the
ﬁrst choice, premia were the same for all respondents. These premia closely resemble the
premia for all plans available in the market as constructed from Heiss et al. (2009a) with
the CMS plan ﬁnder. Note that the premia for the plans actually chosen by the active
deciders in the RPS, and therefore the prices in market equilibrium, are much lower than5 What if everybody had a choice? 122
supply prices, at least for basic and enhanced coverage. For the second and third choice,
premia were randomly assigned.
We ﬁnd large diﬀerences regarding the preferred plans when looking at consumer choices
in the ﬁrst hypothetical choice experiment where the prices were the same for everybody:
Those consumers who chose to remain without coverage in the real market also show a
much greater preference for less or no coverage in the hypothetical choices (see Figure 5.6).
The hypothetical choices of those having chosen stand-alone coverage and those who chose
HMO coverage are quite similar: A large percentage of consumers would prefer plans that
oﬀer more coverage than the Part D standard plan. This tendency is even stronger for
those consumers who were covered by their former employers or the Veterans Adminis-
tration and even more pronounced for those consumers who had private prescription drug
insurance or who were covered by state programs. Surprisingly, consumers on Medicaid
do not show a comparably low preference for plans with no deductible and gap coverage.
Figure 5.6: Hypothetical choices by consumer groups5 What if everybody had a choice? 123
5.5 Multinomial Logit Model
The multinomial logit model (MNL), sometimes also called conditional logit model, was
developed by Daniel McFadden in the mid 1960s in the context of so-called random utility
models (McFadden (1976)). It goes back to the work of Thurstone’s “Law of comparative
judgment” (1927), Marschak (1960)’s introduction of random utility models and Luce
(1959)’s description of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) axiom.
The idea behind the random utility framework (RUM) is as follows.88 A decision maker
i faces a choice among J mutually exclusive alternatives j. In our hypothetical choice
experiment, these alternatives represent diﬀerent prescription drug insurance contracts.
We want to explain what factors drive the individual’s choice. Since J is ﬁnite, the
models describing the individual’s choice are called discrete or qualitative choice models
in contrast to continuous or quantitative models. The choice set is exhaustive, which
means that all possible alternatives are included. In our case, the individual must also be
given the alternative to remain without prescription drug insurance.
We assume that the decision maker will choose the alternative with the highest (indirect)
utility Uij.89 Utility depends on characteristics
 that vary over alternatives only, for example the premium of the insurance contract
if it is unconditional on the insured’s characteristics
 that vary over the decision makers only, for example income or risk aversion
 that vary over both the decision maker and the alternatives, for example expected
drug costs when a speciﬁc insurance contract is chosen.
Some of these characteristics, the xij, are observed by the researcher. Vij = V (xij)
represents the observed or representative part of utility. Other characteristics of either
the alternatives or the decision maker are known by the decision maker himself, but
unobservable to the researcher. The inﬂuence of all unobservable factors is combined in
an error term eij. Therefore
Uij = Vij + eij; (5.1)
or, stated diﬀerently, the unobservable is simply the diﬀerence between the true utility
Uij and the representative utility Vij. Therefore, the distribution of eij will always depend
on the speciﬁcation that the researcher chooses for the observed part of utility.
88 See Train (1986) and Train (2003).
89 Utility that has been maximized under a budget constraint.5 What if everybody had a choice? 124
The particular choice model depends on the distribution that the eij are assumed to
follow. The assumption for the logit model is that the eij are independently, identically
distributed (i.i.d.) extreme value type I with density function
f(eij) = exp( eij)  exp( exp( eij)) (5.2)
and cumulative distribution function
F(eij) = exp( exp(eij)): (5.3)
Knowing that the decision maker will choose the alternative j that yields the highest
utility and knowing the distribution of the unobserved error terms, the probability that
decision maker i will choose alternative j can be expressed as:
Pij = Prob(Uij > Uik 8k 6= j) (5.4)
= Prob(Vij + eij > Vik + eik 8k 6= j) (5.5)
= Prob(eik   eij < Vij   Vik 8k 6= j): (5.6)
This choice probability does not mean that each decision maker’s choice is random - in
fact, from the decision maker’s point of view, his choice is deterministic: He will choose
the alternative that yields the highest utility. The choice is random only for the researcher
who does not observe all relevant characteristics. It is random in the sense that if the
researcher observes a sample of decision makers with the same observed characteristics,
he will still not be able to perfectly predict their choices because he does not observe some
of the relevant factors of this decision. If the sample size goes to inﬁnity, then the share
of people choosing alternative j will converge to Pij.90
Note that the individual’s choice depends on the diﬀerences in the utilities of the diﬀerent
alternatives. Therefore, each decision maker’s choice depends on the joint (cumulative)
distribution of the diﬀerences in unobserved utility between all alternatives. He will only
choose alternative j if the random variables eik   eij 8k 6= j are jointly below the known
value Vij   Vik8k 6= j. In the logit model, the eik   eij follow a logistic distribution with
distribution function
F(eik   eij) =
exp(eik   eij)
1 + exp(eik   eij)
: (5.7)
90 There exist also other interpretations of this randomness, as for example bounded rationality or quixotic
factors. A survey respondent in a stated choice experiment might for example simply make his cross
at a random alternative (Train and Wilson (2009)).5 What if everybody had a choice? 125






where the observed part of utility, Vij, is usually speciﬁed as a linear function of the
observed characteristics and a vector of unknown parameters, , that has to be estimated
Vij = 
0xij: (5.9)
Note that as only diﬀerences in utility matter, only characteristics that vary over alter-
natives can aﬀect the choice probabilities. The inﬂuence of characteristics that vary over
the decision makers can only be identiﬁed by interacting them with variables that vary
over the attributes.
Estimating discrete choice models requires some type of normalization because utility is
a cardinal variable which means that the level of utility is not identiﬁed. Neither adding
a constant to each alternative’s utility, nor multiplying utility by a constant will change
the observed choices. Therefore, some normalization is necessary when estimating the
unknown parameters . As Uij = Vij + eij, multiplying utility by a constant  means
multiplying the variance of the error term by 2. Normalization is therefore usually done
by normalizing the variance of the error term. In the case of the logit model, the variance
is normalized to 2=6. This means that the estimated s are estimates of the “real” s,






In other words, the “true” s cannot be identiﬁed separately from 2, and when we
compare the coeﬃcients from two data sources, we will never know whether diﬀerences
result from diﬀerences in the true parameters or the variance of unobserved factors.
If the model contains alternative-speciﬁc constants cj, these constants will represent the





is distributed i.i.d. extreme value with mean zero and variance 2=6.
The parameters of the MNL model are usually estimated by maximum likelihood. The
joint likelihood (over all individuals) of the observed choices is maximized with respect to
the unknown parameters.
One important feature of the multinomial logit model is the IIA property (Luce (1959)).
In the logit model, the choice between two alternatives j and k is independent of irrele-
vant alternatives in the sense that the ratio of the probability of choosing alternative j to5 What if everybody had a choice? 126
the probability of choosing alternative k is independent of all other alternatives and their
attributes. This property is caused by the relatively strict assumption that the errors are
independent of each other, which means that the unobserved parts of utility of the alterna-
tives are not related to each other. Expressed in terms of elasticities of substitution, when
one desirable characteristic of one alternative changes and this leads to an increase in the
probability that this alternative will be chosen, the result will be a proportionate decrease
in the probabilities that all other alternatives are chosen. This might not be realistic if
some alternatives are more similar than others. However, the residuals in the logit models
depend on the researcher’s speciﬁcation of representative utility. Therefore, the IIA will
hold if heterogeneity in the attributes and the decision makers is attributed to observed
characteristics. In other words, the logit model can capture heterogeneity due to observed
characteristics, while it cannot capture variation due to unobserved characteristics.
Several tests of the IIA property were suggested by McFadden (McFadden (1978) and
McFadden (1987)), Hausman and McFadden (1984), and Train et al. (1989). The test we
will use in this chapter is based on the test developed in Hausman and McFadden (1984).
The idea is to estimate the model twice: Once with the full set of alternatives, and once
with a subset of alternatives (where IIA is assumed to hold). The parameter estimates of
the full sample are consistent and eﬃcient under the null hypothesis that IIA holds, but
inconsistent if it fails. The parameter estimates from the restricted sample are consistent,
but ineﬃcient under IIA, and consistent even if IIA fails. Therefore, a standard Hausman
speciﬁcation test can be used. If the variance-weighted diﬀerence of the two estimates is
too large compared with the critical values of a 2 distribution, then the null hypothesis
of IIA is rejected.
There are some methodological issues concerning stated and revealed preference models
in the context of logit models (see Train (2003), chapter 7, and Louviere et al. (2000),
chapter 8): While the coeﬃcients in respondents’ utility functions should be the same
in both types of data, unobserved factors will diﬀer in stated and revealed preference
situations. We would expect that the real choices of respondents are aﬀected by many
more unobserved factors than stated choices. For the real choices, these might include
unobserved attributes of both the alternatives or the decision maker and measurement
error, while for the stated choices, there might be unobserved attributes of the decision
maker, factors that are speciﬁc to the experimental design and variables that are relevant
for the choice situation, but that have not been included in the experiment (Bhat and
Castelar (2002)).
Therefore, when estimating a joint model of the stated and revealed preferences, we want
to allow for diﬀerent scale factors SP and RP (Morikawa (1989) and Louviere et al.
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the scale factors are unobserved and can never be identiﬁed within one source of data, it
is the convention to normalize RP to unity such that SP represents the stated preference
relative to the revealed preference scale factor. One possibility to jointly estimate both the
model parameters and the (relative) scale factor is using a nested logit model (Bradley and
Daly (1992), Hensher and Bradley (1993) and Louviere et al. (2000)). The nested logit
model generalizes the MNL by relaxing the IIA assumption. In particular, alternatives
are grouped into subsets or nests, and the variances of the error terms (and therefore the
scale factors) are allowed to vary across nests. Therefore, artiﬁcially creating two nests
for each decision made, one that contains the alternatives from the stated and one that
contains the alternatives from the revealed preferences, allows estimating both the s and
the relative scale parameters.
5.6 Econometric results
Let the indirect utility that consumer i obtains from the insurance contract j be
Uij = V (aj;pj;yi;si;gi) + eij (5.12)
where aj are the attributes of the insurance contract of which we explicitly state pj, the
contract’s premium; yi is the income of the insured; si are socio-economic conditions;
and gi is the group of the population that the consumer belongs to, which might either
just reﬂect a diﬀerence in the status quo of the insurance91 or be some proxy for other
unobserved characteristics of the respondent.
The attributes of the insurance contracts are (compare also Table 5.3):
 Insurance: The contract provides prescription drug coverage with copayments, the
deductible and the coverage gap equal to the Part D standard beneﬁt.
 No deductible: The contract does not have the $250 deductible of the Part D
beneﬁt.
 Gap coverage: The contract provides coverage also in the coverage gap.
 Premium: Monthly premium in $.
We will proceed with our analysis as follows: We will ﬁrst analyze the hypothetical choices
from a random sample of the whole potential market. Next, we will analyze the real choices
91 Compare Becker and Zweifel (2008).5 What if everybody had a choice? 128
of the active deciders. Finally, we will estimate a joint model combining both real and
hypothetical choices.
Table 5.7 shows the MNL estimates of consumers’ hypothetical choices. Each consumer is
presented with three choices, and thus we use standard errors clustered by the individual.
The standard Hausman/ McFadden IIA test (see section 5.5) cannot be performed in this
case, because the assumption that the MNL estimator is eﬃcient under the null hypothesis
is violated with clustered standard errors. We instead implement Stata’s suest version
of the Hausman test (StataCorp (2007)). We assume that it is most likely that the IIA
assumption will be violated for the no coverage alternative. The p-value for the rejection
of the IIA assumption is at 8.3 percent, so we cannot reject IIA at either the 1 or 5 percent
level, but at the 10 percent level, we can. Thus, for a ﬁrst analysis, we stick with the
MNL model and the IIA assumption.
Our main interest lies in estimating consumers’ WTP for drug insurance with diﬀerent
levels of coverage where WTP is deﬁned as the amount of premium increase that exactly
oﬀsets the increase of an attribute by one unit (or in the discrete case, the amount of
premium that exactly oﬀsets being provided with the discrete attribute versus not being
provided with it), so that total utility remains unaﬀected:
WTP =  (attribute=premium): (5.13)
The ratio of two coeﬃcients can be interpreted directly in the MNL model as the un-
observed scale factors cancel out in this case. For illustration, Table 5.8 contains the
estimates of consumers WTP for selected equations. Our basic regression (1) shows that
the WTP estimated from the hypothetical choice experiments is $41.80 for basic, $66.57
for enhanced and $94.32 for premium coverage.
Regressions (2) and (3) show that WTP for basic insurance coverage is low for consumers
with either low expected drug costs or low income. By contrast, consumers demand
extensive coverage if they are currently in poor health, expect high future drug costs,
but also if they are more risk averse. These ﬁndings conﬂict with consumers’ real choices
where neither health nor socio-economic indicators prove signiﬁcant. A possible reason
for the discrepancy of regression results on hypothetical and real data is that the active
deciders are too homogenous, and that we need to consider suﬃciently heterogeneous
consumer groups in order to analyze patterns in these characteristics.
Hypothetical WTP in our base regression is somewhat higher than WTP for all observable
plans and a lot higher than WTP for the plans actually demanded by RPS respondents
(compare Table 5.6). In part, this is due to the fact that we observe real choices for the
active deciders only, and the hypothetical choices conﬁrm that WTP is signiﬁcantly lower
for the active deciders than for the passive participants (compare regression (4)). WTP5 What if everybody had a choice? 129
of the active deciders is at $30.30 for basic, $48.91 for enhanced and $63.33 for premium
coverage in the hypothetical choices which is much closer to actual market behavior.
Therefore, welfare estimates on the introduction of Medicare Part D based on the active
deciders only will signiﬁcantly underestimate welfare for the whole potential market.
Table 5.9 shows the MNL estimates of the real market decisions of the active deciders.
WTP estimated from the decisions of the active deciders is insigniﬁcant for prescription
drug insurance per se (compare Table 5.8). Consumers are willing to pay $5,19 for cover-
age without deductible and an additional $8.30 for gap coverage. These estimates seem
unreasonably low. This might be due to three reasons: First, 101 of our 469 active deciders
are consumers who decide to remain without prescription drug coverage. For this group,
WTP should be indeed below the lowest observed supply price. Second, insigniﬁcant
WTP for certain product attributes might be due to the fact that there is a high corre-
lation between attributes and prices. Third, for consumers who expect not to need any
prescription drugs and therefore have zero expected costs, WTP for insurance, whether
basic or more extensive, is either negative or insigniﬁcant. Only consumers with high drug
costs exhibit signiﬁcant and positive WTP. Fourth, we observe more product attributes
in the real market than in the hypothetical market. For example, gap coverage is either
provided for generics only or for both generics and brand-name drugs (see regression (3)).
In fact, WTP for gap coverage for generics only is not signiﬁcant, while it is $25.78 if both
generics and brand-name drugs are covered. Further, consumers’ WTP is lower for plans
with drug tiers and higher for plans with a mail-order option, and WTP decreases for each
top 100 drug that is either uncovered or only covered after authorization (See regression
(4)). We will mitigate the outlined shortcomings of a separate analysis of hypothetical
and real choices by estimating a joint model using both types of data.
As described in section 5.5, combining stated and revealed preference models allows us
ﬁrst, to make use of the whole potential market, second, to create variation in attributes
through the hypothetical choice experiments and third, to base respondents’ decisions in
reality by using the real choices of the active deciders. As described in section 5.5, we
can use a nested logit model in order to allow for diﬀerent scale factors in the stated and
revealed preference model (see Table 5.10). We restrict the scale parameter of the real
choices to be one. Stata does not report the scale parameter itself, but the dissimilarity
parameter 1=. First, note that the estimate of the hypothetical relative to the real
dissimililarity parameter is equal to 0.72. As we can reject the hypothesis that it is
equal to unity (unity lies outside of the conﬁdence interval), we can reject that the scale5 What if everybody had a choice? 130
















2  0:52: (5.15)
Therefore, the variance of the hypothetical data is about 52 percent of the variance of the
real preference data.
Estimated WTP from the combined choices is at $35.39 for the Part D standard plan,
$51.84 for enhanced and $72.39 for premium coverage. Note that these estimates are on
the one hand much more sensible than the unreasonably low estimates from consumers’
real choices. This might be due to the variation in the premia which we created in our
experiment. On the other hand, they are somewhat lower than the estimates from the
hypothetical choices. Therefore, combining real and stated preference data can help re-
searchers to make more reasonable predictions on how consumer welfare has been aﬀected
by a policy change. Further, we can include consumer groups in our analysis whose ac-
tual choices cannot be observed, but who have still been aﬀected by the reform. This is
especially important when we want to take into account the eﬀect of socio-economic char-
acteristics on demand, because taking the whole market into consideration, we observe
much more variation in these characteristics. Both make our results more generalizable
in order to predict the eﬀect of policy changes in other markets.
5.7 Conclusion
This essay has contributed to the discussion about Medicare Part D by using a hypo-
thetical choice experiment that was conducted using a random sample of the relevant
population to analyze consumer demand. Thus, the whole potential market has been
included in the analysis instead of restricting the focus to a small group of consumers
whose actual choices we can observe, the so-called active deciders.
We have found that willingness-to-pay for drug insurance is low for consumers with either
low expected drug costs or low income. By contrast, consumers demand extensive coverage
if they are currently in poor health, expect high future drug costs, but also if they are
risk averse. With the exception of drug costs, none of these variables prove signiﬁcant
when using the actual decisions of the active deciders only, because this group is too
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Further, demand for prescription drugs diﬀers signiﬁcantly between the active deciders
and other consumer groups who have also been aﬀected by the reform. WTP of the
passive participants is signiﬁcantly higher than that of the active deciders. Therefore,
welfare estimates of the introduction of Medicare Part D taking into account the active
deciders only might be too low.
As we observe actual choices for one group of consumers, we have estimated a joint
model using both real and hypothetical choices, thereby making use of the strengths and
mitigating the weaknesses of both types of data. The estimates of WTP of the joint model
seem to be most realistic regarding the prices we actually observe in the market.
So far, hypothetical choice experiments have mainly been used to create variation in
product attributes. We want to draw attention to the fact that they can be used to elicit
the demand of consumer groups whose choices cannot be observed in the actual market.
This becomes important when making predictions about the impacts of policy changes,
especially when we want to analyze how demand is aﬀected by consumers’ socio-economic
conditions.
As lessons from the introduction of Medicare Part D will be crucial both for deciding
whether to introduce universal health care in the USA and for the design of social in-
surance programs in other countries, analyzing how consumers behave in this market is
highly policy relevant. There has been substantial debate on the question whether the
U.S. government should have engaged itself further in individuals’ health care decision,
both in a regulatory and a ﬁnancial way. Therefore, researchers have been interested
how consumers’ welfare has been aﬀected by the introduction of Medicare Part D. In
particular, it is important to ﬁnd out whether the most vulnerable groups of consumers
have been reached by the reform. Our ﬁndings can help to make the ﬁndings from the
literature more generalizable to other populations and markets, because we do not restrict
our focus to a small group of consumers.5 What if everybody had a choice? 132
5.8 Appendix
5.8.1 The RPS hypothetical choice experiments
In 2006, the introduction for individuals without prescription drug coverage was:
“At the end of this year, you will be able to make new choices about your prescription
drug coverage for the next year.”
The introduction for those with Part D plans (whether stand-alone or HMO/ Medi-
care+Choice) was:
“At the end of this year, you will be able to make new choices about your prescription
drug coverage for the next year. You may stay in your current plan, you may switch
to another plan, or you may even elect to unsubscribe and not select any plan.”
The introduction for those covered through their employer or union, the Veterans Admin-
istration, private insurance or some other source was:
“Even though you have prescription drug insurance from other sources, we would
like to know what your choices would be if the only coverage you could get would be
through a Part D plan.”
The second part of the introduction was then the same for everybody:
“We are now going to show you some plans that have realistic features and premiums.
We are interested in what plan you would choose if these were your only options.
Speciﬁcally, on each of the following pages we will show you three plans that diﬀer
in coverage and premiums.
On each page, please report which of these options is the most attractive and which
is the least attractive. You will always have the option to choose none of these
three plans and thus have no prescription drug coverage (but then you would have
to pay higher premiums if you enroll later, according to current Medicare Part D
regulations.”
The actual choice task was as follows:
“Please consider a situation in which you would have no prescription drug coverage
from any other source. Imagine that these were the only three prescription drug
plans that you could choose from. You can also choose not to have coverage at all.”
 Basic Plan premium: $ PBi This plan covers all prescription drugs you currently
use and most of what you might need in the future. It has a deductible of $250, pays
75 percent of costs above $250 up to $2250, provides no additional beneﬁt until costs
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 Enhanced Plan premium: $ PEi This plan is equivalent to the Basic Plan but
has no deductible. This means that the 75 percent coverage begins at the ﬁrst dollar
you spend on prescription drugs, up to $2250. Like the Basic Plan, there are no
additional beneﬁts until costs reach $5100. The Enhanced Plan pays 95 percent of
costs above that level.
 Premier plan premium: $ PPi This plan is equivalent to the Enhanced Plan, but
is does not impose a coverage gap between $2250 and $5100. So it pays 75 percent
of all costs up to $5100 and for 95 percent above that amount.
 No prescription drug insurance at all.5 What if everybody had a choice? 134
Table 5.3: Variable description and descriptive statistics
No Part D Part D Private  Employer  Veterans
coverage stand-alone HMO
Observations 94 352 226 83 573 139
share 6.06% 22.68% 14.56% 5.35% 36.92% 8.96%
Total drug costs in $ (2005)
mean 1411.29 2766.98 2517.73 3268.08 2390.29 2908.36
1st quartile 0.00 834.99 685.39 1110.94 690.91 1204.36
median 93.79 1989.67 1567.16 2246.36 1878.80 2424.45
3rd quartile 1492.48 3335.78 3272.15 4056.73 3373.03 3940.83
Drug costs (2005)
costs=0 39.36% 9.94% 14.60% 3.61% 11.34% 3.60%
0<costs<=250 15.96% 6.53% 7.08% 8.43% 7.16% 6.47%
250<costs<=1000 9.57% 8.81% 11.50% 10.84% 9.77% 10.07%
1000<costs<=2250 20.21% 32.39% 30.53% 27.71% 29.49% 23.02%
2250<costs<=5100 8.51% 29.26% 24.34% 33.73% 31.24% 43.17%
costs>5100 6.38% 13.07% 11.95% 15.66% 10.99% 13.67%
Number of prescriptions (2005)
0 38.30% 9.94% 14.60% 3.61% 11.17% 3.60%
1 to 2 34.04% 29.26% 30.09% 28.92% 26.18% 20.86%
3+ 27.66% 60.80% 55.31% 67.47% 62.65% 75.54%
Number of prescriptions (2006)
0 31.51% 7.05% 10.84% 5.33% 7.97% 7.09%
1 to 2 36.99% 31.54% 29.06% 32.00% 29.48% 26.77%
3+ 31.51% 61.41% 60.10% 62.67% 62.55% 66.14%
Self reported health (2005)
excellent 20.21% 6.55% 8.41% 2.41% 6.46% 2.16%
(very) good 62.77% 72.93% 65.93% 75.90% 74.69% 71.94%
poor/fair 17.02% 20.51% 25.66% 21.69% 18.85% 25.90%
Self reported health (2006)
excellent 14.89% 5.68% 6.19% 3.61% 6.11% 4.32%
(very) good 69.15% 73.86% 69.91% 73.49% 73.12% 71.22%
poor/fair 15.96% 20.45% 23.89% 22.89% 20.77% 24.46%
Age group (2006)
<=70 32.98% 42.90% 34.51% 22.89% 42.06% 30.94%
70<age<=75 42.55% 24.72% 34.07% 27.71% 25.65% 31.65%
>75 24.47% 32.39% 31.42% 49.40% 32.29% 37.41%
Gender
male 35.11% 38.64% 32.30% 45.78% 42.58% 92.09%
female 64.89% 61.36% 67.70% 54.22% 57.42% 7.91%
Educational level
more than high school 38.30% 42.33% 38.94% 53.01% 53.23% 43.17%
high school or less 61.70% 57.67% 61.06% 46.99% 46.77% 56.83%
Income
<=20K 30.85% 28.41% 36.73% 21.69% 12.04% 30.22%
20K-60K 58.51% 55.97% 48.23% 59.04% 63.00% 56.83%
>60K 10.64% 15.63% 15.04% 19.28% 24.96% 12.95%
Risk
pay less than expected value 59.34% 52.03% 54.17% 55.42% 51.78% 52.94%
pay expected value 19.78% 22.38% 14.81% 22.89% 19.57% 19.12%
pay more than expected value 20.88% 25.58% 31.02% 21.69% 28.65% 27.94%
Hypotheticals: preferred plan
no coverage 49.45% 13.45% 12.27% 16.46% 9.11% 17.91%
basic 10.99% 23.10% 21.82% 12.66% 11.79% 17.91%
enhanced 25.27% 36.26% 31.82% 18.99% 35.54% 25.37%
premium 14.29% 27.19% 34.09% 51.90% 43.57% 38.81%5 What if everybody had a choice? 135
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Table 5.5: Descriptive statistics by consumer group
No Part D Part D Private  Employer  Veterans
coverage stand-alone HMO
Observations 94 352 226 83 573 139
share 6.06% 22.68% 14.56% 5.35% 36.92% 8.96%
Total drug costs in $ (2005)
mean 1411.29 2766.98 2517.73 3268.08 2390.29 2908.36
1st quartile 0.00 834.99 685.39 1110.94 690.91 1204.36
median 93.79 1989.67 1567.16 2246.36 1878.80 2424.45
3rd quartile 1492.48 3335.78 3272.15 4056.73 3373.03 3940.83
Drug costs (2005)
costs=0 39.36% 9.94% 14.60% 3.61% 11.34% 3.60%
0<costs<=250 15.96% 6.53% 7.08% 8.43% 7.16% 6.47%
250<costs<=1000 9.57% 8.81% 11.50% 10.84% 9.77% 10.07%
1000<costs<=2250 20.21% 32.39% 30.53% 27.71% 29.49% 23.02%
2250<costs<=5100 8.51% 29.26% 24.34% 33.73% 31.24% 43.17%
costs>5100 6.38% 13.07% 11.95% 15.66% 10.99% 13.67%
Number of prescriptions (2005)
0 38.30% 9.94% 14.60% 3.61% 11.17% 3.60%
1 to 2 34.04% 29.26% 30.09% 28.92% 26.18% 20.86%
3+ 27.66% 60.80% 55.31% 67.47% 62.65% 75.54%
Number of prescriptions (2006)
0 31.51% 7.05% 10.84% 5.33% 7.97% 7.09%
1 to 2 36.99% 31.54% 29.06% 32.00% 29.48% 26.77%
3+ 31.51% 61.41% 60.10% 62.67% 62.55% 66.14%
Self reported health (2005)
excellent 20.21% 6.55% 8.41% 2.41% 6.46% 2.16%
(very) good 62.77% 72.93% 65.93% 75.90% 74.69% 71.94%
poor/fair 17.02% 20.51% 25.66% 21.69% 18.85% 25.90%
Self reported health (2006)
excellent 14.89% 5.68% 6.19% 3.61% 6.11% 4.32%
(very) good 69.15% 73.86% 69.91% 73.49% 73.12% 71.22%
poor/fair 15.96% 20.45% 23.89% 22.89% 20.77% 24.46%
Age group (2006)
<=70 32.98% 42.90% 34.51% 22.89% 42.06% 30.94%
70<age<=75 42.55% 24.72% 34.07% 27.71% 25.65% 31.65%
>75 24.47% 32.39% 31.42% 49.40% 32.29% 37.41%
Gender
male 35.11% 38.64% 32.30% 45.78% 42.58% 92.09%
female 64.89% 61.36% 67.70% 54.22% 57.42% 7.91%
Educational level
more than high school 38.30% 42.33% 38.94% 53.01% 53.23% 43.17%
high school or less 61.70% 57.67% 61.06% 46.99% 46.77% 56.83%
Income
<=20K 30.85% 28.41% 36.73% 21.69% 12.04% 30.22%
20K-60K 58.51% 55.97% 48.23% 59.04% 63.00% 56.83%
>60K 10.64% 15.63% 15.04% 19.28% 24.96% 12.95%
Risk
pay less than expected value 59.34% 52.03% 54.17% 55.42% 51.78% 52.94%
pay expected value 19.78% 22.38% 14.81% 22.89% 19.57% 19.12%
pay more than expected value 20.88% 25.58% 31.02% 21.69% 28.65% 27.94%
Hypotheticals: preferred plan
no coverage 49.45% 13.45% 12.27% 16.46% 9.11% 17.91%
basic 10.99% 23.10% 21.82% 12.66% 11.79% 17.91%
enhanced 25.27% 36.26% 31.82% 18.99% 35.54% 25.37%
premium 14.29% 27.19% 34.09% 51.90% 43.57% 38.81%5 What if everybody had a choice? 137
Medicaid State Part  D Other Total
program unspecified  source 
Observations 49 18 14 21 1569.00
share 3.16% 1.16% 0.90% 1.35% 1.00
Total drug costs in $ (2005)
mean 3383.00 3526.57 1340.41 1851.85 2554.30
1st quartile 1110.94 685.39 122.77 93.79 685.39
median 2726.72 1388.86 898.17 1602.46 1878.80
3rd quartile 5109.45 4797.22 1574.03 2674.51 3338.37
Drug costs (2005)
costs=0 16.33% 5.56% 21.43% 23.81% 12.43%
0<costs<=250 2.04% 11.11% 7.14% 14.29% 7.52%
250<costs<=1000 2.04% 11.11% 21.43% 4.76% 9.69%
1000<costs<=2250 16.33% 27.78% 42.86% 23.81% 28.68%
2250<costs<=5100 36.73% 27.78% 0.00% 23.81% 29.38%
costs>5100 26.53% 16.67% 7.14% 9.52% 12.30%
Number of prescriptions (2005)
0 16.33% 5.56% 21.43% 23.81% 12.30%
1 to 2 8.16% 33.33% 35.71% 28.57% 27.21%
3+ 75.51% 61.11% 42.86% 47.62% 60.48%
Number of prescriptions (2006)
0 15.22% 0.00% 11.11% 26.32% 9.65%
1 to 2 13.04% 12.50% 44.44% 21.05% 29.39%
3+ 71.74% 87.50% 44.44% 52.63% 60.96%
Self reported health (2005)
excellent 2.08% 0.00% 7.14% 9.52% 6.83%
(very) good 41.67% 55.56% 85.71% 80.95% 71.09%
poor/fair 56.25% 44.44% 7.14% 9.52% 22.08%
Self reported health (2006)
excellent 2.04% 5.56% 0.00% 9.52% 6.12%
(very) good 55.10% 50.00% 85.71% 80.95% 71.83%
poor/fair 42.86% 44.44% 14.29% 9.52% 22.05%
Age group (2006)
<=70 48.98% 22.22% 35.71% 28.57% 38.37%
70<age<=75 30.61% 33.33% 21.43% 14.29% 28.36%
>75 20.41% 44.44% 42.86% 57.14% 33.27%
Gender
male 42.86% 27.78% 28.57% 42.86% 44.04%
female 57.14% 72.22% 71.43% 57.14% 55.96%
Educational level
more than high school 36.73% 33.33% 35.71% 28.57% 45.70%
high school or less 53.27% 66.67% 64.29% 71.43% 54.30%
Income
<=20K 61.22% 61.11% 28.57% 33.33% 25.05%
20K-60K 32.65% 38.89% 57.14% 47.62% 56.79%
>60K 6.12% 0.00% 14.29% 19.05% 18.16%
Risk
pay less than expected value 58.33% 58.82% 57.14% 42.86% 53.13%
pay expected value 22.92% 17.65% 14.29% 23.81% 19.78%
pay more than expected value 18.75% 23.53% 28.57% 33.33% 27.09%
Hypotheticals: preferred plan
no coverage 16.33% 5.88% 14.29% 26.32% 14.56%
basic 32.65% 11.76% 42.86% 26.32% 17.44%
enhanced 24.49% 23.53% 28.57% 36.84% 32.26%
premium 26.53% 58.82% 14.29% 10.53% 35.74%5 What if everybody had a choice? 138
Table 5.6: Market shares and premia of prescription drug plans in hypothetical and real choices
in 2006
Monthly premia in $
Hypothetical market Basic Enhanced Premium
First choice Fixed premium 30.79 37.88 50.33
Second and third choice Lowest premium 15.39 18.94 25.16
Highest premium 40.02 49.25 65.43
Real market Basic Enhanced Generics Generics and Brand
All available plans (Average premia) 30.75 37.92 48.13 61.88
Plans actually chosen in the RPS (Average) 17.00 26.60 46.10 60.80
Market shares in percent
Hypothetical Market Basic Enhanced Premium
All respondents 20.0 31.9 48.2
Only those with Part D  22.4 31.6 46.0
First choice All respondents 20.4 37.8 41.8
Only those with Part D  26.7 41.9 31.4
Prediction (Price available plans) All respondents 20.1 32.0 45.7 *
Prediction (Price chosen plans) All respondents 24.8 37.0 38.1 *
Prediction (Price available plans) Only those with Part D  22.8 31.8 45.4 *
Prediction (Price chosen plans) Only those with Part D  30.9 38.8 30.3 *
Real Market Generics Generics and Brand
All available plans 2006  34.0 50.6 12.9 2.5
Plans actually chosen in the RPS  36.3 54.3 4.8 4.6
* Price is the weighted sum of generics and generics and brand coverage, with the weights given by the market shares
Source: The prices and market shares of supplied plans are taken from Heiss, McFadden, Winter (2009)5 What if everybody had a choice? 139
Table 5.7: Multinomial logit analysis of hypothetical choices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Plan attributes
Reference group: no coverage
Premium -0.0263*** -0.0286*** -0.0298*** -0.0301*** -0.0311***
Insurance 1.100*** 1.233*** 1.487*** 0.913*** 1.256***
No deductible 0.652*** 0.766*** 0.618*** 0.561*** 0.459**
Gap coverage 0.730*** 0.435*** 0.384*** 0.435*** 0.200
Real coverage
Reference group: active deciders
Passive x insurance 0.456*** 0.413**
Passive x no deductible 0.249* 0.230
Passive x gap coverage 0.324*** 0.262**
2005 drug costs
Reference group: medium drug costs
No costs x insurance -0.571*** -0.604*** -0.581***
No costs x no deductible -0.603*** -0.593*** -0.580***
No costs x gap coverage 0.186 0.185 0.200
High costs x insurance 0.149 0.195 0.193
High costs x no deductible 0.102 0.174 0.170
High costs x gap coverage 0.472*** 0.406*** 0.400***
Socio-economic variables
Female x insurance -0.123 -0.107
Female x no deductible 0.160 0.167
Female x gap coverage -0.112 -0.110
Low income x insurance -0.223 -0.197
Low income x no deductible -0.245* -0.227
Low income x gap coverage -0.239* -0.219*
Higher education x insurance -0.116 -0.144
Higher education x no deductible 0.0652 0.0532
Higher education x gap coverage 0.136 0.122
SHRS poor/fair x insurance -0.116 -0.151
SHRS poor/fair x no deductible -0.170 -0.182
SHRS poor/fair x gap coverage 0.381*** 0.371***
Age > 75 x insurance -0.0322 -0.0352
Age > 75 x no deductible 0.116 0.118
Age > 75 x gap coverage -0.111 -0.108
Risk averse x insurance 0.100 0.114
Risk averse x no deductible 0.223 0.228
Risk averse x gap coverage 0.333*** 0.334***
Observations 6262 4604 4531 4604 4531
* denotes p<.1, ** denotes p<.05, and *** denotes p<.01 for a two-sided t-test (clustering by respondent)5 What if everybody had a choice? 140
Table 5.8: Willingness-to-pay for insurance attributes by consumer group
Insurance No deductible Gap coverage
Hypothetical choices
Basic MNL 41.80*** 24.77*** 27.75***
Passive 45.41*** 26.88*** 25.16***
Active 30.30*** 18.61*** 14.42***
Real choices
Basic MNL 0.91 5.19*** 8.30***
Combined model
Nested logit 35.39*** 16.45*** 20.55***
* denotes p<.1, ** denotes p<.05, and *** denotes p<.01 for a two-sided t-test.
Table 5.9: Multinomial logit analysis of revealed choices5 What if everybody had a choice? 141
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